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Abstract
Preference aggregation is a topic of study in different fields such as
philosophy, mathematics, economics and political science. Recently,
computational aspects of preference aggregation have gained especial
attention and “computational politics” has emerged as a marked line
of research in computer science with a clear concentration on voting
protocols. The field of voting systems, rooted in social choice the-
ory, has expanded notably in both depth and breadth in the last few
decades. A significant amount of this growth comes from studies con-
cerning the computational aspects of voting systems.
This thesis comprehensively reviews the work on voting systems (from
a computing perspective) by listing, classifying and comparing the re-
sults obtained by different researchers in the field. This survey covers
a wide range of new and historical results yet provides a profound
commentary on related work as individual studies and in relation to
other related work and to the field in general. The deliverables serve
as an overview where students and novice researchers in the field can
start and also as a depository that can be referred to when searching
for specific results. A comprehensive literature survey of the computa-
tional aspects of voting is a task that has not been undertaken yet and
is initially realized here. Part of this research was dedicated to creat-
ing a web-depository that contains material and references related to
the topic based on the survey. The purpose was to create a dynamic
version of the survey that can be updated with latest findings and as
an online practical reference.
Preface
The notions of preference and preference-aggregation are fundamental notions in many dis-
ciplines such as philosophy, social choice theory, mathematical decision theory, economics,
applied mathematics, and computer science. In computer science, the topics of “prefer-
ence” and “preference aggregation” are studied in Artificial Intelligence for coordinating a
society of software agents, in Databases for filtering the information retrieved in response
to queries, in Natural Language Processing for classifying different tokens in a text, and
in Complexity Theory for analyzing the computational complexity of various preference
aggregation methods.
Among Preference aggregation methods is the naturally appealing method of voting.
Recently, computational aspects of preference aggregation through voting have gained es-
pecial attention and “computational politics” has emerged as a marked line of research in
computer science with a clear concentration on voting protocols. The field of voting sys-
tems, rooted in social choice theory, has expanded notably in both depth and breadth in
the last few decades. A significant amount of this growth comes from studies concerning
the computational aspects of voting systems.
This thesis extensively reviews the work on voting systems (from a computing perspec-
tive) by listing, classifying and comparing the results obtained by the researchers in the
field. This survey covers a wide range of new and historical results yet provides a com-
mentary on related work as individual studies and in relation to other related work and to
the field in general. This work serves as an overview where students and novice researchers
in the field can start and also as a depository that can be referred to when searching for
specific results. Each chapter is concluded with comments and bibliographic notes and is
appended with separate bibliography. The entire thesis is appended with a comprehensive
index of subjects/terms and an index of authors that contains the names of over two hun-
dred authors of works in computational aspects of voting cited here1. At the end is a list of
all references sorted in alphabetical order by author (last) name. The list of references con-
tains more than two hundred items including books, book chapters, conference proceedings,
journal articles, technical reports, and other forms of published and unpublished work. A
comprehensive literature survey of the computational aspects of voting is a task that has
not been undertaken yet and is initially realized here.
1Names of authors of cited works appear in the authors index whether or not the names are explicitly
mentioned in the text.
1
2Part of this research was dedicated to creating a web-depository that contains material
and references related to the topic of the survey. The web-depository is a dynamic version
of the survey that can be updated with latest findings and used as an online practical
reference. Both the URL of the dynamic survey and the electronic copy of this thesis can
be accessed at: http://www.cs.rit.edu:8080/ms/static/index.html.
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Chapter 1
Preliminaries
In seeking private interests, we fail to secure greater collective interests. The
narrow rationality of self-interest that can benefit us all in market exchange
can also prevent us from succeeding in collective endeavors.
Russell Hardin (Collective Actions)
1.0 Prologue
This chapter establishes a foundation needed to read most of the following chapters. It
also provides an overview of the field and touches on some aspects that later chapters will
discuss in more depth.
Some mathematical concepts will be used throughout the chapters of this thesis. There-
fore, the first section of this introductory chapter defines these concepts. A reader who
is familiar with the basics of set theory and data structures may skip the Mathematical
Preliminaries section. The second section introduces Social Choice Theory and serves as
a link to the third section which is on the preliminaries of Elections and Voting Systems.
Examples and properties of voting systems are given in the fourth and fifth sections respec-
tively: Some Voting Rules and Properties of Voting Rules.
As an introductory and a preparatory chapter, it has an emphasis on terminology and
definitions with some few examples. The last section, however, concludes with Comments
and Bibliographic Notes.
1.1 Mathematical Preliminaries
1.1.1 Elementary Concepts of Set Theory
A set is an unordered collection of objects called elements and these elements must not be
repeated, in other words, a set contains distinct elements. A list, however, contains ordered
elements. A multiset may contain repeated elements where order is not important. In a list,
both order and multiplicity are significant whereas in a multiset multiplicity is significant
15
16 CHAPTER 1. PRELIMINARIES
but order is not. In sets, both are ignored.
Element x belongs to set S is denoted x ∈ S. A subset of a set S is a set whose elements
are contained in the set S (i.e., each of them belongs to S). Set A is a subset of S is denoted
A ⊆ S. If A is a subset of S then S is a superset of A by definition, and this is written
S ⊇ A. A proper (or a strict) subset of a set S is one that does not contain all the elements
of S. A is a proper (or a strict) subset of S is denoted A ( S. The empty set ∅ is the set
that contains no elements and it is a subset of any set.
The cardinality of a set S is equal to the number of elements in S and is denoted by ‖S‖
(or |S|, but since this notation is used to denote the absolute value of the argument, when
it is a number, we will avoid using it to stand for the cardinality of a set). The intersection
of two sets A and B, denoted A ∩B, is the set of elements that are common to both A and
B. The union of two sets A and B, denoted A ∪B, is the set that contains all the elements
of A and B together. The complement of a set S, denoted S′, is the set that contains all
the elements not in S (with respect to a defined universal set that contains all the elements
in the discussion’s universe of interest).
A partition of a set S is a set that contains subsets of S such that the intersection of any
two of these subsets is empty and the union of these subsets is equal to S. The Cartesian
product of two sets A and B, denoted A×B, is the set of all ordered pairs (x, y) where x
is an element of A and y is an element of B. A binary relation R on a set S is a subset of
the Cartesian product of S with itself (S2). xRy is an alternative expression to (x, y) ∈ R.
1.1.2 Some Data Structures
Graphs
A graph is simply a collection of points and lines. Formally, a graph is a tuple (V,E) where
V is the set of vertices or nodes (the points) and E is the set of edges (the lines) each
connecting some pair of vertices x, y ∈ V and is represented by an ordered pair (x, y) where
x, y ∈ V or simply by a collection or a set of two elements {x, y}. Different types of graphs
exist mostly depending on constraints on the set of vertices or edges. In this simple common
type of graphs, at most one edge (i.e., either one edge or no edges) may connect any two
vertices.
If the edges are directed, i.e., start in one vertex and end in another (or point to
Figure 1.1: A weighted directed graph.
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another), then the graph is a directed graph and edges in this case must be represented by
ordered pairs in which the first element indicates the source vertex and the second element
indicates the destination vertex. The direction of an edge is visually represented by an
arrow on one of the endpoints, the destination vertex. In a directed graph, directed edges
are sometimes referred to as arcs.
A cycle in a graph is a series of edges such that the source vertex of the first edge
coincides with the destination vertex of the last edge, in other words, the cycle edges form a
cycle by starting and ending in the same vertex. If edges are associated with numeric values
then the graph is a weighted graph and the weight of an edge is the number associated with
it. Figure 1.1 shows an example of a weighted directed graph where V = {a, b, c, d} and
E = {(a, b), (b, c), (c, d)}. The numeric labels on edges are the weights.
Binary Trees
A tree is a special graph that is connected and acyclic, in other words, there are no cycles
in a tree and every vertex is connected to every other vertex through some path. A unique
vertex is called the root of the tree, trees which such a designated node are also called rooted
trees.
A vertex y that is one edge away from a given vertex x, with x being closer to the root,
is called a child of x and x is called a parent node to y.
Vertices connected to the same parent node that are the same distance from the root
node are called siblings. The root vertex has no parent and leaf nodes have no children.
A binary tree is a tree in which every vertex has at most two children. The relative
position of a child to its parent vertex is significant in binary trees; each child of a vertex is
designated as its left or right child. A binary tree is balanced if and only if the difference
between the maximum and the minimum depth among the leaves is less than or equal to 1.
Figure 1.2 depicts an example of a binary tree (which is also balanced since all leaves have
depth 2).
1.1.3 Binary Relations and Rankings
A binary (i.e., consisting of two parts) relation is complete if and only if for any two distinct
elements x and y, either xRy or yRx (or both).
A binary relation is reflexive if and only if for all elements x in the set, xRx. It is
irreflexive if and only if for all elements x in the set, it is not the case that xRx (this is
written ¬(xRx) and it stands for the negation of xRx). Note that “irreflexive” is not the
same as “not reflexive,” in other words, one is not the logical negation of the other.
A relation R is symmetric if and only if xRy implies yRx for all elements x and y in
the set. A relation R is asymmetric if and only if xRy implies ¬(yRx) for x 6= y. Here also,
the properties symmetric and asymmetric are not logical negations of each other.
A transitive relation R is one that satisfies the following condition. For all elements
x, y, and z in the set: if xRy and yRz then xRz. If only this condition is satisfied then
the relation is transitive, in other words, this condition is both sufficient and necessary for
transitivity. A relation is negatively transitive if and only if for all elements x, y, and z in
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Figure 1.2: A binary tree.
the set: ¬(xRy) and ¬(yRz) implies ¬(xRz).
A binary relation is called a strict ordering or an irreflexive ordering if and only if it is
complete, irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. If the condition of irreflexivity is relaxed
then a complete, asymmetric, transitive, and negatively transitive binary relation is called
an ordering. An ordering is also referred to as a ranking in the context of elections. In that
context, the set of elements is called the candidate or alternative set. Implicitly, we assume
the existence of a voter set. The voters cast their votes which are a type of ordering on the
elements of the alternative (or candidate) set. The following sections employ the concepts
mentioned above in the voting/election context.
1.2 Social Choice Theory - an Introduction
As social choice theory preceded computational politics (and computational voting theory
in particular), some concepts in computational voting theory stem from former concepts in
social choice theory. Therefore, we start defining the basic terms in computational voting
theory by explaining the counterparts in social choice theory.
Social Choice Theory is a field of study that explores and investigates procedures for
aggregating individual choices in a society and producing a social choice that is based on the
choices of the members of the society. The theory of social choice is interested in fair and
uniform protocols for group decision-making. Group decision-making essentially involves
aggregation of individual preferences into one congregational outcome that best reflects the
individual choices and is the closest possible to a consensus opinion or is at least a globally
desirable outcome. In this context, a choice of an individual is viewed as a binary relation
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that compares two alternatives. When there are more than two alternatives, a choice is
expressed in terms of a number of binary relations each expressing the choice between a
pair of alternatives.
This setting implies a set of alternatives and choices are made to express the preferences
of individuals over the set of alternatives. These choices are expressed in terms of a binary
relation, which is mathematically defined as a subset of the Cartesian product of two sets;
in this case the set of alternatives and itself. This binary relation may be a strict prefer-
ence relation or a weak preference relation. A strict preference relation expression, denoted
xPy for the society and xPiy for an individual i, means that alternative x is preferred to
alternative y but alternative y is not preferred to alternative x. A weak preference relation,
denoted xRy for the society and xRiy for an individual i, implies that x is considered to
be as good as or better than y, or in fewer words: x is no worse than y. This can also be
denoted xPy or xIy where I stands for an indifference relation. In real life scenarios, it is
not unusual to have choices that are indifferent between two alternatives. This is the reason
for using a weak preference relation; it takes into account the possibility of indifference.
The weak preference relation R has a number of properties: completeness, symmetry,
and transitivity. R is a complete relation because for any two distinct alternatives, x and y,
either xRy or yRx (or both). It is also symmetric, xRx, since any alternative is as good as
itself. A property of a preference relation (at least for individual choice before preferences
are aggregated) is transitivity. This property states that if xRy and yRz then it must be
the case that xRz. It is irrational to describe x as no worse than y and y as no worse than
z but then describe x as neither as good as z nor better than z. This means that x is worse
than z. If we think of the weak preference binary relation as similar to the greater than
or equal relational operator on real numbers then the above irrational claim is similar to
saying that x ≥ y, and y ≥ z but x < z where x, y, and z are real numbers. Transitivity is
therefore the hallmark of rationality. Individual choices are expected to be rational; they
are expected to be transitive. This applies to the strict preference relation P as well. In
addition, P is also complete but it is asymmetric, so for any alternative x, x cannot be
preferred to or better than itself, this is denoted ¬(xPx).
Interestingly, individual rational choices do not necessarily imply a rational social choice!
This observation was first made by Condorcet in his analysis of the majority rule. Con-
dorcet noticed that when some transitive individual preferences are aggregated (using the
pairwise majority rule), the result is not a transitive preference. For example, consider the
following preferences of three voters {i, j, k} over a set of three alternatives {x, y, z}:
Voter i’s preferences are x > y > z, voter j’s preferences are y > z > x, and voter k’s pref-
erences are z > x > y.
Condorcet noticed that alternative x is preferred to y by a majority of votes (two votes—
from voters i and k—out of three), alternative y is preferred to z by a majority of votes,
but alternative z is preferred to x by a majority of votes also which clearly clashed with
transitivity since by transitivity x should be preferred by z in the aggregate vote. This
irrationality phenomenon in the majority rule is some referred to as the paradox of “cyclic
majority.” The cycle in the previous example can be seen by writing the aggregate prefer-
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ence as x > y > z > x.
Irrationality is a multifaceted phenomenon in vote aggregation. Intransitivity is one of
them. There are other voting paradoxes in addition to the Condorcet paradox explained
above. The conclusion is as before: rational individual choices do not imply rational collec-
tive choice. This remarkable result was shown—to apply in general and not only in the case
of the majority rule—by the pioneer of modern social choice theory and Nobel Prize winner
Kenneth Arrow [1]. This also draws attention to the importance of the way the individual
choices are transformed into a social choice. This is the role of a social preference function
(also called social choice procedure, and social welfare function, but the latter is rather an
obsolete term today).
A social preference function takes as input a collection of individual preference relations,
Rn, that contains a preference relation for each individual in the society. This collection
of individual preference relations is called a social preference profile Rn = (R1, R2, . . . , Rn)
where n is the number of individuals in the society and Rj stands for the preference relation
of individual j in the society.
The social preference function takes as input a social preference profile, Rn, and out-
puts a social preference relation R. A social choice function outputs only the most preferred
outcome (among the input alternatives) and hence is not informative about the position of
other alternatives in the final outcome. Both a social preference function and a social choice
function can be seen as special cases of a social preference correspondence which produces
a non-empty subset of outcomes (whether an outcome is a full ranking or is simply a subset
of alternatives). In the case of a social preference function, it produces a singleton: a set
of one preference relation. The term social welfare function stands for the same concept as
social preference function, but it is preferred not to use this term1. The domain of a social
preference function is the set of all possible social preference profiles which is the n-times
Cartesian product of R, where R is the set of all possible weak preference relations. This
Cartesian product is denoted Rn. Recall that weak preference relations are used instead
of strict preference relation mainly to take indifference choices into account. However, this
assumption of using weak preference relations to represent individual choices may vary ac-
cording to the model, scenario and intended goal of the discussion.
The range of social preference function is, therefore, the set of all possible weak pref-
erence relations R. The few sentences above are mathematically written as F : Rn → R,
where F stands for a social choice function. Arrow’s possibilibly theorem intended to inves-
tigate the possibility of defining or coming up with a social choice function under conditions
that he laid out as necessary and are thought of as the minimum requirements for fairness
and uniformity. Arrow postulated that those are reasonable pre-requisites and formulated
them in the following conditions:
1. Universal Domain which means that the domain should not be restricted to a subset
of all possible social preference profiles, that is, the individuals in the society are free
to make any choices as long as they are rational (complete and transitive).
1It was pointed out by Johnson that it is better not to use this term because it “confused some readers
and carried emotional baggage for others” [14].
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2. Nondictatorship: the choice of any one individual alone (with no regard to the choices
of other individuals in the society) must not solely decide the outcome of the function.
3. Pareto efficiency: this means that the social choice function must be consistent with
the unanimous choice: if all individuals make the same choice (e.g., prefer alternative
a to b) then the social preference relation must have the same choice (prefer a to b in
the previous example).
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: if two social preference profiles agree on a
subset of alternatives (e.g., all individuals rank a over b) then the corresponding social
preference relations should reflect the same choice in both cases (e.g., rank a over b)
regardless of the place of other irrelevant alternatives in the preference profiles, that
is, the social preference relation between two alternatives, say a and b, is not affected
by the position of some other irrelevant alternative, c.
Starting from these conditions or axioms and proceeding with logical reasoning, Arrow
showed that a social preference function does not exist. In particular, he showed that if a
social preference function satisfies the universal domain, unanimity, and independence of
irrelevant alternatives conditions then it must violate nondictatorship. Since that important
result, Arrow’s theorem is often referred to Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
We remark that Arrow’s theorem holds (as a theorem) given the conditions preceding the
proof. The proof is easily perceived as sound and logical, in technical terms, once we accept
the conditions of the Arrovian framework as axioms. Arrow’s theorem has drawn wide
attention and studies have been dedicated to investigating the conditions of the theorem,
its theoretical bearings and practical implications.
Interested readers should refer to Arrow’s original work [1] or to other work that explain
the axioms, the theorem, its proof, and the implications of this notable result, for example [3,
25] and [14, 9].
1.3 Elections and Voting Systems
1.3.1 Definitions and Terminology
An election E(C, V ) consists of a candidate set C and a voter set V . For the remainder
of this thesis, the set of candidates C and the set of voters V will be finite sets2. There
are different representation issues related to the input of the candidate and voter sets. The
assumptions and representations vary from one work to another. The set of candidates is
implicitly drawn from the votes in some cases and is assumed to be explicitly input in some
others. The voter set is sometimes explicitly input and in some treatments it is identified
by the list of votes (where each vote in the list represents a voter). In any case, most related
research work—specially that concerning complexity-theoretic aspects of voting systems—
assume that the votes are strict ordering over the alternatives. It is worth mentioning here
that orderings or qualitative representations in general are not the only form for expressing
2Nevertheless, in other contexts the set of candidates/voters is continuous.
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choices and preferences, quantitative and hybrid representations are also used to declare
preferences. Chapter 3 of the thesis will cover representation issues in more detail.
As an introduction, an election consists of a candidate set and a voter set. An elec-
tion system or a voting system (interchangeably) is a system that inputs the candidate
and voter sets and outputs a winner set3 according to a well-defined rule that ought to be
fair and uniform. However, with knowledge of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, this implies
the assumption of relaxing at least one of the conditions or desirable properties of a social
preference function (in this context: an election system or a voting system).
Although voting systems are similar to social choice functions, they are different in one
clear aspect: voting or election systems produce a winner set from votes whereas social
choice functions produce a ranking of all alternatives involved in the voting procedure. The
winner set is a subset of the candidate set and it is the set of top-ranked alternative(s). In
some scenarios, a unique winner is sought and so the outcome of the election is a single
member of the candidate set. In some cases, however, more than one winner is possible
through ties or some other definitions. It is also possible that the winner set is empty, this
is the case when there is no winner according to the election rule.
With regards to terminology, the terms “voting rule,” “voting procedure,” “voting
scheme,” “voting system,” and, “voting protocol” are usually used as synonyms in the
literature, but we draw the reader’s attention to the preference of using the term “rule”
or “function” when the emphasis is on the input-output relationship or the main aspect,
or purpose of the rule being studied. On the other hand, the terms “procedure,” “sys-
tem,” and “scheme,” should be used when the emphasis is on the mechanism and steps
taken to transform the input into an output. In addition, Conitzer [5] pointed out a similar
note regarding the use of the term “voting protocol” in comparison with “voting rule.” He
mentions that the word “protocol” is used to further indicate “procedural aspects such as
the manner in which the voters report their ranking (e.g., whether all voters submit their
rankings at the same time or not)” [5].
1.3.2 Some Voting Rules
This section briefly lists a number of common and known voting rules. We will revisit
some of these rules and study them in more detail in following chapters, where different
computational aspects will be discussed in other contexts. Note that this list contains
mostly the voting rules that will be discussed in later chapters (which includes most widely
known and used rules). For an extensive list of voting methods, their classification, and
properties of each, please see [10].
• Majority: the common simple rule by which a winner is a candidate who is chosen
(ranked first) by a majority of voters. The term “simple majority” means“more than
half of the voters.” Very often, the term majority is used to stand for simple majority.
It should be clear from the context whether a rule is a mojority or the simple majority
3There may be more than one winner.
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rule. The simple majority rule is the unique rule that is anonymous, neutral, and
strongly monotonic [4]. These terms will be defined later under Properties of Voting
Rules.
• Plurality: the well-known rule by which a winner is a candidate who is ranked first
by a plurality of voters. A plurality can simply be the majority or it can refer to some
other group of voters that has the most influence on the outcome of the election (even
if it is not the largest in number, i.e., the majority). A candidate wins by plurality if
he gains more votes (by number or weight) than other candidates but the number of
votes this candidate gets is not necessarily the simple majority of the votes.
• Borda Count: the rule (named after the French mathematician Jean-Charles de
Borda) by which each candidate receives points according to his/her position in the
voters ordering, where the candidate who is placed first gains more points than the
candidate who is placed second and so on. The points are added and a candidate with
the maximum number of points wins. Usually the top candidate in a vote is awarded
m− 1 points, where m is the number of candidates, and the least preferred candidate
gets 0 points.
• Approval: in approval voting, each voter specifies the candidates he/she approves, a
candidate with the largest number of approvals wins. In approval voting, voters vote
only once but a voter can vote for more than one candidate.
• Veto: the rule which is used to eliminate least preferred candidates. A candidate
with the fewest number of vetoes wins4.
The previous voting rules belong to a family of voting rules called scoring rules or po-
sitional scoring rules. In all of these rules, a vote is represented by a vector of integers
~α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm), where α1 is the number points that goes to the candidate placed first
in the vote, α2 is the number of points that goes to the candidate placed second and so on.
For example, in the Borda rule, α1 = m− 1 and αm = 0.
Ties can occur for different voting rules (at various stages of the rule for multistage rules).
There are various ways for handling the issue of ties in elections. Adding another round
of the same rule to determine the winner—if more than one candidate perform equally—is
one example of tie-breaking technique. In fact, different tie-breaking rules correspond to
distinct voting rules. Tie breaking can significantly affect the outcome of the election and
also the computational complexity of the voting rule. In the following chapters, we will
refer to the tie-breaking rule used when applicable. For most of the works covered in the
survey, authors specify whether the voting method is a single-winner or multiple-winner
method and what tie-breaking rule is used if a unique winner is to be elected. In some
cases, however, a voting rule is studied in a general perspective without specifying what tie
4The veto method can also be thought of as similar to the so called “antiplurality” or “negative plurality”
method. Since in antiplurality, a voter essentially votes for all but one candidate, i.e., the points in the
vote/antiplurality go against the least preferred candidate. The use of either term will follow from the
context.
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handling procedures is used (in effect, ignoring the issue of ties or assuming no ties for the
purpose of the analysis).We continue with more voting rules:
• Plurality with run-off : as its name suggests, this rule is similar to the plurality rule
except that it proceeds in two rounds. In the first round, all candidates except the
top two—according to their plurality scores—are eliminated and the votes favoring
the eliminated candidates are transferred to the top two candidates as specified in the
votes. A second round, the runoff, determines the winner.
• Single transferable vote: this rule consists of m− 1 rounds, where m (as used
throughout this chapter), is the number of candidates. In each round, the candidate
with the lowest plurality score is eliminated and the votes for this candidate are
transferred to the remaining candidates as specified in the vote. Note that a vote is a
complete ordering over the candidates, so even after excluding some candidates, the
votes favoring those candidates can still be used to rank the rest of the candidates.
• Condorcet: the Condorcet rule or Condorcet method is named after the Marquis de
Condorcet, a French mathematician and philosopher. In this method, published in
his “Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Decisions”
in French [17], the winner is the candidate who beats all other candidates in pairwise
elections held to compare one pair of candidates at a time. For example, consider the
election (C, V ) where C = {a, b, c} and V = {1, 2, 3, 4}, (here, V is explicitly the set
of voters), and the voters vote as follows: voter1 : a > b > c, voter2 : a > c > b,
voter3 : b > a > c, voter4 : c > a > b. Consider candidates a and b, a is preferred to
b by three voters so a beats b. Now consider candidates a and c, a is preferred to
c by three voters so a beats c. So a beats other candidates by a strict majority of
votes (3 out of 4) so a wins this election by the Condorcet method. Unfortunately,
this rule does not guarantee finding a winner. Consider the following example where
C = {a, b, c}, V = {1, 2, 3} and the preferences of the voters are as follows: a > b > c,
b > c > a, and c > a > b. Every candidate beats one of the other candidates by a ma-
jority (two thirds) of votes. This example illustrates the so called Condorcet paradox
(although this is not technically a paradox, the word “paradox” is used here to de-
scribe the counterintuitive observation that individual choices were rational, the rule
is simple, yet the output (the social choice) is not rational) which was mentioned ear-
lier. There are many other interesting observations related to the Condorcet method,
reference [14] addresses some of these.
• Sequential Pairwise Voting: this rule proceeds as a sequence of head-to-head
competitions. The order is set in advance, this is also referred to as the agenda.
If a candidate wins the current competition, that candidate goes to face the next
candidate on the preordered list. For example if the agenda is: a, b, c, (where a, b, and
c comprise the candidate set) then a and b compete with each other first, then the
winner competes with c. If two candidates tie at one stage, then each competes with
the next candidate. The winner of the last pairwise comparison is the winner of the
overall election.
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• Cup (or Binary Voting): this rule is represented using a balanced binary tree.
Leaf nodes of this binary tree represent candidates (who are assigned to leaf nodes
using some schedule or using randomization, in the case of a randomized candidate-
assignment to leaf-nodes the rule is called Randomized Cup). The parent of two
leaf-nodes is the winner of the pairwise election of the two leaf nodes. The assignment
of winners to non-leaf nodes proceeds this way until we reach the root node which is
the winner of the election.
All of the rules listed above are typically unique-winner methods (except for Condorcet’s
rule which by definition always elects a single winner if one exists or no winner if the
Condorcet winner does not exist). The next four rules are multi-winner rules. Furthermore,
these four rules are k-winner rules. The number of possible winners k is fixed before an
actual election takes place:
• k-Approval: A special case of approval voting is the k-approval rule in which the k
candidates with the k largest numbers of approvals win.
• Bloc (a.k.a. block): in bloc voting, each voter gives one point to each one of k
candidates that the voter wants to elect as winners. The k candidates with the most
points win.
• Cumulative: in cumulative voting, each voter distributes a fixed number of points
among the k candidates. The k candidates who gain most points win. The distribution
of points among candidates can be thought of as a way to express the intensity of a
vote, since in addition to voting for the favorite k candidates, points are distributed
among these k candidates such that the most preferred gets most points and the
least preferred, although among the preferred candidates, gets the smallest number
of points. It is argued that cumulative voting is especially interesting because it gives
minorities a better chance for representing their preferences [4] .
• Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV): in this voting rule, each voter gives one
point to a favorite candidate, the k candidates with most points win the election.
For the following rules we need to define N(x, y). Let x and y be two candidates and let
N(x, y) be the number of votes preferring x to y.
• Maximin (a.k.a. Simpson): the maximin score of a candidate x is denoted by s(x)
and is given by s(x) = miny 6=xN(x, y), that is, x’s maximin score is the lowest score
it gets in any pairwise election where a pairwise election score is equal to the number
of voters who prefer x over the opponent. The larger the maximin score, the higher
the candidate is ranked.
• Copeland (a.k.a. Tournament): the Copeland score of a candidate is the number
of pairwise elections that the candidate wins minus the number of pairwise elections
the candidate loses5 [20, 21] . The global election proceeds through pairwise elec-
tions for each pair of candidates in turn. A candidate gets 1 point when defeating
5The Copeland score of a candidate is the sum of the pairwise elections that the candidate wins minus
the sum of the pairwise elections he/she loses, or simply it is the sum of the pairwise elections that the
candidate wins. If two candidates tie in a pairwise competition, then neither gets a point.
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an opponent in a pairwise election, -1 point when losing and 0 points in case of a
tie. Alternatively, the Copeland rule can be described using N(x, y) as follows: for
any two candidates x and y, let C(x, y) = 1 if N(x, y) > N(y, x), C(x, y) = 1/2 if
N(x, y) = N(y, x), and C(x, y) = 0 if N(x, y) < N(y, x). The Copeland score of a
candidate s(a) = Σy 6=xC(x, y). In either cases, candidates are ranked by their scores;
the higher the score, the higher the candidate is ranked.
• Llull’s rule is defined similarly as Copeland rule except for tie-breaking. In this
rule, proposed by Ramon Llull—a Catalan writer and philosopher from the thirteenth
century—if two candidates tie then each one of them gets a point [11] .
• Bucklin6(a.k.a. Grand Junction system7): In this rule, if a candidate uniquely
gets a majority of first choice votes, then that candidate is the winner. Otherwise,
if a candidate has a majority of first and second choice votes, that candidate is the
winner. Otherwise, if a candidate has a majority of first, second, and third choice
votes, then that candidate is the winner, and so on. If two candidates get a majority
at the same stage of the rule, then the candidate with the larger total at that stage
is the winner. Alternatively, for any candidate i and integer l, consider the number
of voters that rank i among the top l candidates, if a voter ranks l candidates as top
candidates, then l is increased repeatedly until some candidate is ranked among the
top candidates by a majority of voters.
A Condorcet-consistent rule is a voting rule electing the Condorcet winner whenever
there is one, however it finds winners that are closest to being Condorcet winners if the
Condorcet method does not output one. Closeness is measured in terms of the distance
between the current voters profiles and the profiles that yield a Condorcet winner under the
condition of making minimal changes. These changes try to remove the “inconsistencies”
(induced by conflicting preferences) in the votes so that a winner can be found. The following
rules are Condorcet-consistent:
• Dodgson’s rule: a voting rule proposed in 1876 by the mathematician and writer
Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) which reemerged in [2] and summarized
later in [20] . The election is won by the candidate(s) who is (are) closest to being a
Condorcet winner where each candidate is given a score that is equal to the smallest
number of exchanges of adjacent preferences in the voters’ preference orders that
are needed to make the candidate a Condorcet winner (with respect to the resulting
collective preference profile). The candidate (or candidates in the case of a tie) with
the lowest score is (are) the winner(s).
• Kemeny’s rule: a voting rule proposed by Kemeny [15, 16]. Kemeny’s rule is a pref-
erence aggregation rule that consists of aggregating n individual preference profiles
into a collective profile (called Kemeny consensus) being closest to the n profiles, with
6A formal definition of Bucklin rule appeared in [6] and another definition appeared in a survey of voting
methods available at:
http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/vm/survey.htm
7Named after Grand Junction, (Colorado,) the city where the Bucklin rule was first proposed.
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respect to a distance which is the sum, for all voters, of the numbers of pairs of alter-
natives on which the social profile disagrees with the voter’s profile. A Kemeny-rule
winner is a candidate who is ranked first in one of the Kemeny consensus. Kemeny’s
voting rule was shown to be the unique rule that is neutral, consistent, and Condorcet
consistent [30]. These properties are defined in the following section.
• Young’s rule: a voting rule introduced by Young in 1977 as an extension to the
Condorcet rule [31]. A winner is a candidate who becomes a Condorcet winner after
removing the least number of votes, these votes can be thought of as the votes which
cause the inconsistencies or ties that prevent having a Condorcet winner (compare
this to the following observation about Plurality: after removing a number of votes,
a winner is the candidate who is placed first in all of the remaining votes).
• Black’s rule: suggested by Black in 1958 [2] to recognize the importance of the
Condorcet criterion yet exploit the advantages of the Borda count. Black’s rule elects
the Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise the winner under this rule is the
candidate with highest Borda count.
Another rule that attempted to avoid the Condorcet paradox is the following:
• Slater rule: a preference aggregation rule that aggregates n individual profiles into a
collective profile (called Slater ranking) such that the number of pairs of candidates
on which the final ranking disagrees with the majority vote is minimized. Of course,
more than one Slater ranking is possible.
1.3.3 Properties of Voting Rules:
Criteria for Evaluating Voting Rules
The following list contains some properties that are considered when evaluating a voting
rule:
• Anonymity embodies the notion of treating voters equally. A voting rule is anony-
mous if the outcome of the election remains the same under any permutation of the
votes/voters. So if voter 1 and voter 2 switch their votes then the outcome is the
same, what really matters is the vote (and its weight), who casts the vote is not a
factor in determining the outcome. Therefrom is the link between anonymity and the
treating voters equally.
• Neutrality captures the notion of treating candidates equally. For example, if the
preferences expressed in the votes remain the same8 and candidates a and b switch
their names, then the outcome of a neutral voting rule—under this change—will be
identical to the outcome of the original election except with positions a and b also
switched. This shows that the relative ranking of a and b is unaffected by their names
and is only determined by the preferences of voters.
8Of course for the preferences to be the same this change is also expressed in the votes by replacing every
a with b and every b with a in the original votes.
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• Monotonicity (a.k.a. Positive Response) stands for the property of maintaining
a candidate’s position if he/she gains more support from voters, under the condition
that the relative order of other candidates remain the same. If gaining more support
from voters may cause the candidate to be ranked lower or to lose under a voting
rule then that voting rule is not monotonic. Strong monotonicity implies that ranking
a candidate higher in the votes (with relative order of other candidates unchanged),
must result in ranking the candidate higher in the social ranking.
• Strong Monotonicity implies monotonicity with the addition that gaining more
support (strictly) improves the position of a candidate.
• Pareto Efficiency resembles to the principle of unanimity when all voters agree on
the relative ranking of some candidates. For example, if all voters prefer candidate a
to candidate b then the outcome of a Pareto-efficient voting rule also prefers a to b.
This is also linked to the term Pareto-optimality and the condition that if a candidate
is ranked lower than some other candidate by all voters, then that candidate never
wins under a Pareto-efficient (or Pareto-optimal) voting rule. This property is named
after Italian welfare economist Wilfredo Pareto.
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) has already been defined as a
condition of a social preference function in the previous mention of Arrow’s theorem.
For voting rules, this criterion can be rephrased to mean whether a voting rule outputs
the same result if non-winning (irrelevant) candidates are added or removed.
• Non-dictatorship which is a universally agreed-upon condition for acceptable voting
rules. This condition says that no voter alone can determine the outcome of the
election regardless of the preferences of other voters. Non-dictatorship is typically an
implied condition for all voting rules.
There are other properties/criteria used to evaluate voting rules such as:
Condorcet-Consistency (or Condorcet Criterion) which is another property of vot-
ing systems (though not necessarily viewed as an applicable criterion when considering all
voting systems). A Condorcet-consistent rule is one that declares as winner the Condorcet
winner if there exists one. Since the Condorcet-method is based on binary (pairwise) com-
parisons, the Condorcet criterion may not apply to voting systems where the ranking is not
merely based on pairwise comparisons.
Extended Condorcet Criterion (ECC) was proposed by Truchon in 1998, this crite-
rion extends the Condorcet criterion to a partition of the set of alternatives into two subsets
C1 and C2, such that for any x ∈ C1 and y ∈ C2, if the majority prefers x to y, then x must
be ranked above y in the final ranking [28]. This criterion extends the Condorcet criterion
in the sense that the latter ranks an individual alternative x above y if the majority of
voters prefers x to y, and in the extended Condorcet criterion, if the set of alternatives can
be partitioned such that all alternatives in a subset C1 of the partition are preferred to all
alternatives in other subsets then C1, as a subset of alternatives, should be ranked higher
than other subsets.
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Consistency if the set of voters is split into two disjoint sets and each set votes separately
and elects the same candidate(s) as winner(s) then the voting rule is consistent if the result
of the overall election, where voters of the two subsets vote together as a single set of
voters, declares the same winner(s) as the two disjoint elections. Formally, this is denoted
as E(V1, C) ∩ E(V2, C) ⊆ E(V,C) where (V1, V2) is a partition of the voter set V .
Strong Consistency as the name suggests is a strong form of consistency. A voting
rule is strongly consistent if for any partition of the voter set V into V1 and V2 then
E(V1, C) ∪ E(V2, C) = E(V,C). In other words, the winner of the overall election is inde-
pendent of the “subelection” in which he/she wins.
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference which requires that if a candidate c is a winner
of some election then that candidate is also a winner of any election where the candidate
set is a subset—containing c of course—of the original set [24].
Path Independence is satisfied by a voting system if for any voter set V and candidate
set C, the outcome of the election E(V,C) is the same as the outcome of E(V, E(V,C1) ∪ C2),
where C1, C2 form a partition of C [23, 24].
1.4 Comments and Bibliographic Notes
• A related topic that has not been addressed here is the topic of ower indices. For
more on the theory and mathematics of power indices, see [26]. We note the rela-
tive sparseness of studies on this subject, in comparison to the multitude on voting.
However, the reader is referred to [13, 18, 19, 29, 12] as examples of progress in this
direction.
• In this chapter, we have briefly discussed Arrow’s theorem and the phenomenon of
cyclic majorities that are both considered among the paradoxes of voting. More on
voting paradoxes can be found in [7, 22, 27].
• For more on the axiomatic foundation of ranking and the mathematics of voting,
see [16] and [8]. For rigorous mathematical definitions of voting rules and their prop-
erties see [4] and for a summary analysis of voting procedures see [21].
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Chapter 2
Classification of Related Work
2.0 Prologue
The classification of work related to the computational aspects of voting can be approached
in different ways. An approach typically depends on the perspective, the discipline the
classification is based on, and the broadness of the coverage.
Since this is the first survey of the topic computational aspects of voting systems as
such, and since classification of related work is one of the main contributions of a literature
survey, no classification of topics in computational aspects of voting systems, as a field, has
been proposed yet.
This chapter provides a list of possible classifications, and concludes with the classifica-
tion adopted in the organization of this survey.
2.1 Mathematics-based Classification
A possible classification is one that is based on the mathematical tools, theories and tech-
niques used in a work. There are basically two different models discussed in social choice
theory: discrete models and spatial models.
Problems in discrete models are tackled using techniques from discrete mathematics and
logic, whereas spatial models draw heavily from calculus of continuous sets, real analysis
and geometry. In addition to these two approaches, statistical methods are also used to
study various issues in voting and social choice.
Most of voting aspects discussed in this thesis fall in the category of discrete models.
Welfare economics topics, on the other hand, fall mostly in the category of spatial continuous
models. Therefore, this mathematics-based classification is suitable for an overall classifica-
tion of social choice theory and applications, which encompasses other topics besides voting.
This classification was adopted in a work presenting social choice theory and research
by Johnson [2]. Although the classification was not explicitly set forth, it was reflected in
the sectioning of this broad albeit introductory brief paper.
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2.2 Direction
Computational aspects of voting systems comprise a topic that clearly combines both com-
puter science and social choice theory, in particular via voting.
Related work has two main directions: The first direction goes from computer science
to social choice theory. Work in this direction applies knowledge from computer science to
solve classical problems in social choice theory. Mostly, Artificial Intelligence- and Com-
plexity Theory-based analyses of voting systems is found in this direction.
The second direction goes the other way, from social choice theory to computing. Work
in this direction imports concepts and techniques from social choice theory to solve prob-
lems originally arising in computer science.
The next two chapters of this thesis are dedicated to surveying work in the first direction
while the last two chapters present work going mainly in the second direction except for
some parts of the last chapter (on electronic voting) that combines the two directions in
balance.
2.3 Analysis versus Design
Studies on voting systems can also be categorized into studies on existing systems and stud-
ies on designing new systems.
The first category includes studies on properties of voting systems, votes and preferences
and how to represent them, computational complexity of existing voting systems and related
problems, impossibility and impracticality results, approximation and heuristic algorithms
for solving problems pertinent to known voting schemes, dichotomy results, applications of
known voting rules in different computing-related disciplines, etc.
The second category includes topics as broad as mechanism design and axiomitiza-
tion of voting procedures and related topics, and as specific as dichotomy criteria, meta-
characterization of voting systems and proposals for designing reliable voting schemes.
The classes according to this classification, however, can be argued to be not clearly
distinct. The two categories intersect at some topics, for example dichotomy results derived
to apply to existing systems can also be used as criteria for designing new systems. Also,
proposals for designing new systems with desirable properties are sometimes mere modi-
fications of existing ones. Even the very impossibility and impracticality results derived
from observations of currently used systems can be thought of as a step towards formalizing
criteria for designing new acceptable systems.
2.4 MCDM vs. DMU vs. Social Choice
Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM), Decision Making under Uncertainty (DMU),
and Social Choice (SC) can be viewed as three broad classes of topics within Decision Mak-
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ing. This classification was brought to the author’s attention while reading a paper “On
the limitations of Ordinal Approaches to Decision-making” [1].
Although this classification reasonably divides problems in decision making, individual work
often combines more than one of these headings. It is very common to find work discussing
social choice issues that is also considered a work in MCDM.
Much of the work surveyed here is pertinent to both social choice and multiple criteria
decision making.
2.5 This Classification
The classification proposed here is based on the computer science content of the surveyed
work. A nice feature of this classification is that it is orthogonal to subjects in computing.
The following chapter, for example, discusses aspects related mainly to Artificial Intelli-
gence, the chapter after that discusses the complexity-theoretic aspects of voting systems
which is—as the title suggests—related to Algorithms and Complexity Theory, the remain-
ing chapters overview applications of voting in computing, the applications are classified
based on the subject they are applied in for example: Networking, Databases, Cryptogra-
phy and Security, etc.
Figure 1 depicts the taxonomy proposed here and reflected in the chapter-theme orga-
nization of this thesis1.
1No chapter is dedicated entirely to discussing design aspects of voting systems, but related design aspects
are discussed where relevant in different chapters.
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Figure 2.1: A proposed taxonomy of computational aspects of voting systems.
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Chapter 3
Preferences: Representation and
Elicitation
The core of a (non-collegial) voting game on a compact policy space W is
non-empty only for a nowhere dense set of preferences, where preferences are
continuous and endowed with the closed convergence or C0-topology: that is
emptiness of the voting core is generic in this topology (Le Breton, 1987). On
the other hand, if preferences are continuous and convex and that dimension
of the space is suitably bounded then a core does exist.
Norman Schofield (from the introduction of a paper on preferences)1
3.0 Prologue
Input specification is essential in the processing of any computable entity. This also applies
to social choice functions and voting systems. In the previous chapter we have described
a number of voting systems and listed properties of voting rules. In the next chapter, we
will discuss the computational complexity of various problems related to voting systems.
This will be in light of some general assumptions about the input to the voting system,
which is constituted by the set of candidates or alternatives and the set of voters and their
preferences.
Before we explore the computational aspects of input representation—which amounts to
preferences in this domain—let us revisit a definition stated in Chapter 1 as we postponed
the discussion of details to this chapter.
In Chapter 1, we have defined an election to consist of a finite set of alternatives and a
finite set of agents who vote over the set of alternatives. For simplicity, the assumption was
that both the candidates and voters are represented as sets and these sets are explicitly and
entirely encoded as the input to an election rule. Also, we have assumed that the votes cast
are complete and explicit orderings over the set of alternatives and that every vote lists all
1Schofield, N. (1994) “The C1 topology on the space of preference profiles and the existence of a continuous
preference aggregation.” School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University in St.
Louis, unpublished.
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the alternatives in order of preference.
These assumptions, although plausible and suitable for an introductory chapter, are not
accurate enough for a technical discussion of topics in preference aggregation. Before we
discuss the various aspects of preference representation in voting settings, we first have to
revisit our definition of elections.
In Chapter 1, an election consists of two sets, the set of candidates and the set of voters.
This definition captures the main constituents of an election but it is not precise mathe-
matically speaking. The following is a revision of that definition:
Definition 3.0.1 (Election Definition (revision)). An election consists of a list of alter-
natives called candidates C, and a multiset of votes representing voters. The vote of the
ith voter is expressed by a list pii ∈ Π(C) where Π(C) is the set of all permutations of the
candidate set.
Feasible candidates are expressed by a list since a list is an ordered set and the order
is introduced to ease referring to candidates (especially when names are ignored) by using
their position in the list as an index. This order is independent of any preference or any
position the candidates may have on a particular issue; the order is merely introduced to
facilitate the process of identifying and referring to candidates.
The set of voters can be represented by their votes since voting rules ought to be anony-
mous and only the vote not who casts the vote should be considered in the final outcome.
The votes are input as a multiset since more than one voter may have the same vote which
results in multiple entries in the vote set. This is more likely to happen when the set of
voters is much larger than the set of alternatives. In this case, every vote can be associated
with a number that refers to the multiplicity of the vote, in other words the number of vot-
ers whose preferences are represented by this particular vote. The set of votes can also be
ordered to facilitate referring to votes (or voters) although this is less needed in comparison
with referring to candidates, for example when casting the votes or presenting candidates
and discussing preferences.
According to this revision, a voting rule is a mapping from the multiset of votes that
selects a winner c ∈ C (the range is possibly a set of winners or an ordering of the alterna-
tives depending on the function of the voting rule in a particular setting). Having refined
the definition of a central entity in the discussions of this thesis, we next move to the rep-
resentation of the input, i.e., the preferences of agents or voters over a set of alternatives or
candidates.
Since preference representation is essential to any preference aggregation method, much
of the content of this chapter applies to (combinatorial) auctions and exchange (ne-
gotiation) as well as voting since all share the essence of being preference aggregation
methods.
The next section describes three “visual” representations of a given preference aggrega-
tion setting. The objective is to introduce preference representation using a vivid discussion
that shows the need for and purpose of having different approaches for representing pref-
erences, which in turn explains the richness of the literature on preference representation
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and preference elicitation. The following section on Preference Representation discusses the
motivation behind preference representation in various domains, gives examples of some
preference representation languages and explains some important properties of preferences,
such as single-peakedness. The section on Preference Elicitation defines preference elicita-
tion with respect to different preference aggregation domains, and lists some results and
applications. As in the previous chapters, this chapter is appended with Comments and
Bibliographic Notes.
The reason behind discussing preference representation and preference elicitation in the
same chapter is that these two topics are closely related; preference elicitation methods usu-
ally take into consideration the representation of preferences to be elicited. Although this
chapter does not go into detail on either topic in relation to the other, it touches on the basic
concepts in each, emphasizes the related computational aspects in the voting context and
presents related work and results. Some of the results are pertinent to the computational
complexity of problems in preference representation and preference elicitation. Although
these results are mentioned in passing here and some will be revisited in the next chap-
ter, the reader may skip to the first section of the next chapter for a brief introduction to
complexity theory before proceeding here.
3.1 Three Pictures Depicting Preferences
3.1.1 Preference Graphs
Figure 3.1: An example of a pairwise election graph.
An election graph is a directed graph where the vertices represent candidates and an
edge from vertex a to b represents a vote that prefers a to b. The weight on the edge from
a to b (if present) represents the number of voters preferring a to b.
The same election graph can represent the final outcome of the election rule. In this case
the graph is not weighted and each edge stands for the preference between two candidates
in the final (social) preference.
A cycle in an election graph (the graph of the result of the election) represents a cyclic
preference in the votes when aggregated. For example, the following directed edges (a, b),
(b, c), (c, a) in a graph with three vertices a, b, and c, visually depicts the simple example of
the famous Condorcet paradox when three voters have the following preferences: a > b > c,
b > c > a, and c > a > b. A similar cycle in the graph representing the actual preferences
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of the voters with the weights of the three edges being all equal depicts the same case.
A majority graph M(P ) is defined similarly. The set of vertices is the set of candidates
C and for all a, b ∈ C, there is a directed edge from a to b if and only if the number of voters
who prefer a to b is greater then the number of voters who prefer b to a. The majority
graph is directed and no edge is bidirectional (i.e., M(P ) is asymmetric) and contains no
loops (i.e., M(P ) is irreflexive). If the number of voters is odd, the majority graph is also
complete, that is for each a, b ∈ C, either an edge directed from a to b exists or an edge
directed from b to a exists in the graph. A graph G = (V,E) that is complete, asymmetric
and irreflexive is also called a tournament on V [26]. Therefore, when the number of voters
is odd the majority graph M(P ) is a tournament on C.
Graph representation of elections is sometimes used to tackle problems using techniques
and algorithms from Graph Theory.
3.1.2 Preference Curves
A preference curve is another visualization of preferences in a preference aggregation setting.
The figure below shows the preferences of an agent and to the right shows the preference
curve of that agent. The horizontal axis represents alternatives and the vertical axis repre-
sents the order2 of the preference. The picture is self-explanatory, the absolute maximum
which is the alternative on the horizontal axis corresponding to the largest point on the
vertical axis is the most preferred alternative and also the winner under the majority rule.
The agent is indifferent between two alternatives that correspond to the same point on the
vertical axis, and the alternative corresponding to the lowest point on the vertical axis is
the least preferred alternative.
Figure 3.2: An example of a preference curve.
2But not necessarily the intensity of the preference.
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The absolute height of the points on the vertical axis and the exact slope of the lines
connecting the different points on the curve have no significance unless stated otherwise.
An example of that special case would be a preference curve depicting preferences in a
quantitative preference structure. Also, the continuity and behavior of the lines connecting
the points are irrelevant unless the model is a continuous model and the curve is explicitly
stated to represent things like the intensity and intra-comparability of preferences.
Figure 3.3 has a number of preference-curves, each corresponding to an agent in a
multiagent system or to a panel of legislators voting over a number of policies put forward.
Not only does this picture allow studying the preference of each individual in the group but
it also allows inter-comparability between preferences and ultimately assists the preference
aggregation process.
Figure 3.3: An example of a collection of preference curves.
3.1.3 Preference Matrices
Although a matrix is not typically perceived as a visual structure, many visual observations
when looking at matrices directly lead to some profound conclusions. The use of matrix
notation in preference representation was first seen in a paper by Black [3], in which he
acknowledges Newing’s suggestion of using matrix notation. Let us now explore some prop-
erties of the matrix construct in representation and aggregation of preferences.
The preference matrix A is a square matrix m×m, where m is the number of alter-
natives. The diagonal of the matrix—across entries indexed by the same row and column
number, (i, i), where i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}—is drawn before inserting the value of any other entry.
For any other entry (i, j) where i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the entry is an ordered pair calculated as
follows: the alternatives ai and aj are compared, the first element in the ordered pair Mij is
equal to the number of agents preferring ai to aj and the second element in the ordered pair
Mij is equal to the number of agents preferring aj to ai. Note that only the upper right
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triangular portion of the matrix or the lower left triangular portion of the matrix needs
to be calculated. The other half of the matrix can be obtained from the one computed
initially by a simple symmetry observation. If n voters prefer ai to aj and p voters prefer aj
to ai, where n, p < m and n+ p ≤ m and this is recorded as Mij = (n, p) then similarly and
based on the same information about agents preferences we can write Mji = (p, n). Gener-
ally, each row to the right of the main diagonal is a reflection—about the diagonal—of the
column immediately beneath it.
Although the construction of this matrix seems to be a tedious job, one can easily infer
results regarding the pairwise majority rule by just looking down the columns of this ma-
trix. The same result may require at least as much work by considering the preferences of
individuals and yet is less obvious by merely looking at the preferences. Moreover, many
other results that are related to pairwise comparisons between the alternatives can be eas-
ily arrived at using the matrix notation which is constructed only once (as a preprocessing
phase) while some computations might need to be repeated every time a question need to
be answered when using the individual orderings of the alternatives.
For example, the figure below shows the preference schedules of the agents to the left
and to the right shows the preference matrix constructed as explained above. If you are
asked to hide the matrix portion of the figure and find the pairwise majority rule winner
given these preferences, you will need some time despite the small size of the problem, five
agents and six alternatives. By looking at the preference matrix, one can immediately find
the winner by looking down the third column (or across the third row) and noticing that
a3 is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. From this figure too, one
can quickly see that a4 is preferred to a6 by all agents.
So far, we have seen three different ways of visually representing preferences. There
are, indeed, different ways and approaches for representing preferences, visually, logically
and using mathematical notation and constructs. The specific choice depends on the pur-
pose of the representation, the nature of the application domain, the scale, and the level of
abstraction in the context. An example of the first dimension, the purpose or goal of the
representation, can be given using the three visual representations described above. Graph
epresentation of preferences or elections can be used to detect cycles corresponding to cyclic
majorities or local cycles3 in the preferences of the voters, it can also be used in the analysis
of some voting rules such as the Kemeny and Slater rules as we will see in Chapter 3 of
this thesis. Techniques from Graph Theory are broadly used to obtain results using graph
representations. Preference curves are used to study intra- and inter- preference properties
that can assist deducing results about the aggregation process and what sort of outcome
to expect. Later in this chapter, we will study some of these properties in more detail.
Matrix representation, although not as widely used as other representations, have led to
some discoveries in preference-related problems such as the Stable Roommate problem. In
this problem for example, the problem of finding a “stable” matching for 2n people to be-
3Cycles that are formed by the preferences of a strict subset of the agents. This type of cycle does not
necessarily lead to the Condorcet paradox or to declaring no winner.
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Figure 3.4: An example of a preference matrix.
come roommates is reduced to the problem of having consecutive 1’s in rows of a matrix
representing preferences.
We now move one step higher in the level of abstraction, and discuss preference repre-
sentation in concept, motivation, and by way of example.
3.2 Preference Representation
3.2.1 Motivation
Voting is a general method for aggregating preferences in many settings. These include
natural settings in which human voters express their preferences over a set of alternatives.
Examples of these natural settings are presidential elections and job candidate interviews.
The domain of voting also extends to multiagent systems in which software agents vote
over alternatives that may be webpages or other software agents. The latter corresponds
to ranking systems where the set of agents and the set of alternatives coincide. In many of
these settings the space of voters and/or alternatives can be a combinatorial (very large)
domain which makes the search space, to be explored for optimal result, grow prohibitively.
A combinatorial domain is defined as a Cartesian product of a finite value domain for
each member of a set of variables, an alternative in a combinatorial domain is a tuple of
values. As the number of values increases (linearly), the size of the corresponding combi-
natorial domain grows exponentially. In such settings, fully and explicitly expressing the
preference of each agent over all alternatives may not be feasible. Therefore, the represen-
tation of preferences should be concise in order to spare time and space resources.
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Different preference representation languages were proposed as a remedy to this prob-
lem. Also, some reference elicitation techniques are suggested such that only relevant parts
of the vote are considered at a time and not the whole vote.
In addition to the peculiarities of combinatorial domains, preference structuring and
preference representation languages (PRL) are also suggested as a way to prevent undesir-
able situations in voting such as impossibility results and paradoxes.
Following sections of this chapter discuss preference representation languages and pref-
erence elicitation in more depth.
3.2.2 The Domain
Any preference aggregation setting involves two basic entities: a set of alternatives or can-
didates and a set of agents or voters expressing their preferences over the set of alternatives.
The preferences are structured in a specific agreed-upon way among the agents and a pref-
erence representation language encodes these preferences (1), is used to elicit preferences in
case of partial preference description (2), and is used to aggregate the preferences into an
outcome according to some defined rule (3).
We have assumed in the previous chapter that the set of alternatives and the set of
agents are both finite. In this aspect, our discussions fall into the category of discrete social
choice models, as opposed to spatial models which are extensively discussed in economics.
In spatial models, the set of alternatives is thought of as an ordered set of points drawn
from a continuum, and hence is infinite. This order is another contrast between discrete
models and spatial models.
Although the set of alternatives is ordered in discrete models, the order is imposed for
convenience of casting the votes or expressing the preferences in a systematic way. On the
other hand, the order in spatial models is a natural order inherent from the underlying
space.
3.2.3 Types of Preferences
The following is a categorization of preference-type
• Numerical preference structure is a structure for representing preferences using nu-
meric values. The best example of numerical preference structures is a utility function
u : X → R that takes as input a set of alternatives and produces as output a real num-
ber representing the utility of the input. This is why this type of preference structure
is sometimes referred to as utilitarian preference. This category is also referred to as
cardinal preference structure, especially when compared to ordinal preference struc-
ture in the same course of discussion.
• Ordinal preference structure is a structure for representing preference using order.
The best example of ordinal preference structure is the preference relation discussed
in Chapter 1.
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• Qualitative preference structure is a hybrid structure for representing preferences using
order on some mensurable scale (that could be, but is not necessarily, numerical). An
example of this type is a function that takes as input a set of alternatives and outputs
a set of a totally ordered (yet not numerical) scale.
While ordinal preference structures seem to naturally express preferences, numerical and
qualitative structures are commensurable and allow a more precise expression of preferences.
Moreover, numerical and qualitative structures allow comparisons between the preferences
of different agents. Since the notion of the intensity of the preference is captured more in
these structures, they allow inter- and intra agent preference comparison. This can be used
to resolve some of the inconsistencies and paradoxes that arise when aggregating preferences.
Many voting systems implicitly devise a quasi-qualitative preference structure. For
example, preferences in approval voting can be expressed as a preference relation where
CaPCb, for all voters I ∈ V and aIb and cId for all alternatives a, b ∈ Ca and c, d ∈ Cb,
where Ca is the set of alternatives approved by the agent and Cb is the set of alternatives
not approved by the agent. Yet, the output is a total order on the set of alternatives where
an alternative is placed based on the number of times it was preferred to some other alterna-
tive. Conversely, scoring protocols aggregate preferences that are based on points (natural
numbers) given to the candidate, different combinations of input yield different outputs,
however the output (with respect to the position of a given candidate) can be “ordered”
from best to worst based on the position (number of points) of that candidate in the output.
A number of logic-based languages have been proposed for succinctly encoding preference
relations over a set of alternatives. Propositional logic languages and weighted logics are
two examples. Next, we exhibit some of these languages and discuss various criteria for
considering a specific language for preference representation.
3.2.4 Preference Representation Languages
There are three main purposes of a preference representation language:
1. To encode the preferences efficiently, specially with respect to computational resources
such as space.
2. To be used in the elicitation of preferences in case of partial preference description for
example and
3. To be used in the aggregation of preferences into an outcome according to some defined
rule.
Thereupon, the choice of a preference representation language is strongly linked to the
preference elicitation process and to optimization of the preference aggregation output.
The criteria for choosing a PRL vary depending on the context and the underlying
computational model. However, the following are some general basic criteria:
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• Compactness. Compact preference representation languages that spare space are
preferred especially in combinatorial domain where the set of alternatives or agents is
very large and hard to trivially represent.
• Complexity. A preference representation language should be chosen such that the
computational complexity of finding winner alternatives (and related problems such
that checking whether an alternative is a winner and which of two alternatives is
ranked higher) is considered. Lower complexity languages are, surely, more preferred.
• Elicitation efficiency. Elicitation efficiency (or elicitation-friendliness [25]) requires
that a preference representation language is such that the design of algorithms used
to elicit preferences and produce aggregate preference is easy.
• Cognitive relevance. A preference representation language should be close to the
way agents naturally express their preferences in their language. It should be at least
possible to simply derive the preferences of the agents from the language expressions
without much complication.
• Expressivity. A preference representation language may have limitations in expres-
sion power. It may be not possible to represent some preference relations, utility
functions or negotiation arguments using that language. Although this limitation can
be acceptable depending on the (restricted) domain, generally a preference represen-
tation language with more expressivity is preferred.
• Comparative succinctness. Succinctness and compactness (of a preference repre-
sentation language) are usually used as synonyms in the literature. However, com-
parative succinctness implies the relative succinctness of one language in comparison
to another. Given two preference representation languages L1 and L2, the question
is: can every preference expressed in L1 also be expressed in L2 using “comparable”
(i.e., within polynomial factor) resources?
• Comparative expressivity. Similarly and more simply the question here is: can
every preference expressed in L1 also be expressed in L2? Preference representation
languages that are easily translated to other languages are considered a better choice
because of their flexibility and applicability to difference domains (via translation).
The reader may have noticed the difficulty in satisfying all these criteria by one language.
For example, compactness might come at the price of less cognitive relevance.
Examples of Preference Representation Languages
Preferences can be expressed in several ways. A specific representation language may focus
on some set of aspects to capture the notion of preference in a given domain. The following
is a brief presentation of some PRLs:
• Goal importance and compensation languages, including the following two examples:
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– Rpenalties: a frequently used preference representation language that focuses on
goals, weights of goals and penalties associated with goals if not satisfied. An
agent expresses its preferences in terms of propositional formulas to be satisfied.
Each formula is associated with a number (the weight) that indicates the im-
portance of satisfying that formula. Alternatives are compared based on their
weights.
– RH : as a refinement to the previous rule which differentiates between alternatives
merely based on whether they satisfy goals or not, closeness to goals can be
introduced as a criterion for accepting alternatives. In other words, an agent
prefers an alternative close to the goal over an alternative that is far from the
goal. This closeness is usually measured using the Hamming distance. The exact
interpretation of the Hamming distance depends on the domain4.
• Prioritized Goals languages: The first two languages are based on the idea of goal
importance and compensations among goals. This means that violating one very
important goal can be compensated for by satisfying a number of less important goals.
When such compensations are not possible, languages based on the idea of prioritized
goals are suggested (e.g., Rbestoutprio , R
discrimin
prio , and R
leximin
prio ). This is the unified feature
of prioritized goals languages. The basic difference between these languages is how
goal-priority is introduced as an extension to a preference relation. The detail on
these extensions in their rather involved knowledge representation scope is explained
elsewhere [14].
• Conditional logics: in this type of languages, preference relations are constrained by
some conditions (according to the definition of the language), only preference orders
satisfying these conditions are considered when comparing a set of alternatives (e.g.,
RcondS the standard preference relation and R
Z
cond.).
• Ceteris Paribus (CP) preferences language: In a Ceteris Paribus (“all else being
equal”) language (e.g., proposed in [32]), preferences are defined in a multicriteria
decision making (MCDM) setting. In CP languages, preferences are expressed with
respect to one criterion (attribute or dimension) while holding all others constant.
Typically, a preference in this language is a propositional logic statment like: “all
other things being equal, I prefer these alternatives over these other ones.” The “other
things” is translated, in the expressions of this language, as variables not included in
the variable-set of the propositional formulas expressing preferences.
We now use the previous examples of preference representation language to touch on a
concrete realization of some of the abstract criteria for selecting a PRL, namely comparative
succinctness and comparative expressivity. The following table summarized the results
obtained in [14] regarding translation among these languages. The table is to be read in
light of the following:
No means the translation is impossible using polynomial space. The type of proof used
for obtaining this result is:
4For an abstract definition see [14].
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1. a direct argument based on cases where the second language is limited in ex-
pressivity when completed to the first (i.e., there are some ordering that the first
language can represent while the second cannot.). Since the second language
cannot represent some preferences in the first place, these preferences cannot be
translated to preferences in this language using efficient space resources.
2. a direct argument based on cases where the first language can represent some or-
derings in polynomial space where the second language needs at least suprapoly-
nomial space to express those orderings.
c-No stands for “conditional no” and means that a polynomial time translation is not
possible unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses.
w-No stands for “weak no” and means there is no polynomial space translation unless we
relax the condition of requiring the formulae of the resulting language to be in Con-
junctive Normal Form (CNF) since requiring this and the possibility of a polynomial
size translation combined together would violate results from circuit complexity5.
Table 3.1: Summary of results on translation among preference representation languages.
fromto Rpen RH Rbestoutprio Rleximinprio Rdiscriminprio RScond RZcond RCP
Rpen Yes Yes No2 ? w-No No2 No2 No2
RH c-No Yes No2 c-No w-No No2 No2 ?
c-No
Rbestoutprio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No2 Yes Yes
Rleximinprio Yes Yes No2 Yes w-No No2 No2 No2
Rdiscriminprio No1 No1 No1 No1 Yes No2 No1 No2
RScond No1 No1 No1 No1 ? Yes No1 ?
RZcond Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No2 Yes Yes
RCP No1 No1 No1 No1 w-No No2 No1 Yes
3.2.5 Single-peaked Preferences
Consider three individuals who plan to buy houses. Assume that the first person has a small
budget for buying a house, the second person has a medium budget and the third person
has a big budget. Also, suppose that there are three types of houses, small-sized low-priced
house, medium-sized medium-priced house, and a spacious expensive house. We expect the
person with the small budget to prefer a small-sized house to a medium-sized house and
to prefer a medium-sized house to a large one. The person with the big budget will have
an inverse preference ordering. The person with the medium budget will probably prefer a
medium size house to both small and big houses. We further assume that all other factors
5For example, the existence of such a translation contradicts the impossibility of expressing the majority
function with a CNF circuit of size that is polynomial in the number of variables.
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are held constant or that the price of the house according to its size is the only criterion
considered.
The preferences of these three individuals are single-peaked. Each person has a “peak” or
an “ideal point” of preference and on both sides of the peak—unless the peak is an extreme
point of the alternative set—alternatives are less desired. The further a point (representing
an alternative) from the peak; the less preferred that alternative is. Figure 3.5 illustrates
this situation.
Figure 3.5: Three single-peaked preferences.
It is important to note that the ordering of the alternatives on the horizontal axis is key
here. If we change that ordering, the picture might change totally and preferences, although
the same, become no longer single peaked. Also, it is worth mentioning that this order is
independent of any preference and is merely introduced to structure the preferences.
The absolute height of the curves at any point is also irrelevant. The important fea-
ture is the relative height and overall shape of the curves in comparison to one another.
Nevertheless, the absolute “utility” of the alternative can be introduced and represented by
the vertical axis in numerical representation structures. Also, the continues lines between
the points are drawn only to assist the human eye in recognizing the shape of the curve
and therefore the preference behavior. These lines do not necessarily indicate a continuous
set of alternatives. Only the relative position of a preference at each point of the set of
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alternatives is significant. Hence, the term “Point Set” on the diagrams.
Single peakedness is a property of preferences that makes them escape some voting
paradoxes. Since ingle-peakedness also expresses the intensity of preference, it is possible to
have a cycle in the majority graph, yet with a possible ordering of the alternatives involved
in the cycle. This is because different intensities of preferences may contribute to unequal
weights on the edges, hence placing an order on the alternatives. Although there are other
restrictions on preferences that circumvent the voting paradox and impossibility results,
single-peakedness seems to be a well known and natural restriction.
In single-peaked preference settings, the alternatives are ordered on a line from left to
right in sequence (or right to left6) and the positions of alternatives on this line represent
their positions on a specific matter. For example, in presidential elections candidates can
be positioned in an ideological spectrum that ranges from most liberal to most conservative
where the position of a candidate on that spectrum is represented by their positions on the
liberal-conservative spectrum.
An ideal point for a voter is the most preferred position, alternatives closer to the
ideal point are preferred to alternatives that are further away, in other words, the further
an alternative from a voter’s ideal point the less support this alternative gets from that
voter.
For example, if the set of alternatives is {u, v, w, x, y, z}, and they are positioned on a line
from left to right in the following order: x, v, y, z, u, w then the vote z > y > v > u > w > x
is single-peaked (around z), but the vote z > x > v > u > w > y is not (with respect to z
as an ideal point) since x is further away from z than v yet x is preferred to v.
Definition 3.2.1 (Condition of Single-peakedness). A profile {R1, R2, . . . , Rn} of individual
preferences satisfies the property of single-peakedness if there exists a strong ordering S such
that for all i ∈ V , xRiy and B(x, y, z) imply yPiz, where B(x, y, z) means that y is between
x and z in the defined sequence of alternatives, and x, y and z are distinct elements of the
set of alternatives. B(x, y, z) can happen if either x is followed by y and y is followed by z
in the sequence of alternatives or z is followed by y and y by x in the sequence [17].
The main appeal to single-peaked preferences is the following possibility theorem:
Theorem 3.2.1 (A Possibility Theorem for Single-peaked Preferences). Provided the num-
ber of voters7 is odd, the majority decision rule is a social welfare function8 for any number
6The alternatives are ordered from left to right or from right to left. The direction does not matter as
long as it is well defined with respect to a reference direction and as long as all voters’ preferences are drawn
with the respect to a fixed ordering of the alternatives on the reference direction.
7In some publications (e.g., [17]), the text of the theorem states “concerned voters.” The set of concerned
voters is the set of voters who are not indifferent between every pair of alternatives in a given set (or subset)
of alternatives to decide upon. When all preferences are strict and total, all voters are concerned voters; no
voter abstain from voting and no vote is incomplete or indifferent among two alternatives.
8Here, the majority decision rule is a social welfare function since it meets the requirements of fairness and
uniformity. It satisfies the conditions of a social welfare function that Arrow stipulated in his impossibility
result. Refer to Chapter 1 of this thesis for details.
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of alternatives if the voters’ individual preferences are all single-peaked over each triple of
alternatives [17].
This theorem states that single-peakedness of preferences (with the oddness requirement
of the number of voters) is a sufficient condition for the outcome of the majority social wel-
fare function to be an ordering (i.e., transitive and complete). However, this theorem says
nothing about single-peakedness being a necessary condition for the outcome of a social
welfare function to be an ordering. Indeed, single-peakedness is not a necessary condition
in this context. It is possible to find cases where preferences are not single peaked yet the
result of a social welfare function is an ordering over the alternatives.
A mirror concept to single-peakedness is single-cavedness (or single-troughedness). In
single-peakedness, a voter has a most preferred point and the further an alternative from
this ideal point the less preferred that alternative is to the voter. In single-cavedness, the
converse is true, a voter has a least preferred point and the further an alternative from
this point the more preferred that alternative is to the voter. In the budget-house exam-
ple, if the order on the horizontal line is reversed, the key representing voters is reversed
and the second person’s curve is flipped upside down we get a figure depicting single-caved
preferences. Generally, and unless the ideal point is at one end of the preference sequence,
a single-peaked preference curve has a ∪-shape and a single-caved preference curve has a
∩-shape. The results applying to single-peaked preferences also apply to single-caved pref-
erences.
Single-peakedness of preferences applies to unidimensional models (discrete or contin-
uous). A similar concept (yet not exactly the same) called convexity is defined in the
context of multidimensional models where preferences are not represented by curves but by
surfaces and each dimension represents a distinct issue.
Recognizing Single-peaked Preferences
Testing for single-peakedness of preferences is a nontrivial task. First, it is not easy to
determine preferences in the first place. This applies to ombinatorial domains as well as to
popular elections for practical reasons, such as the difficultly and cost of drawing a reliable
sample from a large population9. Second, even if preferences are known then recognizing
single-peakedness amounts to finding a permutation of the candidates with respect to which
the preferences of all voters are single-peaked. This is an issue, since for m candidates the
total number of permutation is m!. As the number of candidates increases, the total num-
ber of permutations becomes prohibitively large. In many natural settings, the number of
candidates itself can be relatively large. For example, in 1986 The New York Times of
April 1st reported twenty candidates for mayor of Tulsa, Oklahoma! And 20! is equal to
2432902008176640000.
However, when placing some conditions on the voting setting and under other proper-
ties of the preferences (see the Stable Matching example below), single-peakedness can be
9Note that this property needs to be tested before the election takes place to exploit this structure in the
process of determining winners. A census for determining preferences a priori is therefore out of question
since this census may as well record the votes also.
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tested for in polynomial time, sometimes as efficient as quadratic time in the number of
candidates [2].
If all possible permutations of alternatives are exhaustively considered and for each
permutation, the preferences are not single-peaked with respect to that sequence of the
alternatives, then those preferences do not enjoy the property of single-peakedness. Never-
theless, if a single permutation of the alternatives does not yield single-peaked preferences,
then we cannot draw conclusions about the global picture of the preferences. Figure 3.6
shows a matrix example of preferences that are not single-peaked and further more exhibit-
ing a cyclic majority. Note that reading down any column (or across any row), we cannot
find an non-dominated alternative.
Figure 3.6: Condorcet Paradox with non-single-peaked preferences.
Implications and Results
The following list contains some important results applying to single-peaked preferences:
• When agents/voters report their preferences truthfully and an alternative a wins under
the majority rule, no other alternative can be made the winner by misrepresenting
the preferences of some set of voters. However, it is possible to strategically vote such
that no alternative wins under majority rule [3]. This implies that when preferences
are single-peaked, voters have no incentive to misrepresent their preferences in order
to make a non-winning alternative, the winner under majority rule.
• The Median Vote Theorem, attributed to Black [4] states single-peakedness as a con-
dition for majority rule to produce transitive social ordering and specifies the value
of the pairwise majority election winner:
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Figure 3.7: Median Vote Theorem (for 5 voters).
Theorem 3.2.2 (Median Vote Theorem). [20] If the number of voters is odd, and
the preferences are single-peaked (in one dimension) then:
1. The median of the voters’ ideal points is a Condorcet winner, and
2. majority rule leads to a transitive social ordering.
• If either the order with respect to which preferences are single-peaked is known or the
complete preference of at least one other agent is known then single-peaked preferences
can be elicited10 using only a linear number of comparison queries. Also, a sublinear
number of queries does not suffice to elicit single-peaked preferences [12].
Besides efficient preference elicitation, single-peaked preferences have been studied in
other domains and applications. For example, it has been shown that if preferences are
single-peaked and “narcissistic” (i.e., an alternative is its own ideal) then there exists a
unique stable matching [2]. The Stable Matching (or Stable Roommates) problem is to
match 2n persons in pairs so that no two prefer each other to their assigned partners. Fur-
thermore, when preferences obey single-peakedness and narcissism then the stable matching
can be constructed in O(n) steps using a simple iterative algorithm [2].
Recently, the following characterization of single-peaked preferences was obtained [1]: A
preference profile is linearly ordered over the set of alternatives such that these preferences
are single-peaked with respect to the linear order L if and only if it satisfies these two
properties:
1. For any subset of alternatives the set of alternatives considered as the worst by all
agents cannot contain more than two elements.
10The next section is dedicated entirely to the topic of preference elicitation.
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2. Two agents cannot disagree on the relative ranking of two alternatives with respect
to a third alternative but agree on the (relative) ranking of a fourth one.
3.3 Preference Elicitation
3.3.1 Incomparability and Incompleteness of Preferences
In some voting scenarios, a decision based on partial information about preferences needs
to be made. Partial information about preferences can refer to an incomplete collection of
complete preference profiles, or to a complete collection of partial preferences. The first
can occur when the preference-elicitation process is not complete at the time when out-
comes must be determined. The second for example, can occur when a voter does not
specify her preferences between two alternatives or when a voter states that these alterna-
tives are incomparable. In all such cases, voting rules (or preference aggregation methods
in general) face the challenge of having to determine outcomes given incomplete preferences.
When the collection profile of a group of agents does not include the preference pro-
files for some agents or when some agents do not state their preferences among a subset
of alternatives then we are before a case of incomplete or partial preferences. Recall that
two alternatives a and b can be related in a preference profile by one of the following: aRb,
aPb, or aIb standing for a weak preference, a strict preference, or an indifference relation
respectively. Succinctly, let us use the symbols of the set {≥, >,=} to stand for the above-
mentioned relations in order.
In Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM), when an agent is presented with two al-
ternatives, the agent might refuse to compare the alternatives since the criterion considered
for each alternative is different. For example, when selecting the next step of a resource
allocation plan, an agent might find an easy to implement less efficient step incomparable
to a more involved efficient one since there are two distinct criteria (implementation diffi-
culty and efficiency) to be considered (to simplify the idea of incomparability, think of the
following analogy: a human—choosing between two computers—might find the comparison
between a slow cheap computer and a fast expensive one less obvious since there are two
distinct criteria (speed and cost) to be considered. He might readily compare machines
based on their prices only or speed only.). When considering incomparability as a possible
way of describing preferences among alternatives, we can extend our set of preference sym-
bols to {≥, >,=,∼, ?} where ∼ stands for “incomparable” and ? for “unspecified.”
There are a number of situations in which a preference aggregation method needs to
aggregate incomplete preferences. For example:
• When some k voters have not reported their preferences yet, while others have. Then
the collection of preference profiles Rn contains k complete preference profiles of k
voters and n− k empty preference profiles.
• When all voters have voted but an individual preference profile is not necessarily a
complete preference relation. This is possible in a number of cases:
3.3. PREFERENCE ELICITATION 59
– If the votes are cast incrementally, for example, in a multistage (or multi-round)
voting rule or preference aggregation method in general. This is also similar
to implicitly eliciting votes in a multistage rule after eliminating a subset of
candidates. In these cases, at each stage of the vote aggregation processes not
all information about preferences or about candidates’ status is available,
– when a voter does not have enough information yet to compare two alternatives,
so the choice between these alternatives is left unspecified in the preference profile
of that voter, or
– when a voter does not want to express its preference over a subset of alternatives
either for privacy reasons or when the alternatives are incomparable according
to the criteria the voter uses to evaluate these alternatives.
• When all voters have cast their votes but a new set of candidates is introduced and
merged with the original set. The preferences of voters regarding this new subset are
unknown and the result is incomplete preferences with respect to the new (union) set
of candidates.
• When the preference elicitation process terminates and decisions need to be made
based on the—possibly partially—elicited preferences.
• When preferences are expressed in a compact representation language (such as CP-
nets [7]) that generates partial preference relations in general.
The preference relation representing partial preferences is therefore not complete, as a
result of unspecified preferences and incomparable alternatives, and it is possibly reflexive
and symmetric, as a result of indifference and incomparability between alternatives. Such
a preference relation is referred to as a partial ordering.
3.3.2 What is Preference Elicitation?
The topic of preference elicitation has gained wide attention especially in the domain of
combinatorial auctions and bid elicitation (e.g., [19, 11]). It has also been studied for ex-
change and negotiation as well (e.g., [9]). Compared to this wide attention to preference
elicitation in some preference aggregation methods, less attention has been given to vote
elicitation, where the traditional practice and typical applications require complete pref-
erences as input. However since voting has been recently suggested in various domains
for tackling different problems, as we will see in a later chapter, extending voting rules to
handle incomplete preferences and specifically discussing vote elicitation as a special case of
preference elicitation have emerged as new topics in the voting literature. In this section we
explore some aspects of vote elicitation. Since voting is one way of reporting preferences, we
first discuss preference elicitation in general. Preference elicitation consists of interacting
with agents in order to gather information about their preferences. This information is used
to answer the following question:
Can outcome of the preference aggregation method be determined without the need for
any further information?
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This entails that preference elicitation must also answer the implicit question:
What question(s) must be asked to which agents in order to elicit the right information
(i.e., the information needed for determining the outcome)?
These questions are usually referred to as “queries” in the preference-elicitation litera-
ture. Related questions are: What type of queries is to be asked? How many queries can
the elicitor ask an agent in each step of the elicitation process and in general? What is the
computational complexity of this process? And when to terminate it safely (i.e., when is the
outcome surely known, the case in which further elicitation is useless since any additional
information will not change the current outcome)?
There are different types of preference elicitation:
• Full elicitation: the entire preference profile is obtained from every agent (once).
• Coarse elicitation: every time the elicitor interacts with an agent, the elicitor asks for
the agent’s preferences.
• Fine elicitation: in each query to an agent, the elicitor asks a specific question about
the agent’s preferences, for example, which of two alternatives the agent prefers more.
The previous notions of preference elicitation also apply to vote elicitation. The def-
initions can be easily rewritten to define vote elicitation by simply replacing “preference
aggregation method” with “voting protocol,” replacing “preference” with “vote” and re-
placing “agent” with “voter.”
3.3.3 Vote Elicitation
In traditional voting settings, a voter is usually asked for his complete preferences, whether
these preferences are expressed as a total ordering, as approvals or as a unique favorite
choice. Although some voters may abstain from voting over a specific set of alternatives
or in some domains such as presidential elections, some voters would not register to vote,
as long as a voter is to engage in the voting process, he must report his preferences (over
the set of alternatives) as specified by the voting rule in use. It is possible, however, that
not all votes on the election level or not all preferences of a single voter at the voter level
are needed for determining the final outcome. For example, if more than half of the votes
are considered and they do not place candidate a over candidate b, then we know that a is
not the winner of the majority voting rule without considering the remaining votes. Also,
if only the top ranked candidate is relevant for a specific voting rule then the entire pref-
erence of each voter over all candidates is not needed. Yet another example of cases where
complete information about preferences is not needed is when enough information has been
gathered to conclude that a given alternative does not have a chance to win. Nonetheless,
in some scenarios (such as the ones mentioned early in this section), incomplete preferences
are all that is input to a voting rule that needs to elicit more preferences before being able
to compute the outcome.
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Yet, most theoretical treatment of voting procedures, especially axiomatic foundation
of some impossibility results and complexity-theoretic treatments seeking hardness results,
assume complete preferences and in some problems complete knowledge available for each
voter about all other voters’ preferences. For if hardness results are established under this
condition, hardness readily follows for more obscure settings in which not all preferences
are known.
Nevertheless, forms of vote elicitation do take place in real life voting, in order to predict
outcomes based on partial information and/or to tactically influence the voting process and
therefrom the outcome.
Vote elicitation can empower the voting protocol to determine the outcome of the elec-
tion before the process of casting all the votes is complete. This can also reduce both the
computational complexity and the practical effort involved in determining preferences and
outcomes. In addition to this, some voters prefer not to reveal all of their preferences for
privacy reasons and also to discourage other agents from voting strategically based on in-
formation about other voters’ preferences.
Therefore, voting rules under incomplete preferences, which is closely related to rele-
vant and necessary information for determining outcome—which is the information sought
via vote elicitation—have presented themselves as imperative topics of study in the voting
literature.
3.3.4 Extending Voting Rules to Handle Incomplete Preferences
Consider the Condorcet rule with the set of three alternatives {a, b, c}, three voters {i, j, k},
and a social preference profile Rn = (a > b > c; a?b > c, a > c; a ∼ b > c, a < c).
The preferences of each voter (except the last one in the list) are followed by a semicolon
to separate them from the preferences of the next voter. As mentioned earlier, ∼ stands
for “incomparable” and ? for “unspecified.” The preference profile Rn above denotes the
preferences of three voters which are as follows:
Voter i prefers alternative a to b, alternative b to c, and alternative a to c (by transitivity).
Voter j prefers alternative b to c and alternative a to c, but does not specify his preference
between alternatives a and b.
Voter k finds alternatives a and b incomparable, he prefers alternative b to c and alternative
c to a.
The following are possible extensions (completions) of this profile:
Rne1 = (a > b > c; a > b > c; a ∼ b > c, a < c),
Rne2 = (a > b > c; a ≥ b > c; a ∼ b > c, a < c),
Rne3 = (a > b > c; a < b > c; a ∼ b > c, a < c),
Rne4 = (a > b > c; a ≤ b > c; a ∼ b > c, a < c), and
Rne5 = (a > b > c; a = b > c; a ∼ b > c, a < c).
In general, there are exponentially many extensions of a partial preference profile. Dif-
ferent approaches have been suggested to extend voting rules in order to apply them to
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incomplete preferences:
• Consider all extensions of Rn and apply E to each and every extension, gather the
results and if necessary aggregate the results using the same or some other method.
In the previous example, the set of possible outcomes is {a, b}.
• Consider a subset of extensions (typically a singleton) using some completion process,
and apply E to the resultant complete profile.
• Generalize the definition of E so that it can input incomplete preferences. The new
definition should output the same result as the original when the preferences in the
input are complete.
Some related work [21] focused on the first approach perhaps because it is natural when
incompleteness is intrinsic in the preferences and there is no other way to decide which
extension to consider. However, considering a single extension has also been suggested
using different methods such as candidate gravitation towards preferences [6] or exploiting
indifferences [31].
3.3.5 Effective Elicitation
Preference elicitation ought to be effective. Effective preference elicitation is such that the
right outcome is found by eliciting minimal information about preferences. A preference
elicitation process that needs to obtain information about all or almost all preferences is
useless since it may as well be omitted and replaced with a single deterministic approach
for fully obtaining preferences and drawing outcomes (which would be the actual election).
Effective preference elicitation makes use of information about the candidates, infor-
mation about the voters and information about how agents relate to each other and to
candidates. Eliciting preferences effectively implies knowing when to safely terminate the
elicitation process, which in turn implies knowing what preferences to elicit from which
voters. Both these elements of effective elicitation are formally defined in [13] as follows:
Definition 3.3.1 (Elicitation-Not-Done). Given: A voting rule E, a set of votes V , a
number k of votes that are still unknown and a candidate c.
Question: Is there a way to cast the k votes so that c will not win the E-election?
Definition 3.3.2 (Effective-Elicitation). Given: A voting rule E, a set of votes V and a
number k.
Question: Is there a subset of V of size ≤ k that decides the outcome of the E-election (i.e.,
the winner(s) will be determined based on the preferences of these voters only regardless of
the preferences of other voters)?
It turns out that for many known voting rules, both Elicitation-Not-Done and Effective-
Elicitation are NP-complete. We will revisit these results in the next chapter.
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3.3.6 Possible and Necessary Winners
A possible winner is a winner in (at least) one of the completions of an incomplete preference
profile. A necessary winner is a winner in all completions of an incomplete preference profile.
When the preference profile is complete, the set of possible winners and the set of necessary
winners coincide. Formally,
Definition 3.3.3 (Possible and Necessary Winners). Let E be a voting rule, C a set of
alternatives, Rn a multiset of (possibly incomplete) preference profiles, and let Ext(Rn)
stand for the set of possible extensions of Rn into a multiset of complete preference profiles.
• x ∈ C is a necessary winner for Rn with respect to E if and only if for all T ∈ Ext(Rn),
x ∈ E(T ). The set of necessary winners under E given Rn is denoted by NWE(Rn).
• x ∈ X is a possible winner for Rn with respect to E if and only if there exists a
T ∈ Ext(Rn) such that x ∈ E(T ). The set of possible winners under E given Rn is
denoted by PWE(Rn).
For any voting rule E , the following properties hold:
• For all Rn, NWE(Rn) ⊆ PWE(Rn).
• For allRn1 , Rn2 such thatRn1 ⊆ Rn2 , NWE(Rn2 ) ⊆ NWE(Rn1 ) and PWE(Rn2 ) ⊆ PWE(Rn1 ).
Since there can be exponentially many extensions of a partial preference profile, there
is no general polynomial time algorithm for computing necessary and possible winners for
every voting rule (unless P = NP). However, for some families of voting rules it is possible to
determine necessary and possible winners in polynomial time. When the elicitation process
starts, the set of necessary winners is empty and the set of possible winners contains all
alternatives (unless further information is initially known such that to restrict the set of
possible winners to a proper subset of alternatives). As more preferences are elicited, the
set of necessary winners expands and the set of the possible winners shrinks. The elicitation
process is done when the two sets coincide.
Proposition 3.3.1 (Termination of Vote Elicitation). Given a voting rule E and
a partial preference profile Rn, the vote elicitation process is over if and only if
PWE(Rn) = NWE(Rn).
This is because when the two sets coincide, there is enough information to declare the
winners. Additional information will not possibly add new winners since winners were ob-
tained from the set of all possible winners which was initialized to the set of all alternatives.
Therefore, the remaining preferences can be safely disregarded.
If the voting rule satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)11, then deter-
mining whether an outcome a ∈ PW −NW is a winner or not, can be archived by asking
the voters for their preferences between a and all other alternatives b in pairwise compar-
isons. Therefore, preference/vote elicitation for rules satisfying IIA can be done efficiently
in polynomial time.
11The condition of IIA is defined in Chapter 1.
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3.3.7 Vote Elicitation and Manipulation
If an agent wants a specific alternative to win and plans to (strategically) vote in favor of
this alternative then the agent must at least determine whether this alternative is a possible
winner. Hence, the close relation between the problem of determining possible and nec-
essary winners and the manipulation problem. This relation also stems from the fact the
elicitation itself is closely related to the computation of possible and necessary winners, and
this elicitation process can create opportunities for both the elicitor and agents to strategi-
cally influence the outcome based on knowledge about (others’) preferences. For example,
in multiagent settings, an agent can infer the number of agents elicited so far by compar-
ing the time at which the elicitation process started and the time at which that agent was
queried. The time difference together with the query the agent is asked can be used to deter-
mine (or approximate) the number of agents elicited so far and the nature of their responses.
General manipulability results concerning social choice functions (which include voting
rules by definition12) on partial preferences have been obtained in [30], [29], and [27]. We
need to define the following terms before presenting those results13:
Definition 3.3.4 (Strong dictator). A strong dictator is a voter such that, no matter how
the others vote, this voter’s ordering/choice is the outcome.
Definition 3.3.5 (Dictator). A dictator is a voter such that, no matter how the others
vote, no outcome is selected outside the choice set of this voter.
Definition 3.3.6 (Weak dictator). A weak dictator is a voter such that, no matter how the
others vote, some choices of this voter will always be included in the outcome.
Given these definitions, the following are results concerning manipulability of social
choice functions (and hence voting rules), under partial preferences:
Theorem 3.3.1. If we have at least two agents and at least three alternatives, a social
choice function on partial order without ties that is unanimous and monotonic has at least
one weak dictator [29].
Theorem 3.3.2. If a social choice function is strategy-proof and onto then it is unanimous
and monotonic [27].
Theorem 3.3.3. If a social choice function is strategy-proof and onto then it has at least
one weak dictator14 [27].
Proof. From theorems 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above.
12Consult Chapter 1 of this thesis for these definitions.
13There are alternative definitions of these terms based on pairwise comparisons between the alterna-
tives [27].
14This result extends the Gibbard-Saterthwaite theorem, which is discussed in some detail in the next
chapter, to hold for social choice functions on partial preferences.
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3.3.8 Some Results
We conclude this section with a list of results on vote elicitation and related problems:
Proposition 3.3.2. Given a voting procedure E that is computable in polynomial time and
a partial (i.e., an incomplete) preference profile, the vote elicitation process is over if and
only if PWE = NWE .
Theorem 3.3.4. For Approval, STV, Borda count, Copeland and Maximin voting rules,
Effective-Elicitation is NP-complete [13].
Theorem 3.3.5. In general, determining whether x ∈ PWE(Rn) is NP-hard.
Theorem 3.3.6. In general, determining whether x ∈ NWE(Rn) is coNP-hard.
Theorem 3.3.7. For a polynomially-computable voting rule E, determining whether
x ∈ PWE(Rn) is in NP.
Theorem 3.3.8. For a polynomially-computable voting rule E, determining whether
x ∈ NWE(Rn) is in coNP.
Theorem 3.3.9. For positional scoring protocols, possible and necessary winners can be
computed in polynomial time [21].
Theorem 3.3.10. For STV, computing possible winners is NP-complete and computing
necessary winners is coNP-complete [28].
Theorem 3.3.11. It is NP-hard to return a superset of the possible winners PW ∗ under
STV such that we guarantee ‖PW ∗‖ < k‖PW‖ for some given positive integer k [28].
Theorem 3.3.12. Possible and necessary Condorcet winners can be computed in polynomial
time [21].
Theorem 3.3.13. For a given voting procedure, if necessary and possible winners are com-
puted in polynomial time then deciding whether there is a (constructive/destructive) manip-
ulation15 is also possible in polynomial time [21].
Theorem 3.3.14. If a voting rule E satisfies IIA and is computable in polynomial time,
then determining the set of winners via preference elicitation is polynomial in the number
of agents and alternatives [28].
3.4 Comments and Bibliographic Notes
• This chapter discussed representation and elicitation of preferences. In preference rep-
resentation, different approaches were explained briefly. For more on the capabilities
and limitations of ordinal approaches to group decision-making see [18, 15]. A note-
worthy amount of work have elaborated on logical representation of preferences, for
example [22, 16, 23]. Further more, development of logical calculus for representing
and reasoning with preferences has been presented in [6].
15The complexity of manipulation will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter.
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• Preference elicitation methods were generally surveyed in [10]. One of the approaches
to preference elicitation is the constraint-based approach which has not been discussed
in this chapter, the reader is referred to [8] for more on this.
• Another topic related to preference elicitation, and generally to AI aspects of computa-
tional social choice and decision making, is the topic of query learning (e.g., [5, 33, 24]).
Work in this direction combines preference elicitation and computational learning
theory (in specific, learning via queries). This work, however, is more pertinent to
preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions.
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Chapter 4
Complexity-Theoretic Aspects of
Voting Systems
Both this paper and Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick (1989b) have been influenced
by Nurmi (1984, p. 255), who suggested “. . . constructing a hierarchy reflecting
the difficulty of benefiting from strategic behavior.”
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick1
4.0 Prologue
This chapter surveys complexity-theoretic studies of voting systems. The chapter covers six
major problems. These are the problems of finidng winners, electoral control, manipulation
in elections, bribery, vote elicitation, and the complexity of communication in voting rules.
To facililate complexity-theoretic discussions of voting systems, the chapter begins with an
introduction to Complexity Thoery. The following sections are dedicated each to one of the
following problems in order: The Complexity of Determining Winners, The Complexity of
Electoral Control, The Complexity of Manipulating Elections, The Complexity of Bribery
in Elections, Complexity of Vote Elicitation (Revisited), and The Complexity of Commu-
nication in Voting Rules. A wealth of literature on the first four problems is available.
Hence, Comments and Bibliographic Notes appear at the end of the sections corresponding
to these problems. The chapter concludes with New Criteria for Evaluating Voting Rules
in addition to those presented in Chapter 1.
4.1 Complexity Theory: an Introduction
This section briefly reviews some notions from complexity theory. These notions will be
frequently used in later discussions. The concepts are briefly presented here in simple terms.
For rigorous definitions and full explanation, the reader is referred to standard references
1Bartholdi, J., Tovey, C., and Trick, M. (1992) “How hard is it to control an election?” Mathematical
and Computer Modelling (Special Issue on Formal Theories of Politics)16 (8/9):27–40.
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on formal languages, algorithms, and complexity theory (such as [41, 45, 47], [20] and [39]).
A reader who is familiar with these concepts may skip to the next section.
4.1.1 Problems as Languages
In complexity theory, problem solving can be viewed as language recognition2. A problem
is stated in the form of a question and has some parameter(s). For example, the problem
“what are the dimensions of a rectangle with maximum possible area subject to perimeter
length of 24 units?” has the perimeter as a parameter and the entities in question are the
dimensions of a maximum area rectangle. Varying the parameter creates a new instance
of the problem. You can think of the general problem as a template where parameters
are indicated by symbols (for the sake of description) and of an instance as replacing the
symbolic parameters with actual values. This form of a problem statement where the
question requires an optimal value to be computed is called an optimization problem. If a
problem is stated as a yes or no question, for example, “given an integer n, is n divisible by
3?,” then we get a decision problem. The question statement of an optimization problem
asks for an optimal (best) solution to the problem whilst the question statement of a decision
problem asks whether a solution with specific characteristics exists or not. The following is
an example showing an optimization problem and the corresponding decision problem:
Definition 4.1.1 (Knapsack (optimization)). Given a finite set U , a weight w(u) ∈ Z+
and a profit p(u) ∈ Z+ for each u ∈ U , and a capacity constraint M ∈ Z+.
Find: A subset U ′ ⊆ U such that ∑
u∈U ′
p(u) = P is maximized, subject to
∑
u∈U ′
w(u) ≤M .
Definition 4.1.2 (Knapsack (decision)). Given a finite set U , a weight w(u) ∈ Z+ and a
profit p(u) ∈ Z+ for each u ∈ U , a capacity constraint M ∈ Z+, and a target profit P ∈ Z+.
Question: Is there a subset U ′ ⊆ U such that ∑
u∈U ′
w(u) ≤M and ∑
u∈U ′
p(u) ≥ P .
The answer to the question stated in a decision problem can be determined to be either
“yes” or “no” (if the problem is not decidable, we may not be able to find out the answer
regardless of the time or space resources available). The instances corresponding to “yes”
answers (yes-instances) of a problem constitute a language and the no-instances also consti-
tute a language. The set of all instances also constitute a language. These sets of instances
constitute languages in the (limited) sense that a language is a collection of words. Here
every instance is a word in that language, and words are composed of the language alphabet
and are morphologically structured in a specific way according to the rules of the language.
We will not go into this level of detail but will generally assume that these instances are
words that are generated systematically from a known alphabet. For more details on the
formal definition of languages, see for example [41], [45] or [47].
Problems have to be formalized in order to be tackled systematically by computational
algorithms. Therefore, all the problems that we discuss in this chapter are first formally
2Complexity theory also studies function problems. For the purpose of the following discussions, we will
only focus on language recognition problems in this introduction.
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defined where the given instance and question are stated clearly. This applies to all prob-
lems discussed from the complexity-theoretic perspective. The framework is characterized
by a Given part and a Question part. This parallels the input and processing parts of
an algorithm, subsequently allowing a computer algorithm solution and ultimately an eval-
uation of the computational complexity of the problem. These algorithmic problems are
then classified according to their computational complexity where problems having the same
computational complexity (typically defined in terms of space and time resources required
to solve the problem) are said to belong to the same complexity class. We next define in
more rigorous terms the computational complexity of a problem and briefly mention some
important complexity classes.
4.1.2 The Computational Complexity of a Problem
The running time of an algorithm is defined as the number of steps that the algorithm
requires to solve the problem. Basic operations such as single addition, subtraction or
multiplication are considered to take unit time. The notion of algorithm runtime adopted
in complexity theory does not regard the type of machine3 used or time elapsed in usual
units of minutes and seconds, the assumption here is that the runtime depends only on
the algorithm and the input. This makes a robust normalized framework for studying the
computational complexity of a problem.
So the runtime of an algorithm is a function of the length of the input that depends on
the number of steps in the algorithm. For example, if the input is a number x of length n
and the number of steps is quadratic in the input size then the algorithm’s running time is
n2. If the algorithm’s runtime is always less than quadratic then we say that it is O(n2).
In general, for a given function f(n), O(f(n)) stands for the set of functions g(n) such
that there exist positive constants c and n0, where 0 ≤ g(n) ≤ cf(n) for all n ≥ n0, i.e., the
O-notation gives an upper bound. Similarly, if the running time of an algorithm is always
more than quadratic in the size of the input (e.g., cubic or exponential), then we say it is
Ω(n2), so the Ω notation stands for lower bound. If both upper and lower bounds are the
same then we obtain a tight (or exact) bound denoted by Θ. The followings are formal
definitions of the O-notation, Ω-notation, and Θ-notation in order.
Definition 4.1.3. For a given function f(n), O(f(n)) (pronounced “big-oh of f of n”)
denotes the set of functions
O(f(n)) = {g(n) : there exist positive constants c and n0 such that 0 ≤ g(n) ≤ cf(n) for all
n ≥ n0}.
Definition 4.1.4. For a given function f(n), Ω(f(n)) (pronounced “omega of f of n”)
denotes the set of functions
Ω(f(n)) = {g(n) : there exist positive constants c and n0 such that 0 ≤ cf(n) ≤ g(n) for all
n ≥ n0}.
3Here, by “type of machine” we mean the actual computing platform, i.e., the combination of hardware
and software system (e.g., an Intel 80486 processor running DOS Version 6.0), not the theoretical model of
computation (e.g., a non-deterministic Turing machine).
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Definition 4.1.5. For a given function f(n), Θ(f(n)) (pronounced “theta of f of n”) denotes
the set of functions
Θ(f(n)) = {g(n) : there exist positive constants c1, c2 and n0 such that 0 ≤ c1f(n) ≤ g(n)
and g(n) ≤ c2f(n) for all n ≥ n0}.
As with limits in mathematics, these notations are asymptotic, in other words, what they
tell us is how the runtime of the algorithm increases as the input size increases. Therefore,
only the most dominant summand in the runtime function is considered. For example, if the
runtime of some algorithm is O(n2 + n) then we simply say it is O(n2), since as n increases,
the value of n2 becomes much more significant than n.
Definition 4.1.6. The computational complexity of a problem is bounded above by the
(asymptotic) worst case running time of the algorithms that solve the problem. If every
algorithm that solves the problem requires a specific worst case runtime, then we also obtain
a lower bound of the complexity of the problem. In case the upper and lower bounds are
asymptotically the same, then we obtain the tight bound or exact complexity of the problem.
The above assumes that the complexity of an algorithmic problem is usually measured
in terms of time requirement. The space dimension is also considered and we have space-
complexity as well. Since time is a more critical computational resource, the complexity of
a problem is usually measures in terms of time requirements.
4.1.3 Some Important Complexity Classes
P stands for “polynomial” time and it is the complexity class containing problems (or
languages) that can be solved (recognized) in polynomial time (by a deterministic Turing
machine).
Definition 4.1.7. A problem belongs to the complexity class P of polynomially-solvable
problems if it can be solved by an algorithm with polynomial worst-case runtime.
Recall that a polynomial is a mathematical expression that is the sum of monomials,
where each monomial is a product of a coefficient and (positive whole number) power of
one or more variables. For example, x3 − 7x2 + 1.
Generally speaking, this complexity class contains problems that can be efficiently
solved, or computationally tractable.
NP stands for non-deterministic polynomial time. This is a very important and exten-
sively studied complexity class. In simple terms, the same computational model for studying
P is the underlying model for NP as well, except that for NP the next step, while process-
ing the input, is chosen nondeterministically from a set of steps. Nondeterminism can be
interpreted in terms of parallel computation paths, randomization or guessing4.
A problem in NP is characterized by polynomial time verification. This means if a
solution is given to the problem, its correctness can be verified in polynomial time (in the
4The concept of nondeterminism is a big topic, it is usually confusing at first since we tend to conceive
computer processing as a deterministic well-defined set of instructions. For introductory interpretations of
nondeterminism the reader is referred to [63].
4.1. COMPLEXITY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 75
length of the input). Note that all problems in P are also in NP since if a problem can be
solved in polynomial time then the solution can also be verified in polynomial time. How-
ever, NP also contains problems that can be verified in polynomial time but no polynomial
time algorithm was found to solve any of them yet. We still do not know whether this is
because those problems cannot be solved in polynomial time or because individual research
endeavors could not find polynomial time algorithms to solve them. However, since many
researchers for many years have independently tried to tackle different problems of this type
and no one could solve any of those problems, this is taken as a strong evidence that P is
not equal to NP, in other words, there are problem in NP but outside P and they cannot
be solved in deterministic polynomial time. The only deterministic algorithms known to
solve these problems run in exponential time, other algorithms are based on heuristics or
are approximation algorithms.
NP-complete problems are considered to be the hardest problems in NP. An NP-
complete problem is at least as hard as any other problem in NP (hence, the term “com-
plete”). A proof that a problem is NP-complete (or NP-hard) is a strong indication that it
is not in P and therefore the problem is considered computationally difficult to solve.
#P (read: “sharp P” or “number P”) is the complexity class of counting problems as-
sociated with decision problems in the class NP. Unlike the other complexity classes listed
here, #P is not a class of decision problems but a class of function problems. #P contains
all counting problems #A for which there is a polynomial-time non-deterministic Turing
machine that for each instance x has exactly as many accepting paths as there are solutions
to x. Equivalently, #P is the class of function problems that compute f(x), where f is
the number of accepting paths of an NP machine recognizing x. Recall that in decision
problems, the question is whether a solution with specific characteristics exits or not, in
counting problems the question is how many solutions with specific characteristics exist.
PNP‖ is the complexity class containing problems that can be decided in polynomial time
via parallel access to NP. The class PNP contains those languages that can be accepted by
a deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine with the help of an oracle in NP. We can
think of an oracle as a subprogram that we call to get an answer for a given query and a
call5 to which is assigned a unit cost. In general, for classes C,D, the class CD contains
languages recognized by C given access to the power of D. Formally, this is defined as
CD = ⋃A∈D CA. We obtain the class PNP‖ if we require the deterministic polynomial-time
Turing machine to make all queries to the NP oracle in parallel. The following is another
definition of PNP‖ in terms of polynomial time truth table reducibility (which is defined in
“Operations on Problems and Complexity Classes” below).
Definition 4.1.8. PNP‖ =
⋃
A∈NP{L|L ≤ptt A}.
5This call is usually termed a query.
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4.1.4 Operations on Problems and Complexity Classes
Since complexity classes are sets, all set operations such as union, intersection, difference
and complement apply to problems and complexity classes. In addition to the basic set
operations, we will mention two other types of operations: the disjoint union operation and
reductions.
Disjoint union stands for a type of union of two sets that retains the original membership
information. To explain this, note that in the (ordinary) union operation if the same element
exists in two sets then it appears (once) in the union. In the disjoint union, the elements
of each set are marked such that under union of the sets, an element that appears in both
sets appears twice as two distinct elements in the union, where each one of these copies is
marked in a way indicating its original set. This is why this type of union is also called
marked union. For simplicity, it is also referred to as the “join” operation. The following
is an example. Let A = {1, 2, 3} and B = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then the disjoint union of A and B,
denoted6 A ∪∗ B, is found by first marking the elements of each set as follows:
A∗ = {(1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0)}, B∗ = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 1)} or any other marking that makes
it possible to distinguish between element a that comes from set A and element a that
comes from set B. The disjoint union is then simply the union of A∗ and B∗ which is
{(1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0), (1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 1)}.
Reductions are of many types. The basic idea is that some problems can be reduced
to other problems. If we know the solution to the problem we are reducing to then we
can solve the problem we are reducing (from). Conversely, if we know that the problem
we are reducing is difficult then we conclude that the problem we are reducing to is also
difficult. For simplicity, one can think of “problem A is reducible to B” as “problem A is
less than or equal in difficulty than B.” Out of the various types of reductions, polynomial
time reduction is widely known and used. The followings are formal definitions of reduction
types that will be referred to later in this chapter.
Definition 4.1.9 (Polynomial-Time Many-One Reducibility). If A and B are two problems,
then A is polynomial-time many-one reducible to B, denoted A ≤pm B, if there is a function
f that maps every instance of A to an instance of B such that the first instance (of A) is
a yes-instance if and only if the second instance (of B) is a yes-instance7, and f can be
computed in polynomial time.
Polynomial time truth table reducibility is another type of reductions and is defined as
follows:
Definition 4.1.10 (Polynomial-Time Truth Table Reducibility, ≤ptt). A ≤ptt B if and only
if there is a polynomial-time machine M such that L(MB) = A and M asks all its questions
to B in parallel and receives all their answers simultaneously.
6Sometimes, the disjoint union is denoted by A⊕B but since this symbol is also used to stand for the
symmetric difference of two sets (which is the union minus intersection), it is preferred to use ∪∗ to stand
for the disjoint union.
7In other words, both are yes-instances or both are no-instances.
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4.1.5 The Notion of Completeness
Complete problems for any complexity class are the hardest problems in that class. That
is, a complete problem for any complexity class is considered to be at least as hard as any
problem in the class and a solution to a complete problem implies solutions to all problems in
that class. The following is a formal definition of completeness (polynomial time reduction
(≤pm) is defined in “Operations on Problems and Complexity Classes” above).
Definition 4.1.11. C-hard For any class C, we say that set A is C-hard if and only if for
all B ∈ C, B ≤pm A.
Definition 4.1.12. C-complete For any class C, we say that set A is C-complete if and only
if A ∈ C and A is C-hard.
To prove the NP-completeness of a problem, it is sufficient to show that the problem
belongs to NP (which is usually shown easily) and then to reduce an NP-complete problem
to it.
Some NP-complete Problems
The following is a list of NP-complete problems. These are the problems mostly used in
complexity analysis of voting and related problems. These problems are all stated as in [31].
Definition 4.1.13 (Partition). Given a finite set A and a “size” s(a) ∈ Z+ for each a ∈ A.
Question: Is there a subset A′ ⊆ A such that ∑
a∈A′
s(a) =
∑
a∈A−A′
s(a)?
Definition 4.1.14 (Knapsack (decision)). Given a finite set U , a weight w(u) ∈ Z+ and a
profit p(u) ∈ Z+ for each u ∈ U , a capacity constraint M ∈ Z+, and a target profit P ∈ Z+.
Question: Is there a subset U ′ ⊆ U such that ∑
u∈U ′
w(u) ≤M and ∑
u∈U ′
p(u) ≥ P?
Definition 4.1.15 (Exact Cover By 3-Sets (X3C)). Given a finite set X of size 3q and a
collection C of r subsets of X (where r > q) each of size 3.
Question: Does C contain an exact cover for X, that is, a subcollection C ′ ∈ C such that
every element of X occurs in exactly one member of C ′?
Definition 4.1.16 (Cover By 3-Sets (3-Cover)). Given a finite set X of size 3q and a
collection C of subsets Si1≤i≤r of X (where r > q) each of size 3.
Question: Is there a cover of X consisting of q of the subsets?
Definition 4.1.17 (Feedback Arc Set). Given a directed graph G(V,E) and a positive
integer k ≤ ‖E‖.
Question: Is there a subset of no more than k arcs (directed edges) which includes at least
one arc (directed edge) from every cycle in G?
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4.1.6 The Polynomial Hierarchy
Different complexity classes have different properties and different logical descriptions of
problems they contain. This description suggests that these classes form a hierarchy of
classes that are thought to be distinct8.
The polynomial hierarchy is formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.1.18 (Polynomial Hierarchy). Let Σ0 = P, Σ1 = NP, and Σk+1 = NPΣk . The
polynomial hierarchy (PH) is the union of all Σk for k ≥ 1 .
We will see next how this hierarchal structure of complexity classes inspired the early
work on complexity-theoretic analysis of voting schemes.
4.1.7 Complexity Theory and the Study of Voting
The computational complexity of voting schemes and related problems was initially studied
by Bartholdi, Tovey, Trick, and Orlin. In a series of papers that appeared in the late eighties-
early nineties, these pioneers of what is now known as computational social choice presented
a complexity theoretic treatment of some voting schemes and studied the computational
complexity of two related problems: manipulation and control [5, 4, 3, 6]. In “How hard is
it to control an election?,” Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick note how the classification of voting
systems according to their computational complexity was inspired by Nurmi’s comment on
the hierarchical difficulty of different levels of voters’ strategic behavior:
“The classification of voting procedures by their computational complexity has
also appeared in Bartholdi, Narasimhan, and Tovey (1990), Bartholdi, Tovey,
and Trick (1989a), and Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick (1989b). Both this paper
and Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick (1989b) have been influenced by Nurmi (1984,
p. 255), who suggested ‘. . . constructing a hierarchy reflecting the difficulty of
benefiting from strategic behavior’ ” [6].
In the following sections of this chapter, we will discuss the main problems in voting
that are studied from the complexity theory perspective. These are in order: the com-
plexity of determining winners, the complexity of control, the complexity of manipulation
and strategic voting, the complexity of bribery, the complexity of vote elicitation, and the
complexity of communication in voting rules.
8These classes are thought to be distinct with respect to which sets each includes, i.e., with respect to
how many more problems each higher class includes or how much more computational power each higher
class has.
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4.2 The Complexity of Determining Winners
4.2.1 Background
Perhaps one of the earliest problems studied in what is now called computational social
choice is the computational complexity of determining winners. The complexity of deter-
mining the winner set and the complexity of the voting system are used interchangeably
in the literature. This reflects the fundamental importance of this problem in the compu-
tational study of voting systems. Moreover, using the general description “complexity of a
voting system” to refer to the complexity of determining winners (under that system) is apt.
After all, the main goal is to declare winners, based on the votes. This is the function of a
voting system, and hence its computational complexity is the computational complexity of
determining winners.
Most widely used voting rules, such as Plurality, have a low complexity which is a ne-
cessity for the efficient operation of any voting system (especially if paper ballots are used
which is the case with large scale national presidential elections). However, the investiga-
tion of voting rules’ computational complexity, began with the discussing “voting schemes
for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election” [5]. About a decade before that
paper appeared, the empricial difficulty of these schemes was noted by Fishburn [30]. This
difficulty was first formally presented in Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick’s work.
In addition to this novel exposition of two voting schemes with high complexity, their
work presented a new perspective and new tools for studying and evaluating voting rules:
computational complexity theory.
In this section, we present a range of related work and study computational aspects of
the winner problem.
4.2.2 Definitions
The winner problem is formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.2.1 (E-Winner). Given a set of candidates C, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C,
and a set of voters V specified by their preference orders9 on C, and a voting rule E.
Question: Is c a winner under E?
Definition 4.2.2 (E-Ranking). Given a set of candidates C, distinguished candidates
c, c′ ∈ C, and a set of voters V specified by their preference orders on C.
Question: Does c defeat c′ in the E-election?
We will refer to this definition in the following discussion of the complexity of determing
winners.
4.2.3 The Beginning: Difficult Voting Schemes
The start of complexity theoretic study of voting systems as a field is marked with the
early work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [5] which appeared in the late eighties. They
9In other words, their preferences are strict (irreflexive and antisymmetric), transitive, and complete.
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presented three well-defined voting schemes and showed that although these schemes have
nice properties, they are computationally difficult to compute10.
Next are the formulations of these problems and main results regarding their computa-
tional complexity.
Definition 4.2.3 (Dodgson Score). Given a set of candidates C, a distinguished candidate
c ∈ C, and a set of voters V specified by their preference orders on C, and a positive integer
k.
Question: Is the Dodgson score of c less than or equal to k?
It was proven in [5] that this problem is NP-complete. Showing membership in NP is
simple since we can verify a “yes” answer to the previous question in polynomial time by
identifying appropriate switches and counting the votes. NP-hardness was proven via a
reduction the (NP-complete problem) X3S (Exact Cover by 3 Sets).
Theorem 4.2.1. Dodgson-Score is NP-complete [5].
A similar approach was used to obtain the following results:
Theorem 4.2.2. Dodgson-Ranking is NP-hard [5].
Theorem 4.2.3. Dodgson-Winner is NP-hard [5].
Remark: This result shows only NP-hardness. Recall that NP-hard means NP-complete
or harder, so the question of whether Dodgson-Ranking is NP-complete was left open in
this work.
Although the general complexity for Dodgson-Winner is high, and so it is a compu-
tationally difficult problem, it was pointed out that when either the candidate set or the
vote set is bounded by a constant, then the problem becomes solvable in polynomial time
using integer linear programming [5]. The authors further noted that “the effort required
to determine a Dodgson winner appears to increase more quickly as a function of |C| than
as a function of |V |.”
It was also shown by Rothe et al. that a homogenous variant of Dodgson’s scheme can
be solved efficiently also by linear programming [58].
There is yet more progress in this direction. When the number of voters is much greater
than the number of candidates (which is the case in many voting applications), a poly-
nomial time greedy algorithm designed by Homan and Hemaspaandra was proven to very
frequently find Dodgson winners. The algorithm moreover knows that it found the winners
(correctly) and it never declares a nonwinner to be a winner [40].
Similar general results were obtained for Kemeny’s voting rule. NP-hardness was shown
via a reduction from Feedback-Arc-Set. They are listed next.
Theorem 4.2.4. Kemeny-Score is NP-complete [5].
10These voting systems and related terms are defined in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
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Remark: This result was independently obtained by Orlin11 and by Wakabayashi [62].
A similar approach was used to obtain the following results:
Theorem 4.2.5. Kemeny-Ranking is NP-hard [5].
Theorem 4.2.6. Kemeny-Winner is NP-hard [5].
Since the Kemeny rule is computationally hard (even when there are only four input
rankings to aggregate [24]), researchers studied polynomial time approximations for this
rule. The first 2-approximation (i.e., the approximation differs from the optimal solution
by a factor of 2) algorithms were given in [22, 24]. An improved 11/7-approximation is
given in [1]12.
In concert with Arrow’s impossibility theorem, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick suggested a
new model of theorems that they called “impracticality” theorems. The first was a theorem
that says basically that any voting system satisfying a specific set of criteria is impractical
(recall that Arrow’s theorem basically says that any social welfare function satisfying a
specific set of criteria is impossible). In Chapter 1, when defining Kemeny’s voting rule,
we mentioned that it is the only voting rule that satisfies neutrality, consistency and the
Condorcet criterion. Hence, this was the impracticality theorem proven by Bartholdi et
al. [5]:
Theorem 4.2.7 (Impracticality Theorem). Under any voting scheme that is neutral, con-
sistent, and Condorcet, the winner problem is NP-hard.
Just before the conclusion of their groundbreaking paper, Bartholdi et al. posed the
question of whether there are stronger versions of this theorem. Was this question answered?
We will see next.
4.2.4 The Continuation: More-Difficult Voting Schemes
As noted previously, Bartholdi et al. left open the question of whether Dodgson and Kemeny
schemes are NP-complete. For Dodgson’s scheme, this question was answered by Hemas-
paandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [35] and for emeny’s scheme, it was answered later by
Hemaspaandra, Spakowski, and Vogel [38]. The answer in both cases was “No.” Moreover,
in each of these cases it turned out that the exact complexity of these systems is higher
than NP-complete. It was shown that both problem were PNP‖ -complete (or equivalently
Θp2-complete), i.e., they belong to the class of languages that are complete for parallel ac-
cess to NP13. This was obtained by improving on the previous lower bound (NP-hard) and
then by providing matching upper bounds. Combining both bounds, the exact complex-
ity of these schemes was obtained. The same result was also obtained for oung’s election
systems [58] . The three following theorems are listed in chronological order.
11It is mentioned in [5] that Orlin established the NP-completeness of Kemeny-Score by private correspon-
dance.
12In [1], computing a Kemeny ranking is referred to as the Rank-Aggregation problem.
13Parallel access to NP and the notion of completeness are defined in section 4.1.
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Theorem 4.2.8. Dodgson-Winner is PNP‖ -complete [35].
Remark: Dodgson-Winner is considered to be the first natural problem that is complete
for parallel access to NP. Before this result, the class PNP‖ was empty of “natural” complete
problems. Given that voting systems are natural methods for aggregating preferences, the
winner problem of a voting scheme that—in addition—dates back to the nineteenth century-
was widely accepted as a natural difficult problem in the class PNP‖ .
Theorem 4.2.9. Young-Winner is PNP‖ -complete [58].
Theorem 4.2.10. Kemeny-Winneris PNP‖ -complete [38].
We have demonstrated in a previous chapter that these three voting systems have some-
thing in common: they are all Condorcet consistent. In particular, they were all proposed
to extend the Condorcet rule by respecting Condorcet winners yet overcoming the cyclic
majority problem. Nevertheless, the techniques used for obtaining these results are quite
different and the three problems were not reduced to each other.
A PNP‖ -complete problem is considered to be extremely difficult in terms of computa-
tional complexity, since not only no polynomial time algorithm exists for such problems
(unless P = NP) but unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses (to NP), these problem are
outside the class NP.
Thereupon, another open question in Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick’s paper was answered
and a stronger version of their practicality theorem was proven:
Theorem 4.2.11 (Optimal Impracticality Theorem). Under any voting scheme that is
neutral, consistent, and Condorcet, the winner problem is PNP‖ -complete.
It seems that satisfying a number of criteria comes at the cost of computational feasi-
bility.
4.2.5 Multi-Winner Voting Schemes
In single-winner voting schemes, the assumption is that a vote completely reflects the po-
litical opinion of the voter. This assumption is demonstrated mostly in the use of plurality
rule. Since this assumption is not realistic, many alternative voting schemes have been
suggested to overcome this weakness of simple plurality. Among these alternative schemes
are the Borda count, approval voting, Copeland and distinctly antiplurality. In comparison
to plurality, these schemes try to realize the goal of full proportional representation. In the
case of multi-winner schemes, only few alternatives were suggested as fully proportional rep-
resentative schemes. Among these are two methods: Chamberlin and Courant’s scheme [8]
and Monroe’s scheme [49].
To explain these two schemes, we first need the following definitions. Let uic quan-
tify14 the degree to which candidate c misrepresents voter i. Assume that the scale of
uic can be normalized over all voters for comparison purposes. For example, for a scale
14The details of how this value is calculated are irrelevant here. We only assume that this value is known.
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from 0 to m− 1, where m is the number of candidates, let uic = 0 be the misrepresenta-
tion value of i’s favorite candidates and uic′ = m− 1 be the misrepresentation value for i’s
least preferred candidates. For all other candidates this value is between 0 and m− 1. Let
S = {S ⊆ C : ‖S‖ = k} by the collection of all possible subsets of the set of candidates of
size k. Let fS : V → S be a function that assigns voters to candidates based on misrepresen-
tation values. The misrepresentation value of a voter i under this assignment is ui fS(i). The
total misrepresentation of fS is Σi∈V ui fS(i). The goal of Chamberlin and Courant’s scheme
is to find a subset of k candidates that minimize that misrepresentation. The subset of k
candidates that optimally minimizes representation for all voters, is the winner set. Cham-
berlin and Courant use weighted voting to attain even proportionality. Monroe’s scheme
has a different approach for achieving balanced proportionality. Monroe’s scheme is similar
to Chamberlin and Courant’s but has one restriction; in the voters-candidate assignment,
voters are evenly distributed among candidates in every subset of k candidates. Hence, each
candidate in the winner set is supported by roughly the same number (n/k) of voters15.
The details of how an even distribution can be achieved are given in [49].
So the problem in these schemes is basically an optimization problem (minimizing mis-
representation).
Consider the following definition of deciding whether a set of candidates has misrepre-
sentation value that does not exceed a certain limit:
Definition 4.2.4. Given a set of n voters V , a set of candidates C, the number of winners
k ∈ N, misrepresentation values16 uic ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and t ∈ N. We are
asked whether there exists a subset S ⊆ C such that ‖S‖ = k, with misrepresentation at
most k [56].
Clearly, the problem of determining winners in the abovementioned (multi-winners)
schemes is harder than the problem just defined. The following related theorems are due
to Procaccia et al. [56]:
Theorem 4.2.12. Chamberlin and Courant’s rule-Winners is NP-complete.
Theorem 4.2.13. Monroe’s rule-Winners is NP-complete.
Theorem 4.2.14. When the number of winners k satisfies k = O(1) (i.e., is a constant)
then Chamberlin and Courant’s rule-Winners is in P.
Theorem 4.2.15. When the number of winners k satisfies k = O(1) then Monroe’s rule-
Winners is in P.
Results show again that satisfying desirable criteria (such as full proportional represen-
tation) comes at the cost of computational feasibility.
15When deriving complexity results, n/k is assumed to be an integer. This assumption does not compro-
mise the generality of the result as pointed in [56] since the set of voters can be padded with enough number
of voters with uic = 0 for all c ∈ C such that n/k is an integer.
16In the definition given in [56], misrepresentation values range between 0 and m inclusively.
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4.2.6 Determining Winners as Graph Problems
Sequential Majority Voting
Recall the binary voting rule defined in Chapter 1, the majority graph G defined in Chapter
3, and the set of possible winners defined in Chapter 3. A top cycle in the majority graph
corresponds to a set of k alternatives ci, were k > 2 and 1 ≤ i ≤ k such that c1 beats c2, c2
beats c3, . . ., ck−1 beats ck and ck beats c1, and every alternative not in the top cycle is
beaten by some alternative in the top cycle.
The following is a characterization of possible winners in terms of paths in G.
Theorem 4.2.16. Given a complete majority graph G(C,E), a candidate c is a possible
winner if and only if, for every other candidate c′ in C, there exists a path from c to c′ [50].
Based on this result and the fact that path finding in graphs is in P, the following result
was obtained:
Theorem 4.2.17. Given a complete majority graph G(C,E) and a candidate c, checking
whether c is a possible winner and if so finding a tree where c wins is in P [44].
The previous results apply to binary voting trees in general, however, since not all
binary trees are balanced trees, a binary voting tree might correspond to an election where
some candidate (possibly the winner) competes with very few other candidates. Hence,
yielding an unfair competition (especially if this candidate ends up being the winner). A
competition is considered fair if the corresponding binary tree is balanced17. A fair possible
winner is a winner in some balanced binary tree. Since the Condorcet winner is the winner
of all possible binary trees corresponding to pairwise sequential majority elections, the
Condorcet winner, in the context of graph representations of elections, is the best depiction
of a fair winner. Unfortunately, the complexity of determining fair possible winners is not
known yet, moreover, in the only setting for which it is known—weighted voting—it is
computationally difficult to check whether a given candidate is a fair possible winner.
Theorem 4.2.18. Given a complete majority graph G(C,E) and a candidate c, it is NP-
complete to check whether c is a fair possible winner for G [44].
Kemeny Rankings
Recall the Kemeny rule defined in Chapter 1, and discussed earlier in this section. The
Kemeny voting rule can be thought of as an optimization problem where the goal is to
produce a ranking of all alternatives that minimizes the number of disagreements with n
individual rankings, or equivalently maximizes the number of agreements with the individ-
ual rankings.
Given the majority graph, we can assign weights to G and reinterpret Kemeny’s voting
rule as a graph problem. Consider the majority graph G, where vertices represent candi-
dates and for any two candidates a, b ∈ C, let hab be the number of voters who prefer a to
17This implies the assumption that the number of candidates is a power of two, however, this assumption
does not restrict the generality of the problem.
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b and hba be the number of voters who prefer b to a. For an edge (a, b) in G, let the weight
of this edge be hab minus hba. Note that this number is always nonnegative since an edge
is drawn from vertex a to vertex b only if more voters prefer a to b.
If an edge (a, b) exists in G and a Kemeny ranking ranks a above b, then the Kemeny
ranking agrees with hab individual rankings on the pair (a, b) otherwise if the Kemeny rank-
ing ranks b above a, then this Kemeny ranking agrees with hba individual rankings (which
is a smaller number of agreements). Given the way we assigned weights to edges, when the
direction of an edge does not agree with the Kemeny ranking then the number of disagree-
ments with the Kemeny ranking is equal to the weight of that edge. Hence we can translate
the Kemeny rule optimization problem into a graph optimization problem where the goal
is to minimize the total weight of edges that disagree with the final ranking.
Initially, a lower bound on the total weight of edges that disagree with the Kemeny
ranking was proposed by Davenport and Kalagnanam [21]. This lower bound was obtained
by observing that for each cycle in a set of edge-disjoint cycles in G, at least one edge
disagrees with the Kemeny ranking (since the Kemeny ranking must be transitive), since
the goal is to minimize the total weight, for every cycle in G, the edge of the smallest weight
is augmented to the lower bound. Several improved lower bounds were later proposed by
Conitzer, Davenport and Kalagnanam [11]. These were obtained by looking at general
cycles (not necessarily edge-disjoint) and using linear programs.
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4.2.7 Summary of Results
Table 4.1 summarizes results discussed in this section and table 4.2 summarizes results
related to the winner problem discussed in this section and in Chapter 3. Some of the latter
results will be revisited and discussed in more detail in a later section of this chapter.
Table 4.1: Summary of results on complexity of determining winners sorted by increasing
order of complexity.
Voting Rule Complexity Remark Result in
Plurality P O(|C|+ |V |) [5]
Positional scoring P
protocols
Dodgson P ‖C‖ is constant [5]
Dodgson P ‖V ‖ is constant [5]
Dodgson homogenous P [58]
variant
Dodgson P greedy heuristic algorithm [40]
“frequently correct” when ‖V ‖  ‖C‖
Chamberlin and Courant’s P if k is constant [56]
k multi-winner scheme
Monroe’s k P if k is constant [56]
multi-winner scheme
Chamberlin and Courant’s NP-complete even when uic [56]
k multi-winner scheme values are in binary
Monroe’s k NP-complete even when uic [56]
multi-winner scheme values are in binary
Sequential majorty NP-complete fair possible winner [44]
weighted voting
Kemeny PNP‖ -complete tight bound [38]
Dodgson PNP‖ -complete tight bound [35]
Young PNP‖ -complete tight bound [58]
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Table 4.2: Summary of results on finding possible/necessary winners under incomplete
preferences.
Problem Voting Rule Complexity Result in
Necessary Winners Condorcet P [42]
Necessary Winners Positional Scoring P [42]
Protocols
Necessary Winners STV coNP-complete [53]
Possible Winners Scoring P [42]
Protocols
Possible Winners STV NP-complete [53]
Possible Winners Condorcet P [42]
Fair Possible Winners Weighted sequential NP-complete [44]
majority
Is c ∈ C a Any E ∈ P coNP [42]
Necessary Winner?
Is c ∈ C a General E coNP-hard [53]
Necessary Winner?
Is c ∈ C a Any E ∈ P NP [42]
Possible Winner?
Is c ∈ C a General E NP [53]
Possible Winner?
Determining winners Any E ∈ P P [53]
via Vote Elicitation satisfying IIA
Finding PW ∗ ⊆ PW s.t. STV NP-hard [53]
‖PW ∗‖ < k‖PW‖, k ∈ Z+
Manipulation Any E s.t. P [42]
PW, NW ∈ P
4.2.8 Comments and Bibliographic Notes
• Although the complexity theoretic analysis of voting rules [5] is widely known as the
first computational study of voting rules, at least a decade earlier, some work studied
the empirical computational complexity of voting rules [30]. Also, the early result of
the difficulty in finding Kemeny scores, was proven independently by Orlin18 and by
Wakabayashi [62] few years before that.
• Among the topics discussed in this section was the graph interpretation of some voting
rules. A work that has not been discussed here is related to computing Slater rankings
(using similarities among candidates and hieratical election graphs) by Conitzer [10].
Another interpretation of voting rules is based on viewing them as “maximum likeli-
hood estimators” of correct outcomes where we view optimal alternatives as correct
outcomes and the vote of each voter as a “noisy perception” of this correct out-
come. This interpretation is dated back to Condorcet [46] and continued recently by
Young [65], and Conitzer and Sandholm [16].
18Private correspondance.
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4.3 The Complexity of Electoral Control
4.3.1 Electoral Control
Electoral control refers to the election chair’s attempt or action to change the outcome
of the election by controlling its structure. This involves procedural aspects of conducting
elections such as the way the election agenda is set such as the sequence in which candidates
run against each other or the way voters are partitioned and grouped.
The control problem is a natural one in many voting settings. As was mentioned earlier,
these settings occur in a wide range of domains. Therefore, investigating the issue of control,
which is closely and naturally related to voting, is central in the study of voting systems.
Moreover, since complexity-theory is used as measure through which this problem is studied,
the control problem has a special and important place in the study of complexity-theoretic
aspects of voting systems.
The work on the complexity of control problems was pioneered by Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [6]. In “How hard is it to control an election?,” they defined the control problem,
and discussed its complexity. The work focused on different types of control and results
were shown for the two known voting rules: Plurality and Condorcet. The different types
of control and the computational complexity of each of them are discussed next.
4.3.2 Types of Control
Two types of control are studied in the literature of electoral control complexity. These
are the constructive control which was studied first [6], and the destructive control which
followed in the work of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra and Rothe [36].
There is a different classification for the types of control problems. It is the classification
that focuses on whether the control is exercised on the voters and voting related aspects
or on the candidate set and related aspects (e.g., tie-breaking rules). The emphasis in a
given context depends on the key concepts and on the goal of the discussion. Since this
work surveys related research studies, the types of control problems are presented here
according to the main theme of each of the related works in chronological order. This seems
to serve both the nature and purpose of this work and also makes it easy to understand the
development of research on the control problem.
Next are the definitions of the different control problems, formulated as they were first
presented by the authors in the corresponding work. The formulation of these problems is
consistent with the conventions of defining problems in complexity theory. This thesis too,
follows this line throughout. The notation in the formal definitions in this section assume
basic knowledge of how elections and related entities are denoted. Chapter 1 discusses
notation and basic definitions.
Constructive Control
In the problem of constructive control, we ask the question of whether the authority con-
ducting the election (or the chairman) can adjust some procedural matters so that a given
candidate c, who is not a winner of the election if no control is executed, becomes the unique
winner of the election? What is the cost of achieving this goal if achievable? And how to
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achieve it if it is feasible? It is assumed that the chairman knows the preferences of the
voters in advance.
Constructive control is accomplished in a number of ways. These are: adding can-
didates, deleting candidates, partition of candidates, run-off partition of candidates and
adding voters, deleting voters and partition of voters.
Destructive Control
In the problem of destructive control, we ask the question of whether the chairman can ad-
just some procedural matters so that a given candidate c, who is the winner of the election
if no control is executed, does not become the unique winner? What is the cost of achieving
this goal if achievable and how to achieve it (if it is achievable or it is computationally easy
to achieve)?
In this type of control also, it is assumed that the chairman knows the preferences of
the voters a priori.
Regarding the terminology, here the term control “type” refers to constructive or de-
structive control and the term control “method” refers to the procedure through which the
desired outcome of the control is realized, namely: adding candidates, deleting candidates,
partitioning of candidates, run-off partitioning of candidates and adding voters, deleting
voters and partitioning of voters.
The term “model” of control is used here in a way similar to the way it was used in
some related work, to stand for the specification of the type of control and the method
used together, for example “destructive control via adding candidates” is a model of con-
trol. However, it is used here to precisely mean that, although it was used loosely in the
literature to stand for a method of control or a model of control.
4.3.3 How is Control Exercised?
Constructive or destructive control is accomplished by means of adding candidates, deleting
candidates, partition of candidates, run-off partition of candidates and adding voters, delet-
ing voters and partition of voters. Tie-breaking rules, whether tie-promote or tie-eliminate,
also play an important role in determining the outcome and sometimes the complexity of
the control.
The following are formulations of each of these control methods (given for the construc-
tive and destructive cases).
The following control methods pertain to the candidate set:
Definition 4.3.1 (Control by Adding Candidates). Given a set C of qualified candidates
and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set D of possible spoiler (added) candidates, and a
set V of voters with preferences over C ∪D.
• Question (constructive): Is there a choice of candidates from D whose entry into
the election would guarantee that c is the unique winner?
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• Question (destructive): Is there a choice of candidates from D whose entry into
the election would guarantee that c is not the unique winner?
Definition 4.3.2 (Control by Adding ≤ k-Candidates). Given a set C of qualified candi-
dates and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set D of possible spoiler (added) candidates, a
positive integer k ≤ ‖D‖, and a set V of voters with preferences over C ∪D.
• Question (constructive): Is there a choice of at most k candidates from D whose
entry into the election would guarantee that c is the unique winner?
• Question (destructive): Is there a choice of at most k candidates from D whose
entry into the election would guarantee that c is not the unique winner?
Definition 4.3.3 (Control by Deleting Candidates). Given a set C of qualified candidates
and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set V of voters and a positive integer k < ‖C‖.
• Question (constructive): Is there a set of k or fewer candidates in C whose dis-
qualification would guarantee that c is the unique winner?
• Question (destructive): Is there a set of k or fewer candidates in C − {c} whose
disqualification would assure that c is not the unique winner?
Note that if we replace C − {c} by C in the last question then the answer is trivially:
Yes! this is the singleton set {c}.
Definition 4.3.4 (Control by Partition of Candidates). Given a set C of qualified candi-
dates and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C and a set V of voters.
• Question (constructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that c
is the unique winner in the sequential two-stage election in which the winners in
the subelection (C1, V ) (after applying the tie-handling rule move forward to face the
candidates in C2 (with voter set V )?
• Question (destructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that c is
not the unique winner in the sequential two-stage election in which the winners in
the subelection (C1, V ) who survive the tie-handling rule move forward to face the
candidates in C2 (with voter set V )?
Definition 4.3.5 (Control by Run-Off Partition of Candidates). Given a set C of qualified
candidates and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C and a set V of voters.
• Question (constructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that c is
the unique winner of the election in which those candidates winning (with respect to
the tie-handling rule) subelections (C1, V ) and (C2, V ) have a run-off with voter set
V ?
• Question (destructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that c is not
the unique winner of the election in which those candidates winning (with respect to
the tie-handling rule) subelections (C1, V ) and (C2, V ) have a run-off with voter set
V ?
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Definition 4.3.6 (Control by Effective Sequence of Comparisons19). Given a set C of
qualified candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a set V of voters.
• Question (constructive): Is there a sequence of pairwise comparisons between can-
didates such that c is the unique winner under the sequential pairwise voting rule?
• Question (destructive): Is there a sequence of pairwise comparisons between can-
didates such that c is not the (unique) winner under the sequential pairwise voting
rule?
The following control methods pertain to the voter set:
Definition 4.3.7 (Control by Adding Voters). Given a set C of qualified candidates and
a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set V of registered voters, an additional set V ′ of yet
unregistered voters (both V and V ′ have preferences over C), and a positive integer k < ‖V ′‖.
• Question (constructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters from V ′ whose regis-
tration would guarantee that c is the unique winner?
• Question (destructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters from V ′ whose registra-
tion would guarantee that c is not the unique winner?
A generalization of control by adding voters for multi-winner voting systems was pre-
sented in [56]. However, this definition uses utility functions to evaluate candidates. Win-
ners in this definition are candidates with maximum utility.
Definition 4.3.8 (Multi-Winner-Control). Given a set C of candidates, a set V of voters,
a set V ′ of unregistered voters, the number of winners m ∈ N, a utility function u : C → N,
the number of winners we are allowed to register k ∈ N, and an integer t ∈ N.
• Question: Is it possible to register at most k voters from V ′ such that in the resulting
election, Σc∈Wu(c) ≥ t, where W is the set of winners and ‖W‖ = m.
Definition 4.3.9 (Control by Deleting Voters). Given a set C of qualified candidates and
a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set V of voters and a positive integer k < ‖V ‖.
• Question (constructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters in V whose removal
(disenfranchisement) would guarantee that c is the unique winner?
• Question (destructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters in V whose removal
(disenfranchisement) would guarantee that c is not the unique winner?
Definition 4.3.10 (Control by Partition of Voters). Given a set C of qualified candidates
and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C and a set V of voters.
• Question (constructive): Is there a partition of V into V1 and V2 such that c is the
unique winner in the hierarchical two-stage election in which the winners of (C, V1)
and (C, V2) run against each other with voter set V ?
19This definition applies only to rules where sequential pairwise comparisons take place. This type of
agenda control was discussed in previous work (e.g., [2]), however, it is first formalized in the context of
computational social choice as one of standard types of control here.
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• Question (destructive): Is there a partition of V into V1 and V2 such that c is
not the unique winner in the hierarchical two-stage election in which the winners of
(C, V1) and (C, V2) run against each other with voter set V ?
4.3.4 Important Notions of Control Complexity
The answers to the above questions (for their corresponding “given” instances) determine
the immunity against or susceptibility of a voting system to the corresponding control. In
addition, if a result shows that a voting system is susceptible to a specific type of control
then it also shows the level of this susceptibility in terms of computational complexity, that
is whether the voting system is computationally resistant to control or computationally vul-
nerable to control. To fully grasp the meaning behind these terms we need clear definitions
of the terms immunity, susceptibility, resistance and vulnerability. All of these terms are
defined similarly for both constructive and destructive control as follows.
Immunity: a voting system is immune to constructive control through a given method if
it is never possible for the authority running the election to promote a non-winner candidate
to becoming the unique winner by using the control method. Similarly, a voting system
is immune to destructive control through a given method if it is never possible for the
authority running the election to prevent a winning candidate from becoming the unique
winner by using the control method.
Susceptibility: if a voting system is not immune to a model of control then it is said to
be susceptible to that model of control.
Vulnerability: a voting system is (computationally) vulnerable to a (model of) control if
it is susceptible to that (model of) control and the corresponding problem is computationally
easy to solve (i.e., it is in P).
Certifiable Vulnerability: a voting system is certifiably vulnerable to a model of control
if it is vulnerable to that model of control and an algorithm that the chairman needs to
implement to control the outcome of the election exists and runs in polynomial time.
Resistance: a voting system is resistant to a control model if it is susceptible to control
but the corresponding control problem is computationally hard (NP-complete [6, 36] or
NP-hard [37, 29]).
The first two properties mostly result from knowledge in axiomatic social choice theory
and political science. The last two mostly stem from results derived from complexity-
theoretic treatments of the problem. The two however are related. Since general suscep-
tibility results were shown by studies in the theory of social choice and economics, this
inspired more specific and practical results based on some new tool and a new perspective;
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which is complexity-theory. The section on “Proofs” touches on how the results were ob-
tained, in terms of the technique used, and provides a summary of findings. Before getting
there, it is now time to discuss an important work in electoral conrol.
4.3.5 Hybridization of Voting Systems and Control
As previous work showed, none of the studied election systems is globally resistant to all
types of control. This motivated the question of whether or not there exists an election
system with the property of being resistant to all twenty types of control20. In “Hybrid
elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control,” Hemaspaanra et al., showed
that there exists such a system [37]. This system is basically a hybrid of a number of
voting systems such that it inherits the easiness of implementation (i.e., the winner(s) can
be determined in polynomial time) if all constituents systems are easy to implement yet
it also inherits the difficulty of control if at least one of the underlying systems is hard to
control. The authors described the “hybridization” in their work as an analog to the “join”
operation discussed in the previous section on complexity theory. The combined result of
resistance to control and easiness of implementation was derived by the way inheritance
works when the join operation is used. This work proved, for the first time, that a desirable
election system (though artificial) indeed exists.
4.3.6 Proofs
The proof techniques vary and seem to be strongly connected to the type of results. Im-
munity results (mostly) require direct proof methods based on the axioms of social choice
theory and political science, and knowledge of results in these former fields. Since suscep-
tibility is merely the logical negation of immunity, the proofs concerning these results are
somewhat related. On the other hand, proofs of vulnerability results vs. resistance employ
techniques from computer science, in particular algorithm design and complexity theory.
In specific, for vulnerability results the proof basically provides an algorithm (well-defined
step by step specification) for answering the yes/no question of the given instance and then
argues that the algorithm runs in time that is polynomial in the length of the input. For
certifiable-vulnerability results, the proof provides an algorithm, i.e., actions to be taken by
the chairman, to control the election and then argues that the algorithm runs in polynomial
time (solves the problem whose decision version is proven easy in the vulnerability case).
Finally, for resistance results the special work of complexity theory comes into play and
corresponding language problems are shown to be NP-complete or NP-hard via reductions
from known NP-hard problems (and polynomial verification for membership to NP in case
of NP-completeness results). Many NP-hard results were obtained by reductions from dif-
ferent variants of the Exact-Cover NP-complete problem.
The following are selected theorems and their proofs. The results and proofs—except
for Theorem 4.3.3 which is proven independently here—are due to previous work as cited.
The proofs are rewritten here.
20Except of course control by effective sequence of pairwise comparisons, since this one only applies to the
sequential pairwise voting rule.
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Theorem 4.3.1. Condorcet voting is immune to constructive control by adding candi-
dates [6].
Proof. If a given candidate is not a winner under the uncontrolled election, then by definition
of the Condorcet rule that candidate is defeated by at least one other candidate. Adding
new candidates will not change the fact that c is defeated by some candidate and hence will
not make c the winner of the new election.
Theorem 4.3.2. Plurality voting is computationally vulnerable to constructive control by
deleting voters [6].
Proof. Since Plurality considers only first choice candidates, each vote influences the po-
sition of one candidate only. Hence, it is possible to delete voters in order to promote a
candidate to be the winner.
Theorem 4.3.3. Plurality voting is certifiably vulnerable to destructive control by deleting
voters.
Proof. Since Plurality considers only first choice candidates, the algorithm to prevent a
given candidate c from winning is simply as follows: consider the number of voters choosing
c as a top candidate. Finding this is possible in polynomial time since there is a total of ‖V ‖
voters whose preferences are known to the chairman in advance. If this number is at most
k, then there exists a set of k voters (where k ≤ ‖V ‖, see defitnition 4.3.9) whose removal
would guarentee that c is not the winner. Otherwise, there does not exist a set of k voters
whose removal would guarentee that c is not the winner. This algorithm is polynomial in
the number of voters (which is clearly a polynomial in the size of the input).
Theorem 4.3.4. Sequential pairwise majority voting is certifiably vulnerable to control by
effective sequence of comparisons [6].
Proof. The following is a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether a sequence
of pairwise competitions exists such that a given candidate c wins the sequential election
under this sequence, and if it exists, the algorithm finds that sequence in polynomial time.
1. Construct the tournament G of all pairwise comparisons between candidates21.
2. Use breadth-first-search to determine whether a spanning tree (that spans all candidates)
rooted at c exists.
3. If the tree in step 2 is found, then c is the winner of election given the sequence in which
candidates appear in non-increasing order of their distance from c in G. Otherwise, some
other candidate (not in the maximal tree rooted at c wins the election).
Step 1 is O(|V ||C|2), step 2 is O(|C|) and the construction of the tree is O(|C|2). The
algorithm is O(|V ||C|2) which is clearly polynomial in the length of the input.
21A tournament is defined in Chapter 2.
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4.3.7 Results
Results obtained from work on the control problem show that most natural and widely
used voting systems are not globally immune or resistant to control [6, 37, 29]. Nevertheless
some are more susceptible than others to specific model of control. For example, Plurality is
resistant to structure control of the candidate set but it is vulnerable to control of the voter
set. The Condorcet method, to the contrary, is mostly vulnerable to constructive control
of the candidate set but it is resistant to control of the voter set. The only voting system
that is resistant to all twenty standard types of control22, is an artificial one. Nevertheless,
two natural voting systems, namely Copeland and Llull’s were shown to be “broadly” re-
sistant to control. Moreover, tie-eliminating rules play an important role in the complexity
of control by parition of candidates. It is worth mentioning too that the results obtained
for Llull’s system apply also to irrational voter set, since his system was defined on possibly
non-transitive preferences.
The following table summarizes the results for the different control models for a number
of voting systems. hybrid stands for the hybrid election system described in [37].
22Not counting control by effective sequence of comparisons because of its restricted application.
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The following are additional results that are not mentioned in the table above:
Theorem 4.3.5. Both Llull’s voting system and Copeland voting system are resistant to
constructive control by adding ≤ k-candidates and both are vulnerable to destructive control
by adding ≤ k-candidates [29].
Theorem 4.3.6. For SNTV, Multi-Winner-Control (by adding voters) is in P [56]
Theorem 4.3.7. Multi-Winner-Control(by adding voters) is NP-complete for Bloc voting,
Approval voting, and Cumulative voting [56].
4.3.8 Comments and Bibliographic Notes
• The scope of the related research works discussed in this section is the control problem
from a complexity-theoretic perspective. Although the scope is basically the same for
all of these studies, the focus of each is clearly different. The original work of Bartholdi,
Tovey and Trick focused on the complexity of constructive control for Plurality and
Condorcet voting systems. Following their work was the work of Hemaspaandra,
Hemaspaandra and Rothe on the complexity of destructive control for plurality, Con-
dorcet and approval voting systems. The latter introduced tie-breaking and refined
complexity results of control by partition of candidates based on the tie-breaking rule
in use. A notable work of Hemaspaandra et al. established the existence of a voting
system that is resistant to all types of control discussed previously [37]. A work of
Faliszewski et al. introduced yet positive results regarding resistance to control by
Copeland and Llull’s voting systems [29]. In addition, this work studied a restricted
form of control by adding a bounded number of candidates.
• In the context of multi-winner systems, Procaccia et al. redefined the control-by-
adding-voters problem for multi-winner systems using utility functions. New results
were obtained based on this definition for Bloc23voting, Approval, SNTV, and Cumu-
lative voting [56].
23Chapter 1 provides definitions of these voting rules.
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4.4 The Complexity of Manipulating Elections
4.4.1 Background
In the voting context, manipulation stands mainly for a voter’s misreporting his/her vote
such that it does not reflect true preferences, so that to change the outcome of the election
as desired. This is also referred to as strategic voting in which agents or voters are called
“self-interested” agents. When interested in a specific outcome of the election, the “would-
be” manipulator asks whether there exists an “effective preference” that would tailor the
outcome of the election to be the favorable one. Is it clear then that some researchers refer
to manipulation in election as the problem of finding an “effective preference.”
For example, consider the sequential pairwise majority rule. Assume that the election
consists of three candidates x, y and z, and three voters v1, v2 and v3. The agenda is as
follows: x and y compete in the first round, and the winner competes with z in the second
round. Assume that the voters have the following (true) preferences respectively: x > y > z,
y > z > x, and z > x > y. Under the sequential majority rule, the winner of the first round
is x so x competes with z next, and according to the preferences above, z wins. Note that
z is v1’s least preferred candidate. If instead of reporting her (true) preference x > y > z,
v1 reports the following preference order: y > x > z, then the winner of the first round is
y and then y competes with z in the second round and wins. So by reporting a preference
order other than his true preference order, v1 achieves an outcome (y) that he prefers to
the outcome under true preferences (z). We say in this case that the sequential pairwise
majority is manipulable, or it is not strategy-proof, since there is a voter who can manipu-
late the rule by misrepresenting preferences to achieve a desirable outcome.
Since voting systems are supposed to output a socially desirable choice, misrepresenting
a vote can lead to an outcome that does not reflect the true preferences of the society mem-
bers. Therefore, manipulation is considered an undesirable phenomenon in voting. While
this is a concern in human contexts, it has a similar if not a higher importance in software
agents settings. This is because software agents are not affected by irrationality, emotions
or limited computational speed and capacity. Therefore, computing effective preferences
can be done easily in societies of software agents.
It was known for a long time that many voting procedures are subject to manipulation
by strategic voters. The first conjecture on the manipulability of voting procedures in gen-
eral was Dummett and Farquharson’s conjecture, in which they state: “It seems unlikely
that there is any voting procedure in which it can ever be advantegous for any voter to vote
‘strategically’, i.e., non-sincerely” [23], page 34.
Vickery [61] made another conjecture based on Arrow’s theorem. Basically, he con-
jectured that satisfying the conditions of IIA and Pareto efficiency, implies manipulabil-
ity or dictatorship. The conjecture was proven independently by Gibbard [32] and Sat-
terthwaite [59]. The result is referred to as Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Gibbard-
Satterthwaite’s theorem and Duggan-Schwartz’s theorem apply to voting rules with at least
three candidates, but the first one applies to single-winner rules while the second applies
to rules that output a set of winners. The two theorems prove that there does not exist a
non-dictatorial non-manipulable voting system without compromising other conditions of
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fairness and uniformity.
Basically, these theorems establish the theoretical impossibility of non-manipulability of
voting systems. However, like Arrow’s theorem, these therorems show that there are cases
where voting systems (satisfying the conditions of the theorems) are manipulable. It does
not say that every election is mainpulable. Moreover, these results do not tell much about
the practical difficulty of manipulating a specific voting rule, i.e., if it is true that voting sys-
tems are basically manipulable, then is it feasible in practise to find effective preference that
will change the outcome of the election if reported? This question was first raised by the
pioneers of computational voting theory: Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick in their paper: “The
Computational Difficulty of Manipulating an Election” [4] and then again by Bartholdi and
Orlin in “Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting” [3]. Since then, the research
in the computational complexity of manipulation has been actively and rapidly extending.
The manipulation problem is the most extensively studied in the complexity theorey litera-
ture of voting systems. The following sections shed some light on some of the main results
in this area.
4.4.2 Different Manipulation Problems
The followings are different formulations of the manipulation problem:
Definition 4.4.1 (Existence of a Winning Preference). Given a set of candidates C, a set
of votes24 V that are transitive and complete orders over C, and a distinguished candidate
c ∈ C.
Question: Does there exist a preference order P that will ensure that c is the winner?
This is a formulation of a single-voter manipulation problem (which appeared in [4]).
Definition 4.4.2 (Effective Preference). Given a set of candidates C, a set of votes V that
are sincere, transitive and complete orders over C, and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C.
Question: Does there exist a preference order on C that when tallied with the preferences
of V will ensure that c is the winner?
This is also a formulation of a single-voter manipulation problem (which appeared in [3]).
Definition 4.4.3 (Preferred Outcome). Given a set of candidates C, a set of votes V
that are sincere transitive and complete orders over C, and the sincere preferences of the
manipulator.
Question: Can the manipulator achieve a preferred outcome in the election by voting other
than his/her true preferences?
This is also a formulation of a single-voter manipulation problem but it focuses on finding
a strategic vote that will yield results better than the sincere vote (appeared in [3]).
24or voters having votes that are reported as transitive and complete orders over C.
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Definition 4.4.4 (E-manipulation). Given a set of candidates C, a set of non-manipulative
voters V , a set of manipulative voters S with V ∩ S = ∅ and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C.
Question: Is there a way to set the preferences lists of the voters in S such that c is the
winner of the election (C, V ∪ S) under the rule E?
This is a formulation of a coalition-of-voter manipulation problem.
The following are definitions of constructive manipulation by a coalition of weighted
voters for deterministic and randomized protocols respectively [12].
Definition 4.4.5 (E-Constructive-Coalitional-Weighted-Manipulation–CCWD). Given a set of
candidates C, a set of non-manipulative weighted voters V , the weights for a set of manip-
ulative voters S with V ∩ S = ∅ and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C.
Question: Is there a way to cast the votes in S such c is the winner of the election
E(C, V ∪ S)?
Definition 4.4.6 (E-Constructive-Coalitional-Weighted-Manipulation–CCWR). Given a set of
candidates C, a set of non-manipulative weighted voters V , the weights for a set of ma-
nipulative voters S with V ∩ S = ∅, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a distribution over
instantiations of the voting protocol, and a number r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
Question: Is there a way to cast the votes in S such c is the winner of the election
E(C, V ∪ S) with probability greater than r?
The following are definitions of destructive manipulation by a coalition of weighted voters
for deterministic and randomized protocols respectively [12].
Definition 4.4.7 (E-Destructive-Coalitional-Weighted-Manipulation–DCWD). Given a set of
candidates C, a set of non-manipulative weighted voters V , the weights for a set of manip-
ulative voters S with V ∩ S = ∅ and a candidate c ∈ C.
Question: Is there a way to cast the votes in S such c is not the winner of the election
E(C, V ∪ S)?
Definition 4.4.8 (E-Destructive-Coalitional-Weighted-Manipulation–DCWR). Given a set of
candidates C, a set of non-manipulative weighted voters V , the weights for a set of ma-
nipulative voters S with V ∩ S = ∅, a candidate c ∈ C, a distribution over instantiations of
the voting protocol, and a number r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
Question: Is there a way to cast the votes in S such c is the winner of the election
E(C, V ∪ S) with probability less than r?
4.4.3 Types of Manipulation
There are different factors to be considered when analyzing the complexity of manipulating
elections. These include the nature of the manipulation, i.e., whether constructive or de-
structive, whether manipulation is done by a single voter or a group of voters and whether
the votes are weighted or not. The following few paragraphs briefly explain these factors.
Manipulation can be effected by a single voter or a number of voters (a coalition of
voters).
4.4. THE COMPLEXITY OF MANIPULATING ELECTIONS 101
Like electoral control, manipulation can be constructive or destructive. In constructive
manipulation, a voter or a coalition of voters misreports preferences so that a distinguished
candidate c becomes the winner of the election. In destructive manipulation, a voter or a
coalition of voters misreports preferences so that a distinguished candidate c does not win
the election.
In weighted manipulation, a voter has a weight and so the influence of his/her vote on
the election’s outcome is related to the weight the voter has. In elections where votes are
unweighted, two voters with the same ordering over the candidates contribute equally to the
rank of the alternatives in the final result of the election. A k-weighted vote can be viewed
as k unweighted votes and hence many results pertaining to weighted voting/manipulation
are used to infer results in the unweighted version of the problem.
The type of manipulation to be studied is determined by some or all of the previous
factors. In the following sections, we will encounter general results and results that are
specific to each type of manipulation.
4.4.4 Questions and Directions
The following are the main questions that led different directions in the area of manipulation
complexity:
• What is the computational complexity of manipulating multi-winner voting schemes?
• What is the computational complexity of manipulation for some common voting rules?
• How is the complexity of manipulating elections related to the number of candidates?
• Is it possible to design voting rules that are hard to manipulate? If so, how?
• What is the manipulation power of voter coalitions?
• What is the source of the complexity of manipulation (with respect to some broad
family of voting protocols)? In other words, what are the characteristics of a voting
system that determine its manipulation complexity?
• Are there manipulation related analyses other than worst-case?
• What is the computational complexity of manipulating voting rules under incomplete
knowledge of preferences?
Each of the following subsections is dedicated to the discussion of one of these directions
and is concluded with answers for related questions.
4.4.5 Complexity of Manipulating Multi-Winner Schemes
Recall the definitions of the following k-winner voting schemes: pproval, Bloc Voting, Cu-
mulative Voting and SNTV. Manipulation for these schemes is defined in [56] as follows:
102 CHAPTER 4. COMPLEXITY-THEORETIC ASPECTS OF VOTING
Definition 4.4.9. Given a set C of candidates, a set V of voters that have already cast
their votes, the number of winners k ∈ N, a utility function u : C → Z and an integer t ∈ N.
Question: Can the manipulator cast its vote such that in the resulting election25:
Σc∈W u(c) ≥ t, where W is the set of winners and ‖W‖ = k.
The following are results pertaining to manipulating the abovementioned multi-winner
schemes. These results are due to Procaccia et al. [56].
Theorem 4.4.1. Manipulation in Approval voting, Bloc voting, and SNTV is in P.
The proof was omitted in the paper, but basically the algorithm is simple. The manipulator
awards points (according to the rule) to candidates whom he wants to win exclusively. If
this suffices to make his favorite candidates win then the vote was effective, otherwise we
conclude that there is no way the manipulator can maximize the utility of favorite candidates
as required by awarding all points to these candidates only.
Theorem 4.4.2. Manipulation in Cumulative voting is NP-complete.
Membership in NP is easy, hardness was obtained via a reduction from Knapsack.
4.4.6 Complexity of Manipulating Common Voting Rules
For an unbounded number of candidates and voters, and under the assumption of complete
information about other voters’ preferences, the following are results regarding constructive
manipulation as defined in Existence of a Winning Preference:
Theorem 4.4.3. Plurality, Borda Count, Maximin, and Copeland’s method are all manip-
ulable in polynomial time.
Theorem 4.4.4. Any monotone increasing function of voting methods that are all manip-
ulable in polynomial time is also manipulable in polynomial time.
Second-order Copeland stands for a tie breaking rule used with the Copeland method
that has a drawback of producing many ties. In second-order Copeland, if a tie occurs then
the winner is “the candidate whose defeated competitors have the largest sum of Copeland
scores” [4], page 231.
Theorem 4.4.5. Manipulation of second-order Copeland is NP-complete.
Theorem 4.4.6. Manipulation of first-order Copeland with second-order Copeland tie
breaks is NP-complete.
Theorem 4.4.7. Manipulation of Single Transferable Vote26 is NP-complete.
25The authors in [56] remark that tie breaking is assumed to go against the manipulator. So if a number
of candidates do equally well, then the candidates with the lower utility win. This is a standard assumption
in handling tie breaking for manipulation problems.
26There are different variations of STV, here STV is defined as in Chapter 1. The method is also called
successive elimination or alternative voting.
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The first four results are due to Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [4], and the last one is due
to Bartholdi and Orlin [3]. The results listed above assume complete knowledge about all
voters’ preferences. One can argue that if it is hard to manipulate a voting scheme given
complete knowledge of others’ preferences, then manipulation of the scheme will also be hard
given incomplete information. However, polynomial time results will be restricted to this
assumption, we will discuss later the manipulation problem under incomplete knowledge of
preferences.
The above results were obtained for unbounded number of candidates and voters. In
many settings, however, there are restrictions on the number of candidates and sometimes
even on the number of voters or typically on the ratio of the number of candidates to
voters. In presidential elections for example, there are many more voters than candidates
while in some search engine settings the number of candidates (e.g., webpages) far exceeds
the number of voters (e.g., other search engines). The following section spells out results of
manipulation complexity for bounded number of candidates.
4.4.7 Manipulation of Elections and the Number of Candidates
The initial work studying the manipulation problem did not explicitly consider the number
of candidates when addressing the complexity of manipulation. It was assumed that the
number of candidates is unbounded. Conitzer and Sandholm analyzed first the complexity
of manipulating elections with few candidates [13], a following paper by the same authors
appeared a year later and answered the question of how many candidates (minimum) are
needed to make manipulation hard [12]. These results together with new ones were pre-
sented in a following work by Conitzer et al. [19].
Some of the assumptions made were similar to previous works assumptions and some
where different. The authors considered coalitions of weighted voters and showed that for
simpler voting settings manipulation is easy for a small number of candidates. Also, it may
be more realistic and important to study the effectiveness and efficiency of coalition manip-
ulation. Results obtained for this model can be used to infer results for different settings.
For example, results obtained for a coalition of manipulators with complete information can
be used to get results for single manipulator with incomplete information setting. Similarly,
results pertaining to weighted voters in the complete information setting can be used to find
results for the unweighted limited information setting.
The following tables summarize the results of the first and second papers ([13] and [12])
grouped by constructive and destructive manipulation types respectively:
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Table 4.4: Summary of results on the complexity of constructive manipulation of elections
with few candidates by a coalition of weighted voters.
Number of candidates 2 3 4,5,6 >7
Plurality P P P P
Regular Binary Cup (BC) P P P P
Randomized BC P P P NP-complete
Copeland P P NP-complete NP-complete
Maximin P P NP-complete NP-complete
Borda P NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete
lurality with run-off P NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete
STV P NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete
Veto P NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete
Table 4.5: Summary of results on the complexity of destructive manipulation of elections
with few candidates by a coalition of weighted voters.
Number of candidates 2 >3
Borda P P
Copeland P P
Maximin P P
Plurality P P
Veto P P
Regular Binary Cup (BC) P P
Randomized BC P ?
Plurality with run-off P NP-complete
STV P NP-complete
We observe that Plurality is the easiest to manipulate while STV, Borda, Veto and
Plurality with Run-off are the hardest to manipulate when the number of candidates is a
small constant. This also draws attention to the complexity of STV, Veto and Plurality
with Run-off. Notice that in all of these rule, determining winners is a multi-phase process.
With this in mind we are ready to introduce the next subsection.
4.4.8 Designing Voting Protocols that are Hard to Manipulate
Some research work in the complexity of manipulation shifted from the study of the com-
plexity of manipulating existing voting systems to the topic of designing new voting systems
that are hard to manipulate. There are two main works to be discussed here: one proposes
modifying existing systems and the other proposes hybridization of voting systems. The
goal in the two approaches is the same, to raise the complexity of manipulation.
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I. Modifying Existing Systems
The first work in this area suggested modifying existing efficiently manipulable voting
schemes in such a way that the resulting system is computationally difficult to manipu-
late. In their paper titled “Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard,”
Conitzer and Sandholm show how a simple modification (tweak), can dramatically raise
the complexity of manipulating a voting system from being in P to being NP-complete or
even higher [15]. The tweak they suggested is simply the addition of an elimination pre-
round to the election. Before we explain this preround, we highlight reasons the authors
mentioned for choosing to modify existing voting protocols as a step towards designing new
hard-to-manipulate protocols:
• Complexity results obtained from this modification apply to a large family of voting
protocols and are not restricted to a specific voting protocol (in comparison, designing
a new protocol will mostly imply results pertaining to that particular protocol).
• The modifications do not significantly change the original work, and this has two ad-
vantages: first, it preserves the desirable theoretical properties of the original system.
Second,
• it is much easier in practice to work with a slightly modified known voting system
than to work with a totally new one.
I.1 The Pre-round Modification
Definition 4.4.10. Given a voting rule E, the new (modified) protocol proceeds with an
initial preround as follows:
1. The candidates are paired. If there is an odd number of candidates, a candidate gets
a bye.
2. Each pair of candidates compete in a pairwise election, the candidate who loses is
eliminated. (the candidate who got a bye is never eliminated).
3. E is executed on the remaining candidates (including the one who got a bye) to produce
a winner27.
I.2 Manipulation of Modified Protocols
The complexity of manipulating the modified system depends on whether the pairing
(also called scheduling) is done and known to all voters before votes are drawn, whether the
pairing is drawn completely randomly after the voters vote, or whether the two processes
of pairing and voting are interleaved. According to the previous description of when the
pairing is done, the preround is called deterministic, randomized or interleaved respectively.
This work considered constructive manipulation by a single voter with all other votes
27Eliminated candidates are dropped from the votes. For example if a voter voted a > b > c > d and b
and c are eliminated, then the voter’s “implied” vote is a > d.
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known to the manipulator. In each of the aforementioned protocol types, the the question
asked is:
• Can the manipulator cast the vote to make c win the election under E?
• Can the manipulator cast the vote to make the probability of c winning the election
under E at least equal to k where k is some given value ∈ [0, 1]?
• Given the initial random choices (if any) by the protocol, is there a contingency plan
(based on the random decisions the protocol takes between collecting parts of the
votes) for the manipulator to answer the queries to make the probability of c winning
under E at least equal to k where k is some given value ∈ [0, 1]?
I.3 Results
Theorem 4.4.8. The following protocols when preceded with a deterministic preround (the
first type of pairing of alternatives) are NP-complete to manipulate: Plurality, Borda, Max-
imin and STV.
Theorem 4.4.9. The following protocols when preceded with a randomized preround (the
second type of pairing of alternatives) are #P-complete to manipulate: Plurality, Borda,
Maximin and STV.
Theorem 4.4.10. The following protocols when preceded with an interleaved preround (the
first type of pairing of alternatives) are PSPACE-complete to manipulate: Plurality, Borda,
Maximin and STV.
Remark: This is the first work in computational voting theory that have results in a com-
plexity class that is higher than NP (assuming PSPACE 6= NP).
I.4 An Alternative Modification
Inspired by the pre-round modification and by the open question of whether this approach
can make manipulation as hard as inverting one-way functions, Elkind and Lipmaa proposed
a pre-round where the schedule is computed from the votes using a one-way function [26].
They argued that for many reasons this one-way function approach has appeal over the pre-
round approach explained above. For security reasons, the pre-round schedule should not
be determined by the authority conducting the election but should be extracted fairly based
on all votes. This approach extracts randomness from the votes themselves. For conceptual
reasons, the problem of manipulation in voting resembles the cryptographic challenge of
designing protocols that are resistant to malicious attacks with reliable probabilities. One-
way functions have been proposed for that purpose in the cryptography domain.
Although this approach has produced interesting hardness results for manipulation by
small coalitions of voters, its hardness results apply only to settings with a very large number
of candidates and it is restricted to given fractions of the voter set as a coalition size (another
work discussed the asymptotic average size of effective coalition of manipulating voters [54]).
4.4. THE COMPLEXITY OF MANIPULATING ELECTIONS 107
II. Hybridization of Voting Systems
Based on the observation that the pre-round in the previous work is basically the first step of
the binary cup (BC) rule, Elkind and Lipmaa constructed another family of voting systems
that are hard to manipulate [25]. They used hybridization of voting systems to construct
new protocols that are hard to manipulate.
They defined hybridization of two voting systems X and Y to be the voting system that
starts by executing X—mostly to eliminate a number of candidates—then to execute Y on
the remaining candidates, in a sequential manner28. X is usually defined as the k-steps of
some known voting system and Y is also one of the common voting systems. A step is a
single stage of the protocol and it depends on the particular protocol. In STV, for example,
a step consists of eliminating a candidate with the lowest plurality score, while a step in
BC consists of pairing up the candidates and eliminating the ones who lose the pairwise
election against their opponents. The hybrid of k-steps of Y , and X is denoted Hyb(Xk, Y )
and is formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.4.11. A hybrid protocol Hyb(Xk, Y ) consists of two phases. In the first phase,
the protocol executes k steps of X on all candidates; suppose that S is the set of candidates
not eliminated in the first phase. In the second phase, the protocol applies Y to the implied
votes on S, i.e., votes restricted to the remaining set of candidates S.
Inspired by the results of the previous work of Conitzer and Sandholm [15], this work
focused on creating a more general framework for constructing voting systems that are hard
to manipulate. Unlike the case of the pre-round modification with regard to when votes are
drawn, here the execution of the voting rules takes place entirely after casting the votes.
After the elimination of some candidates however, the scores are recomputed but this is
done on basis of the initial votes. In addition to this difference, the authors of “Hybrid
Voting Protocols and Hardness of Manipulation” mentioned that although the pre-round
approach preserved some properties of the modified system (such as Condorcet-consistency),
eliminating half or a significant percentage of the candidates using a criteria that may be
fundamentally different in spirit from the original protocol, may result in a considerably
different mechanism and outcome (which can be both not desirable and can—expectedly—
cause a considerable change in the complexity of the manipulation) [25]. Their approach,
however, can be used to construct hybrids of a voting system with itself or with some other
chosen voting system without changing the function of the constituent systems.
This work also showed that not all hybrids are NP-hard to manipulate, for instance
Hyb(Pluralityk, Y ) where Y ∈ {Plurality,Borda,Maximin,BC} can be manipulated in
polynomial time, but on the other hand this work successfully used the hybridization frame-
work to show that many hybrids of common voting systems are hard to manipulate. The
following list summarizes these results:
28This is not the same definition of hybridization that was used to construct a voting system that is
resistant to electoral control in the previous section.
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Hybridization Results
Theorem 4.4.11. The hybrids of the form Hyb(STVk, Y ) where
Y ∈ {Plurality,Borda,Maximin,BC, STV } are NP-hard to manipulate for infinitely
many values of k.
Theorem 4.4.12. The hybrids of the form Hyb(Xk, STV ) where
X ∈ {Plurality,Borda,Maximin,BC} are NP-hard to manipulate for infinitely many val-
ues of k.
Theorem 4.4.13. The protocols Hyb(Bordak, P lurality) and Hyb(Maximink, P lurality)
are NP-hard to manipulate for infinitely many values of k.
Theorem 4.4.14. The (hybrid) protocol Hyb(Bordak, Borda) is NP-hard to manipulate
for infinitely many values of k.
Theorem 4.4.15. The (hybrid) protocol Hyb(Maximink, Borda) is NP-hard to manipulate
for infinitely many values of k.
In addition to these computational attributes of hybrid protocols, the following result
summarizes other attributes of hybrid protocols29:
Proposition 4.4.1. For any voting systems X and Y and any k,
• if both X and Y are Condorcet-consistent then so is Hyb(Xk, Y ).
• if X is strongly Pareto-optimal and Y is Pareto-optimal then Hyb(Xk, Y ) is Pareto-
optimal.
• if X is strongly monotone and Y is monotone then Hyb(Xk, Y ) is monotone.
In addition to these results, a result similar was obtained for utility-based voting which
suggests that the technique of hybridization can be used for even a wider class of preference
aggregation protocols. We draw attention to the contribution of this work in understanding
what makes some voting protocols inherently manipulation-resistant (in light of results given
in previous subsections, think of hybridization and compare STV to Borda for example).
An important work in the manipulation literature addressed the topic of what characteristic
determines the degree of resistance a voting system have against manipulation. This is the
topic of the next subsection.
4.4.9 What Makes Voting Rules Hard to Manipulate
As stated generally, the question “What Makes Voting Rules Hard to Manipulate?” it is
still an open question. However, for two general families of voting protocols, the answer
is known. These two families are the family of scoring protocols and the family of scoring
elimination protocols. Recall the definition of positional scoring protocols given in Chap-
ter 1. The family of scoring protocols is defined by a vector ~α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm) of integers
29Refer to Chapter 1 for definitions of the properties.
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as a vote. The value of each αi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m where m is the number of candidates, in the
vector depends on the particular voting protocol. For example, for plurality, all αi’s are
equal to 0 except for α1 which is equal to 1. The points in all votes are then added for
every candidate and the candidate with the maximum number of points wins.
We can think of positional scoring protocols as a generalization of plurality voting. Sim-
ilarly, we can think of scoring elimination protocols as a generalization of STV. STV is a
multi-round elimination protocol that uses plurality as the underlying scheme in each round.
In general, any other positional scoring protocol can be used in the individual rounds, such
as the Borda-count, or veto. For example, when the underlying protocol is veto, then the
successive elimination rule using veto is the Coombs rule.
For both these families of voting rules, we have a dichotomy theorem for the hardness
of manipulation.
For all positional scoring protocols, the basic manipulation problem by a single-voter is
in P. Therefore, the first dichotomy theorem regards manipulation by a coalition of voters.
The case is different for scoring elimination protocols since STV is known for example to
be NP-complete to manipulate by a single voter in the general case.
The first dichotomy theorem is due to Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [33, 34]. The
theorem basically says that every positional scoring protocol that assigns two or more points
to candidates other than the favorite candidate is NP-complete to manipulate. Every other
scoring protocol is manipulable in polynomial time. This means that plurality protocol and
plurality-like protocols (such as veto for example) are computationally easy to manipulate,
and all other systems are computationally difficult to manipulate.
Theorem 4.4.16 (Dichotomy Theorem for Positional Scoring Protocols). For any scoring
protocol ~α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm) and any m, manipulation and weighted-manipulation by a
coalition of voters are in P if α2 = α3 = . . . = αm, and are NP-complete in all other cases.
The theorem applies for a general number of candidates, for weighted and unweighted votes,
and for the unique and non-unique winner cases.
The second dichotomy theorem is due to Coleman and Teague [9]. It applies to scoring
elimination protocols with fixed number of candidates.
Theorem 4.4.17 (Dichotomy Theorem for Scoring Elimination Protocols). When the num-
ber of candidates is fixed, for any scoring elimination protocol ~α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm) eighted-
manipulation by a coalition of voters is in P if α1 = α2 = . . . = αm−1, for all m, and is
NP-hard in all other cases.
4.4.10 Worst-case Hardness Results: a Second Look
One of the limitations of all hardness results discussed above is that they are all worst-case
analysis. These results simply say that there are instances in which manipulation is going
to be computationally difficult. They do not imply that every instance of manipulating the
voting scheme for which hardness results were obtained is difficult to compute. The ques-
tion is what if in practice most instances are not difficult to manipulate? Then hardness
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results have little practical weight. Another question is what is the average case complexity
of manipulating voting rules? Progress in this direction was initiated by Procaccia and
Rosenschein in “Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elec-
tions” [55]. The average case analysis they introduce is not the typical (famously difficult)
average case analysis. They use the concept of Junta distribution which is a distribution
over NP-hard problem instances, to study this type of average case complexity of manipu-
lating voting rules. A problem is shown to be computationally easy on average (i.e., in P) if
a polynomial time algorithm can frequently find instances of the problem in the Junta distri-
bution. They conjectured that such distribution exists for probabilistic indextermweighted
manipulationweighted manipulation of voting protocols. They designed a heuristic poly-
nomial time greedy algorithm to show that when the number of candidates is fixed, some
scoring protocols such as the Borda count is easily manipulable on average by a coalition
of voters (not only in the worst-case).
Conitzer and Sandholm raised a similar concern regarding worst-case hardness results.
He argued that voting rules that are “usually” hard to manipulate do not exists unless other
important desiderata are compromised [18]. The work presents this idea as an impossibility
result that holds even for a stronger type of manipulation where the manipulator(s) needs
to find the set of all candidates that they can promote to become winners. The work is
concluded with suggestions to overcome this impossibility, such as extending the defini-
tion of voting rules, and allowing low-ranked candidates to win sometimes. One can argue
that these modifications are not always feasible in practice which in turn strengthens the
argument of nonexistence of usually hard to manipulate voting rules.
4.4.11 Manipulation Under Incomplete Knowledge of Preferences
Recall the previous discussions on vote elicitation and on finding winners under incomplete
preferences. The same result apply to manipulation under incomplete knowledge of prefer-
ences. Since if an agent wants a specific alternative to win and plans to (strategically) vote
in favor of this alternative then the agent must at least determine whether this alternative
is a possible winner. Hence, the the problem of determining possible and necessary winners
and the manipulation problem are closely related. This relation also stems from the fact the
elicitation itself is closely related to the computation of possible and necessary winners, and
this elicitation process can create opportunities for both the elicitor and agents to strategi-
cally influence the outcome based on knowledge about others agents preferences
General manipulability results concerning social choice functions on partial preferences have
been obtained in [57], [51], and [52]. Recall the following terms from Chapter 3:
Strong dictator A strong dictator is a voter such that, no matter how the others vote, this
voter’s ordering/choice is the outcome.
Dictator A dictator is a voter such that, no matter how the others vote, no outcome is
selected outside the choice set of this voter.
Weak dictator A weak dictator is a voter such that, no matter how the others vote, some
choices of this voter will always be included in the outcome.
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Given these definitions, the following are results concerning manipulability of social
choice functions (and hence voting rules), under partial preferences:
Theorem 4.4.18. If we have at least two agents and at least three alternatives, a social
choice function on partial order without ties that is unanimous and monotonic has at least
one weak dictator [51].
Theorem 4.4.19. If a social choice function is strategy proof and onto then it is unanimous
and monotonic [52].
Theorem 4.4.20. If a social choice function is onto then it is either not strategy-proof or
it has at least one weak dictator [52].
Proof. From theorems 4.4.18 and 4.4.19 above.
This result extends the Gibbard-Saterthwaite theorem to hold for social choice functions
on partial preferences.
Results on Manipulation Under Incomplete Knowledge of Preferences
We conclude this section with a list of results related to manipulation under incomplete
preferences:
Theorem 4.4.21. In general, determining whether x ∈ PWE(Rn) is NP-hard.
Theorem 4.4.22. In general, determining whether x ∈ NWE(Rn) is coNP-hard.
Theorem 4.4.23. For a polynomially-computable voting rule E, determining whether
x ∈ PWE(Rn) is in NP.
Theorem 4.4.24. For a polynomially-computable voting rule E, determining whether
x ∈ NWE(Rn) is in coNP.
Theorem 4.4.25. For positional scoring protocols, possible and necessary winners can be
computed in polynomial time [42]indexauthorsKonczak.
Theorem 4.4.26. For STV, computing possible winners is NP-complete and computing
necessary winners is coNP-complete [53].
Theorem 4.4.27. It is NP-hard to return a superset of the possible winners PW ∗ under
STV such that we guarantee ‖PW ∗‖ < k‖PW‖ for some given positive integer k [53].
Theorem 4.4.28. Possible and necessary Condorcet winners can be computed in polynomial
time [42]indexauthorsKonczak.
Theorem 4.4.29. For a given voting procedure, if necessary and possible winners are com-
puted in polynomial time then deciding whether there is a (constructive/destructive) manip-
ulation30 is also possible in polynomial time [42]indexauthorsKonczak.
30The complexity of manipulation will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter.
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4.4.12 Comments and Bibliographic Notes
• In the previous chapter, we discussed single-peaked preferences and mentioned that
under this restriction on the preference domain, voters cannot promote a non-winner
alternative to become the winner under the new set of preferences. So manipulation
in this sense is not possible in single-peaked domains. However, it is possible that the
voters will change their votes such that no alternative wins the election. Using this
section’s terminology, destructive manipulation is possible even with single-peaked
preferences.
• A related work that has not been listed under one of main directions discussed in this
section is on manipulability when considering the number of manipulable profiles [48].
The minimal number of such profiles was established for voting rules with specific
properties.
• We have discussed the computational complexity of the manipulation problem in this
section. In the computing literature, manipulation of voting rules is usually used as a
synonym for untruthful reporting of preferences, and typically has negative connota-
tions. The terms strategic voting, manipulation, misrepresentation of preferences are
used interchangeably. The argument here is against this inaccurate use of terms. Take
for example the so called “manipulation” in approval voting, proposed “manipulation”
algorithms suggest approving only candidates that the voter wishes to win, but then
how can this act be described as “misrepresentation” of preferences? It is indeed a
representation of the voter preferences. The counterargument might be: what if the
voter approves other candidates but reports only a subset of those candidates in the
vote in order to achieve a specific outcome? But then the reported vote represents the
preferences of the voter at the voting time given feasibility concerns. The argument
can be traced back to the philosophical meaning of “preference” and whether a vote
as defined in voting rules, should be considered the same as preferences or as a way
to represent those preferences whether explicitly or indirectly.
The argument “if every voter misrepresent her preferences, then the result might be
a socially undesirable outcome” (or something similar in essence) is usually presented
when introducing the manipulation problem and discussing the motivation behind
studying it. The argument here is that no such thing as “socially desirable outcome”
exists! Given Arrow’s theorem and other results on preference aggregation, we con-
clude that society “as a whole” does not have preferences, does not think (in the
first place to think rationally second) as individuals perceive thinking and hence no
outcome can be accurately described as “socially desirable outcome.” All voting rules
that we know are simply “attempts” to achieve an outcome that reflects the pref-
erences of individuals in the society as much as possible. Yet no rule, is proven to
achieve satisfactory results, even in the limited sense of satisfying a set of basic crite-
ria. Moreover, one can argue (in a similar way) that if every voter votes strategically
then the outcome is maximized welfare for all voters.
We point out that literature on computational social choice, sheds more light on ma-
nipulation and whether it is a negative phenomenon or not. One particular work
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of interest here is by Hees and Dowding “In Praise of Manipulation.” In this work,
the authors (coming from philosophy and political science backgrounds) differentiate
between different types of manipulation, which they call “sincere” and “transparent”
manipulation and argue about the nature and the impact of each on voting outcomes.
We suggest that computational treatments of the manipulation problem take into
account the underlying meaning and implication of different variants of the manipu-
lation problem and dedicate efforts into investigating the complexity of most relevant
(undesirable) types.
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4.5 The Complexity of Bribery in Elections
4.5.1 Introduction
The previous two sections shed light on the control and manipulation problems. This sec-
tion discusses the problem of bribery in elections, mainly its computational complexity.
Bribery is similar to control in the sense that it needs to determine which voters to bribe
in order to achieve a specific outcome. In the control problem, this party is the authority
conducting the election whereas in bribery this party is any party (possibly a third party
outside the election (i.e., neither candidates, nor voters nor the chairman) interested in
changing preferences of voters.
Seen from a different perspective, bribery is also similar to manipulation in the sense
that it involves changing voters’ preferences. The difference between the two problems is
the following: in manipulation, the set of manipulators is part of the input while in bribery
it is part of the question. We will see in some of the following subsections that bribery is
linked to manipulation and that results pertinent to the manipulation problem can be used
to obtain new results for the bribery problem. This is a reason why this section on bribery
comes after the sections on control and manipulation.
It is important to note that the computational complexity of a bribery problem is
sensitive to the setting, and there are many different flavors of this problem. Therefore we
start by defining different bribery problems next.
4.5.2 Different Bribery Problems
There are different settings for the bribery problem, the following list explains these settings:
• Basic: in the basic setting, voters are unweighted (equivalently, they all have the
same weight and hence weights are ignored), and they all have the same price which
is equal to the unit price. In this setting we are interested in the number of voters to
bribe to achieve a specific outcome. This number is equal to the bribery budget in
this basic setting.
• Weighted: in this setting, voters may have different weights, so voters with more
weight are likely to influence the outcome more than voters with less weight.
• Priced: in this setting, voters have different price tags, so some voters are more
expensive than others to bribe. In this case, the budget is the bribery amount to be
spent to achieve a specific outcome. It is also possible that each voter has a different
price tag depending on the degree to which her vote is to be influenced, but since it
is unclear how to encode a voter’s price scheme, this more complex setting has not
been addressed in related work.
• Weighted and Priced: in this setting, voters have both weights and prices. It is
natural to find voters with more weight also to have higher price tags. Nevertheless,
the two entities (weight and price) are treated independently.
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• Input representation: this refers to identical voters (same weight, price, and pref-
erences) being represented by a single input next to a count in binary indicating the
number of such voters. This is referred to as a “succinct” input. The non-succinct
input refers to all voters being listed in the input. For example, if 100 voters are
identical then there are 100 identical entries in the election input. Note that if E-
{succinct}-bribery is in P, then that implies that E-bribery is also in P.
• Encoding-based: this refers to whether weights/prices are encoded in binary or
unary.
Next are the definitions of different bribery problems corresponding to the settings above.
Definitions and Notation
Definition 4.5.1. An instance of a bribery problem is a 4-tuple E = (C, V, c, k), where
1. C is a list of candidates,
2. V is a list of voters (see below),
3. c ∈ C is the candidate whom a bribing party wants to make a winner (or a unique
winner in case of unique winner settings), and
4. k a nonnegative integer that is the bribing limit. This limit is the maximum number
of voters that can be bribed or the amount of money that can be spent on bribing, i.e.,
the budget.
In the bribery setting, each voter is a 3-tuple (prefs, pi, ω), where
1. prefs is the preference of the voter (whether a list or a vector of scores depending on
the election system).
2. pi is the price for changing the voter’s preference, and
3. ω is the weight of the voter (applicable in weighted bribery and is the same for all
voters in the unweighted version and hence is ignored in that case).
Note that according to this definition, bribes are only payments made to change preferences
of voters. This means that the way in which preferences are changed is not part of the
definition and is not necessarily what is generally known as bribery. For example, if the
same budget is spent on a campaign in order to promote (or demote) a candidate (via
media for example), and it is known that spending a specific amount of money will result
in change of preferences, then the complexity applies to this case as well. In other words,
prices are only associated with voters, the real life mechanism of bribery, the connotations
of bribed voters trading true preferences for payments, moral failure, etc. do not apply in
this computational very restricted use of the word bribery.
Definition 4.5.2 (E-bribery). Given a set C of candidates, a collection V of voters, a
distinguished candidate c ∈ C and a nonnegative integer k.
Question: Is it possible to change the preference lists of at most k voters such that, under
election system E, c is a winner of the election E(C, V )?
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Example (E = Plurality):
Name: plurality-weighted-$bribery.
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters specified via their preference lists
(prefs1, . . . , prefsm), their nonnegative integer weights (w1, . . . , wm) and their nonnegative
integer prices (p1, . . . , pm), a distinguished candidate c ∈ C and a nonnegative integer k
(which will sometimes be referred to as the budget).
Question: Is there a set B ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} such that Σi∈Bpi ≤ k and there is a way to bribe
the voters from B in such a way that c becomes a winner?
Definition 4.5.3. E-negative-bribery is defined to be the same as E-bribery except with the
restriction that voters are not bribed to explicitly vote for the designated candidate (e.g.,
in plurality, this amounts to ranking that candidate first in the vote) but they are bribed in
such a way that takes away the votes from other candidates.
Definition 4.5.4 (E-bribery′). E-bribery′ is the basic bribery problem with the restriction
that the change is not made to the whole vote but only to a unit entry in the vote, and the
unit price is associaed with changing only a unit part of the vote. The exact meaning of
unit change depends on the voting system, for example in approval voting, this is the change
of an entry in the vote vector, while in Dodgson voting system it is a single switch of two
adjecnt candidates in the preference order.
In general,
• E-bribery refers to the basic bribery problem for voting system E ,
• E-weighted-bribery refers to the weighted version of the bribery problem for voting
system E ,
• E-$bribery refers to the priced version of the bribery problem where by priced we
mean that each voter has a price in exchange of altering his preference, and
• E-weighted-$bribery refers to the weighted priced version of the bribery problem (i.e.,
both weights and prices are considered) for voting system E .
These are the basic flavors of the bribery problem, they can be applied to any voting system.
Others are specific to particular voting systems.
4.5.3 The Computational Complexity of Bribery
The following results, for various positional scoring protocols, are all due to Faliszewski,
Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [27] (full version [28]):
Results for Plurality Voting
Theorem 4.5.1. Plurality-bribery is in P.
Proof. The algorithm solving the basic bribery problem for Plurality is as follows: If c is
not the winner then continue to bribe the supporters of the current winner to vote for c
until c becomes the winner. This algorithm will terminate when c becomes the winner or
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when the bribing party exhausts the budget and c is not the winner. In either case, the
algorithm answers the question of whether it is possible to bribe at most k voters to make
c the winner–in polynomial time.
Theorem 4.5.2. Plurality-weighted-bribery is in P and Plurality-$bribery is in P.
Proof. The proof describes a more involved polynomial time greedy algorithm (than the
one in the previous proof). The reader is referred to [28] for the full proof.
Theorem 4.5.3. Plurality-weighted-$bribery is NP-complete, even for just two candidates.
Remark: Neither weights alone nor the prices alone make the bribery problem hard. It
is the combination of both that raises the complexity of bribery for plurality from P to
NP-complete. However, the problem falls back in P if either prices or weights are encoded
in unary.
Theorem 4.5.4. Both Plurality-weighted-$briberyunary and Plurality-weightedunary-
$bribery are in P.
Theorem 4.5.5. Plurality-weighted-negative-bribery is NP-complete but Plurality-
negative-$bribery is in P.
Remark: Except for negative-bribery, Plurality-weighted-bribery and Plurality-$bribery
have the same complexity, where the exact complexity depends on the particular encoding
of weights/prices. In the case of negative-bribery, however, the two problems have different
complexities.
Results for Approval Voting
Theorem 4.5.6. Approval-bribery is NP-complete.
Theorem 4.5.7. Approval-weighted-$bribery′ is NP-complete.
Theorem 4.5.8. Both Approval-weighted-$bribery′unary and Approval-weightedunary-
$bribery′ are in P.
Results for Veto
Theorem 4.5.9. Veto-bribery is in P.
Proof. Given the winner as the candidate with the least number of vetoes, the algorithm
that decides whether a candidate c can be made the winner by bribing at most k voters is as
follows: continue on bribing voters that veto c to veto a candidate that has the least number
of vetoes, until c has the least number of vetoes or the budget k is exhausted without c
becoming the least vetoed. Clearly, in the former case the answer to the question in the
basic bribery problem is yes, and in the latter the answer is no. The algorithm clearly runs
in polynomial time.
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Results for Positinal Scoring Protocols
Theorem 4.5.10. For every scoring protocol ~α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm), α-{succinct}-bribery is
in P.
Table 4.6 shows the complexity of each of the five bribery problems for each scoring protocol
represented by the vector ~α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm).
Table 4.6: Dichotomy result for positinal scoring protocols.
Scoring Protocol ~α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm)
α1 = . . . = αm α1 > α2 and not true that
Bribery Problem α2 = . . . = αm α2 = . . . = αm
(Basic) ~α-bribery P P P
~α-$bribery P P P
~α-weightedunary-$bribery P P P
~α-weighted-bribery P P NP-complete
~α-weighted-$bribery P NP-complete NP-complete
Results for Dodgson’s, Kemeny’s and Young’s Systems
The following results are all due to Faliszewski et al. [28]:
Theorem 4.5.11. For each fixed number of candidates, DodgsonScore-{succinct}-bribery
is in P when restricted to that number of candidates.
Theorem 4.5.12. For each fixed number of candidates, YoungScore-{succinct}-bribery is
in P when restricted to that number of candidates.
Theorem 4.5.13. For each fixed number of candidates, Dodgson-bribery, Dodgson-
$bribery, Young-bribery, Young-$bribery are all in P.
Theorem 4.5.14. For each fixed number of candidates, Kemeny-{succinct}-bribery is in
P when restricted to that number of candidates.
A useful tool for obtaining the results above for fixed number of candidates is Lenstra’s
result31 showing that the integer programming feasibility problem is in P when the number
of variables is bounded (which is the case here since the number of variables is fixed). The
following results are all due to Faliszewski et al. [29]:
Results for Copeland
Theorem 4.5.15. Copeland voting system is resistant to bribery (i.e., the basic bribery
problem is NP-hard) in both the rational voters case and the irrational voters case.
Theorem 4.5.16. Copeland voting system is vulnerable to bribery′ in the irrational voters
case.
31Presented in: H. Lenstra, Jr. Integer programming with a fixed number of variables. Mathematics of
Operations Research, 8(4):538–548, 1983.
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Results for Llull’s Voting System
Theorem 4.5.17. Llull’s voting system is resistant to bribery (i.e., the basic bribery problem
is NP-hard) in both the rational voters case and the irrational voters case.
Theorem 4.5.18. Llull’s voting system is vulnerable to bribery′ in the irrational voters
case.
Remark 1: Copeland and Llull’s voting system exhibit identical complexity of bribery.
Recall that both systems have very similar, almost identical, definitions except for tie-
breaking rules. Therefore, tie-breaking rules do not affect the complexity of bribery for
these problems (and the same results apply for the unique and multiple winner cases too).
Remark 2: The previous theorems for Copeland and Llull voting systems apply to both
constructive and destructive bribery problems (which—the constructive and destructive
nature—is defined analogously to constructive and destructive cases in control). However,
techniques used for each case vary in nature and intricacy. The destructive case follows via
greedy algorithms while for the constructive case, Copeland and Llull’s election systems are
modeled as a network flow problems, and that model is then used to derive results [29].
The Link between Manipulation and Bribery
Although the manipulation problem and the bribery problem are closely related, there exists
voting systems where one problem is (computaionally) easy but the other is difficult. For
example, this is the case with approval voting.
Theorem 4.5.19. Approval-bribery is NP-complete, but Approval-manipulation32 is in
P.
Trying to explain this result, the intuition may be something like this: since bribery
involves both deciding which voters to bribe and then how to manipulate their votes to
achieve a specific outcome, then bribery is a more general version of manipulation since
we can think of the latter as a special case of the former where the set of voters to be
influenced is known and hence it is more difficult than manipulation. Surprisingly, however,
there exists a voting system where bribery is in P but manipulation is NP-complete! But
it is worth to note that this system is an artificial system designed to answer the question:
does there exist a voting system E such that the bribery is easy but manipulation is difficult?
The details of the design are given in [28].
Theorem 4.5.20. There exists a voting system E for which manipulation is NP-complete,
but bribery is in P.
To establish the link between bribery and manipulations, researchers have observed that
to check whether bribery can be successful, it is sufficient to try all possible manipulations
by k voters. If at least one is successful then we conclude that bribery can be effectuated.
But this idea of trying all possible manipulations by k voters and accepting if any of these
is successful resembles, in essence, the way truth-table reduction works. In light of that,
the following theorem was obtained:
32Recall that Approval-weighted-manipulation, which is more involved than basic manipulation, is also in
P whereas the basic problem of bribery for the same voting system is NP-complete.
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Theorem 4.5.21. For each fixed k, a non-priced bribery problem B and the analogous
manipulation problem M, it holds that B ≤pdttM.
The implication of this reduction is that many results obtained from the vast literature
on manipulation can be used to obtain similar results for the corresponding bribery problem.
The other observation—that establishes the link between manipulation and priced bribery
which the previous theorem does not apply to—is that manipulation is a special case of
$bribery where all manipulators have price 0, each manipulator has price 1, and the budget
is equal to 0.
Theorem 4.5.22. Let E-M be some manipulation problem for voting system E and let E-B
be the analogous $bribery problem, it holds that M≤pm B.
The observant reader may notice that link is still missing for some bribery problem,
involving weight only. The link exists indeed and the description of its more elaborated
establishment can be found in [28].
4.5.4 Comments and Bibliographic Notes
• Electoral control and manipulation has been studied extensively in both social choice
theory and computational social choice. The issue of bribery was only recently ad-
dressed by Faliszewski et al. [27, 29]. This has been pointed out in the work of
Faliszewski et al. and it is noted again here.
• As this survey is being developed, a new work on bribery is also being developed.
It extends the previous work by examining approximation algorithms for finding a
bribery strategy for some well-known voting systems, including plurality [7].
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4.6 Complexity of Vote Elicitation (Revisited)
We have discussed the topic of vote elicitation in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Here, we revisit
some complexity-theoretic results and present them in more detail.
Recall the following definitions from Chapter 3.
Definition 4.6.1 (Effective-Elicitation). Given: A voting rule E, a set of votes V and a
number k.
Question: Is there a subset of V of size ≤ k that decides the outcome of the E-election?
Definition 4.6.2 (Elicitation-Not-Done). Given: A voting rule E, a set of votes V , a
number k of votes that are still unknown and a candidate c.
Question: Is there a way to cast the k votes so that c will not win the E-election?
Definition 4.6.3 (Possible and Necessary Winners). Let E be a voting rule, X a set of
alternatives, and Rn a collection of (possibly incomplete) preference profiles.
• x ∈ X is a necessary winner for Rn with respect to E if and only if for all T ∈ Ext(Rn),
x ∈ E(T ). The set of necessary winners under E given Rn is denoted by NWE(Rn).
• x ∈ X is a possible winner for Rn with respect to E if and only if there exists a
T ∈ Ext(Rn) such that x ∈ E(T ). The set of possible winners under E given Rn is
denoted by PWE(Rn).
Now after establishing foundational results in this chapter, we revisit selected theorems
and present their proofs. The theorems are stated (but proofs of only some are given) in
cited work. Here, some of those proofs are provided with more explanation:
Theorem 4.6.1. For the Approval protocol, Effective-Elicitation is NP-complete [14].
Proof. First, given the unknown votes, it can be verified in polynomial time whether the
outcome of the election coincides with the preferences of the voters in the subset of V of
size ≤ k.
Second, to show completeness, the proof proceeds as a reduction from 3-Cover33. Reduce
an instance of X3C to the following instance of Effective-Elicitation: Let the candidate set
be X ∪ {w}. There are 2r − 2q + 2 voters voting as follows: for every subset Si in the
collection of r subsets of X, there is a vote approving Si ∪ w. Additionally, there are
r − 2q + 2 votes approving only w. Finally, let k = r − q + 2.
To show that these problems instances are equivalent, first suppose that there is a X3C,
then we elicit all the votes that approve only w and the votes that correspond to sets in
the cover . The total is r − 2q + 2 + q = r − q + 2 = k votes. Then w gains r − q + 1 more
points than all other candidates (there are only r − q votes remaining to be distributed
among all of the remaining candidates). Hence there is an effective elicitation. The other
direction can be shown by a contrapositive argument. Suppose there is no 3-Cover, then
333-Cover is an NP-complete problem which is defined in the first section of this chapter.
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eliciting k votes will always give one of the candidates in X at least 2 votes. This means
w can be at most r − q points ahead of this candidate which is not enough to guarantee
winning the overall election. Therefore, with r − q votes remaining, the outcome cannot be
decided. So there is no effective elicitation.
Theorem 4.6.2. For STV, deciding whether c ∈ C is a possible winner is NP-complete [53].
Proof. First, to show that the problem is in NP, note that given a completion of the pref-
erence profiles collection, it can be checked in polynomial time whether c wins.
Second, hardness follows from the result that Effective-Preference for STV is NP-
complete [3].
The following table summerizes the results on the complexity of vote elicitation and
related problems. Note that P is a subset of NP by definition, we therefore do not emphesize
that a problem which is in P is also in NP.
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Table 4.7: Summary of results on vote elicitation and related problems.
Problem Voting Rule Complexity Result in
Effective-Elicitation STV NP-complete [14]
Effective-Elicitation Borda NP-complete [14]
Effective-Elicitation Copeland NP-complete [14]
Effective-Elicitation Maximin NP-complete [14]
Necessary Winners Condorcet P [42]
Necessary Winners Scoring P [42]
Protocols
Necessary Winners STV coNP-complete [53]
Possible Winners Scoring P [42]
Protocols
Possible Winners STV NP-complete [53]
Possible Winners Condorcet P [42]
Is c ∈ C a Any E ∈ P coNP [42]
Necessary Winner?
Is c ∈ C a General E coNP-hard [53]
Necessary Winner?
Is c ∈ C a Any E ∈ P NP [42]
Possible Winner?
Is c ∈ C a General E NP [53]
Possible Winner?
Determining winners Any E ∈ P P [53]
via Vote Elicitation satisfying IIA
Finding PW ∗ ⊆ PW s.t. STV NP-hard [53]
‖PW ∗‖ < k‖PW‖, k ∈ Z+
Manipulation Any E s.t. P [42]
PW, NW ∈ P
Key: NW = Necessary Winner, PW = Possible Winner.
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4.7 The Complexity of Communication in Voting Rules
4.7.1 What is Communication Complexity?
The first basic model of a communication problems is due to Yao [64]. In their overview of
communication complexity [43], Kushilevits and Nisan describe in simple terms the com-
munication problems as follows:
“A system must perform some task that depends on information distributed among dif-
ferent parts of the system (called processors, parties, or players). The players thus need to
communicate with each other in order to perform the task” [43].
In the context of voting rules, the system mentioned in Kushilevits and Nisan’s descrip-
tion above is a given voting rule, the players are the voters and the communication needs
to take place between the elicitor protocol and the voters.
The question that arises in the context of communication complexity of voting is the
following: assuming nothing is known about voters’ preferences a priori, what is the worst-
case number of bits that needs to be communicated to execute a voting rule and find the
outcome? The answer to this question for a given voting rule is the communication com-
plexity of that rule. In general, the (deterministic) communication complexity of a problem
is the worst-case number of bits communicated in the best (deterministic) algorithm for
solving the problem.
It is important to make the distinction between a voting rule and a communication
protocol clear. The voting rule maps votes into outcomes (whether full ranking or winner
set), independently of how these votes are communicated or how the preferences are elicited.
The latter is the role of a communication protocol, it actually determinates (relevant parts
of the) votes by eliciting relevant information about preferences from the voters.
4.7.2 Communication Complexity of Voting Rules
The situation of communication in voting rules can be detailed as follows. Each voter i,
where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} knows its vote vi, the goal is to compute the outcome of the voting
rule E based on the votes of all voters, E(v1, v2, . . . , vn). In each stage of the process, a
voter discloses a bit of information based on its vote and the bits communicated so far.
Ultimately, the outcome of E(v1, v2, . . . , vn) is determined and becomes known to all voters.
This is described as a deterministic communication protocol.
In a nondeterministic protocol, the next bit to sent is (possibly) chosen nondeterminis-
tically.
The aim, in either cases of determinism and nondeterminism, is to minimize the worst-
case number of bits communicated.
4.7.3 The Importance of Communication Complexity
It is argued that when elicitation is “clever,” in other words, when the protocol asks mini-
mum number of queries to the right agents in order to determine the outcome; it can reduce
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the communication overhead and also make the whole process more efficient. This is be-
cause preference aggregation can be infeasible when the total number of preferences (votes)
is too large to communicate or to consider. From an agent-perspective, and especially in
software multi-agent systems, it can also reduce the communication burden on the agent
which needs its computational resources to gather information and determine preferences
before communicating them. It is also argued that reduced communication requirements
“preserve (some of) the agents’ privacy” [17], although this advantage can also be seen as a
disadvantage since agents can exploit the communication protocol to effect strategic voting
in favor of individual interests.
4.7.4 Communicating Votes and Strategic Voting
The choice of the communication protocol may further influence the strategic behavior of
the voters. For example, a multistage protocol, such as plurality with runoff, reveals through
the queries asked in the second round, the top two candidates of the previous round before
the outcome is actually declared. This indicates the close relation between the amount of
communication that takes place in the elicitation process and the opportunities created for
strategic voting, which again reminds us of the close connection between vote elicitation
and the manipulation problem.
4.7.5 Results
In this section, we present the results of work related to communication complexity of
voting rules [60, 17]. The first work, however, applies mostly to intersection-monotonic
rules. Intersection monotonicity is a strong form of monotonicity34. For rules with this
property, such as Approval and Condorcet, both work contribute similar results and can be
referred to for alternative proofs.
Given m as the number of candidates and n as the number of voters, the following is
a list of results pertaining to the communication complexity of common voting rules. All
these results—except for Theorem 4.7.9 which is proven independently here—are due to
authors as indicated in the citation of each result. The proofs presented here, however
based on proofs in cited work, are rewritten here and expanded with more detail.
Theorem 4.7.1. The deterministic communication complexity of any ranked-based voting
rule is O(nm log m) [17].
Proof. First, reporting the rank of a given candidate c requires O(log m) bits per voter.
This is because each voter knows its ranking of alternatives and there are m alternatives,
the position of any can be represented by O(log m) bits.
Second, let every voter communicates his entire ranking which requires, for each voter,
O(m log m) bits, then the total rankings of n voters require O(nm log m) communicated
bits.
Theorem 4.7.2. The deterministic communication complexity of Plurality is
O(n log m) [17].
34Monotonicity and other properites of voting rules are defined in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
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Proof. As above, indicating the rank of a given candidate requires O(log m) bits. Since the
plurality rule only considers first choice candidates, every voter communicate her first choice
candidate only, and since there are n voters, the deterministic communication complexity
of the plurality rule is O(n log m).
Theorem 4.7.3. The nondeterministic communication complexity of Plurality is Ω(n log m)
(even to decide whether a given candidate has won 35) [17].
Theorem 4.7.4. The deterministic communication complexity of Plurality with Runoff is
O(n log m) [17].
Proof. An argument similar to the one in the proof of deterministic communication com-
plexity of Plurality can be used to show that the communication complexity of the first
stage of plurality with runoff is O(n log m).
In the second stage, each voter communicates the preferred candidate among the top two
which requires a single bit for every voter and since there are n voters the total communi-
cation requirement is O(n) bits.
The overall deterministic communication complexity of Plurality with Runoff is therefore
O(n log m).
Theorem 4.7.5. The nondeterministic communication complexity of Plurality with Runoff
is Ω(n log m) (even to decide whether a given candidate has won) [17].
Theorem 4.7.6. The deterministic communication complexity of STV is
O(n(log m)2) [17].
Theorem 4.7.7. The nondeterministic communication complexity of STV 36 is
Ω(n log m) [17].
Theorem 4.7.8. The nondeterministic communication complexity of each of Borda rule
and the Copeland rule is Ω(nm log m) (even to decide whether a given candidate has won).
Theorem 4.7.9. The deterministic communication complexity of the Borda rule is
O(nm log m).
Proof. In the Borda count, each voter ranks all alternatives, and alternatives are given
points based on their position in the vote. Finally alternatives are ranked based on their
total number of points.
Since ranking an alternative requires O(log m) bits and there are m candidates, each voter
requires O(m log m) bits to communicate the vote, and since there are n voters, the total
number of bits communicated is O(nm log m).
Theorem 4.7.10. The nondeterministic communication complexity of Maximin is Θ(mn).
Proof. Directly from the definition of the tight bound Θ and related upper and lower bounds
obtained in [17].
35Although this lower bound is the same as the upper bound in the deterministic case, the proof is much
more involved and the reader is referred to the brief version of the proof in [17].
36The proof was omitted in the cited paper.
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Theorem 4.7.11. The deterministic communication complexity of each of the Condorcet
rule, Approval voting, Cup, and Bucklin rule is O(nm) [17].
Theorem 4.7.12. The nondeterministic communication complexity of the Condorcet rule
is Ω(nm) [60, 17].
Theorem 4.7.13. The nondeterministic communication complexity of each of the Approval
voting, Cup, and Bucklin rule is Ω(nm) [17].
The following table summarizes the results obtained. All upper bound are deterministic
except for Maximin, the entry for Maximin under the upper bound is nondeterministic, the
best deterministic upper bound found for Maximim communication complexity in [17] is
O(nm log m).
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4.8 New Criteria for Evaluating Voting Rules
Chapter 1 stated a list of properties of voting rules. Those properties, such as Anonymity,
IIA, and Pareto Optimality, were proposed by social choice theorists based on the axiomatic
(and sometimes practical) analysis of voting rules. In this chapter, we have discussed six
main problems studied in the literature of complexity voting theory. Based on these dis-
cussions and related results, we present a new set of (computational) criteria for evaluating
voting rules:
• Efficient winner determination process (i.e., polynomial time winner problem).
• Resistance against control by the authority conducting the election (i.e., NP-hardness
of control).
• Resistance against manipulation by voters (i.e., NP-hardness of manipulation).
• Resistance against bribery (i.e., NP-hardness of bribery).
• Efficient/Intractable vote elicitation process (depending on the purpose of vote elic-
itation, i.e., whether it is for efficiently finding winners or for realizing results by
manipulation).
• Efficient vote communication process (i.e., polynomial time vote communication).
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Chapter 5
Applications of Voting in
Computing
The vote is the most powerful instrument ever devised by man...
Lyndon B. Johnson
5.0 Prologue
As a general, simple and appealing method for aggregating preferences, voting has been
devised for a wide range of applications spanning economics, operations research, linguis-
tics, mathematics, computer science and other interdisciplinary fields such as information
science and sociology. This is in addition, of course, to its essential importance in political
science and social choice theory.
Within computer science and related disciplines, voting applications traverse areas such
as: Artificial Intelligence (AI), Databases (DB), Networking, Natural Language Process-
ing (NLP), Information Retrieval (IR) and e-Commerce. In addition, both the theoretical
study of voting and its applications have also influenced areas such as Complexity Theory,
Software Engineering (SE), and Cryptography and Security.
Although these are the main areas where voting applications in computing are found,
these applications are not confined to this small list of areas. It seems that wherever there
are preferences, there will probably be a voting scheme suggested to aggregate those pref-
erences. And situations that can be interpreted as a group decision-making problem based
on individual preferences are not uncommon in automated processing. Therefore, scattered
employment of voting appears in software systems and applications serving various domains.
In this chapter, we briefly list some of voting applications in computing. The sections
of the chapter provide a classification of the applications based on the computing field in
which they were devised. This classification is further refined in subsections; forming a
hierarchy of voting applications in computing. The order of a subject in the list reflects, to
a limited extent, the prevalence of applying voting in that subject in comparison to others.
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It is worth observing that this chapter is not intended to introduce the computing disciplines
mentioned here, for that has different avenues and is clearly not the focus of this chapter.
5.1 Applications of Voting in Artificial Intelligence
5.1.1 Voting in Multi-agent Planning
In distributed AI, a group of autonomous agents needs to coordinate individual actions in
order to accomplish a goal (as a group). At each step of processing, agents must agree on
the next step to take. This is ideally a consensus or an agreement based on some preference
aggregation mechanism. Negotiation has been previously used in such situations. Recently,
voting has been proposed as preference aggregation mechanics for multi-agent planning [6,
7]. At each step, instead of negotiation over the next joint action, each agent votes for the
next preferred action in the group plan and individual preferences are aggregated using a
voting procedure. This approach enjoys an effective coordination of tasks via voting whilst
keeping the process simple and natural in spirit (an appealing characteristic of a solution
in AI).
5.1.2 Voting in Collaborative Filtering
In the context of Collaborative Filtering (CF), users have preferences over a domain of items
and a system is to recommend a subset of items to a user based on the preferences of all
users in the group. Hence, the collaboration (of users) and filtering (of items) in the method
name. In CF, a prediction of a user’s preferences is viewed as a function of the preferences
of all users, and a recommendation is made based on this prediction. This means that some
aggregation of preferences must take place to form these predictions. Voting as a natural
method for aggregating preferences has been effected in collaborative filtering algorithms.
Each user votes over its preferred item(s) and items are then assigned (average) scores based
on the number of votes received, preferences over items are finally predicted based on items’
scores. Weighted voting is suggested as an enhancement to the filtering process.
This approach to CF has many applications especially in e-commerce and information
retrieval.
Besides applying voting to collaborative filtering, a theoretical axiomatization of this
alternative technique of CF was presented in a framework similar to that of traditional
social choice theory [22]. Through the application of voting and by drawing from the long-
studied aspects of voting procedures in social choice theory, the proposal bridges the two
disciplines at a more profound level and initiates the foundational analysis of CF which was
previously discussed from an empirical perspective only.
5.2 Voting and Ranking Systems
In typical ranking system setting, the set of alternatives and the set of agents coincide.
Each agent ranks other agents and then all agents’ rankings are aggregated in order to
obtain a “social” ranking. Ranking Systems have many applications in Internet technology,
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e-commerce and the intersection of these two. The axiomatic foundation of ranking systems
is closely related to and based on that of voting theory, this line of research has been initi-
ated to reduce the gap between ranking algorithms and the mathematical theory of social
choice [2, 3]. In addition to the theoretical link, applications of voting in ranking systems
are numerous. We have already discussed a side of that in the context of collaborative
filtering. Another important application of voting is in ranking methods for the Web [5].
Ranking Methods for the Web
applications of voting in computing!ranking systems!ranking methods for the Web Inspired
by the extended Condorcet criterion (ECC) and Kemeny’s voting rule in combination with
other techniques, a rank aggregation for the web was suggested to address different problems
facing web-based ranking systems [5]. The ECC is both efficient and particularly effective
in combating spam. The idea of Kemeny’s rule is used in meta-search engines that produce
results based on the rankings of several search engines by minimizing the disagreement of
several input rankings, in a similar way to which Kemeny’s rule minimizes the distance to
a consensus ordering of the alternatives. The computational difficulty of the Kemeny’s rule
was managed using a “local” Kemenization process that is a relaxation of the optimal rule
yet satisfying the extended Condorcet criterion and is computationally tractable.
5.3 Applications of Voting in Information Retrieval
5.3.1 Information Extraction
Information Extraction (IE) is a form of Information Retrieval where shallow text processing
is performed to automatically extract structured information from unstructured documents.
A structure may refer to a category (a class), a well defined contextual information or se-
mantics associated with the extracted piece of information.
Voting is used in classifying a set of attributes or features. This is done by combining
the output of multiple classifiers through voting. Each classifier is queried for the class value
and the class with highest frequency is selected. In other words, the majority voting rule
is used to select a class value where classifiers are voters and classes are candidates. Other
voting rules have also been suggested for this purpose, for example weighted plurality, where
a classifier’s vote is weighted by its accuracy, and voting over class probability distributions.
Voting was compared with other methods of classification and turned to be computa-
tionally cheaper and was argued to be the “the simplest form of loosely integrating the
output of multiple components” [25].
5.4 Applications of Voting in Databases and
Networking
5.4.1 Data Consistency Maintenance
When data files are replicated to ensure availability, for example in case of a network
communication failure or site connectivity problem, algorithms managing the several replica
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are needed to ensure consistency of replicated data. When a link breaks within a network,
the network splits into disjoint smaller networks. Each of these networks is a connected
partition. The sites within the same partition can communicate with each other but no site
can communicate with sites from a different partition.
The files of a database may be replicated at different sites, when a network is partitioned,
attempts to update replicated files by various disconnected sites may cause an inconsistency
problem. One way of enforcing consistency is by allowing only one partition to update files
at any given time. This distinguished partition, if any, is the partition that contains more
than half of the sites, and is therefore called the majority partition [28, 29, 10]. Using
voting this way, “sites” are voters and partitions are “candidates.” The majority rule is
a simple and effective rule for avoiding conflicting updates since only a unique partition
can contain more than half of the sites at a time and hence only this partition can update
the files. The voting approach to maintaining replicated data consistency was proposed
by many researchers using various enhancements such as weighted voting and “dynamic”
voting which permits updates in a partition provided it contains more than half of the
up-to-date copies of the replicated file which arguably improves availability [16, 17, 27].
5.4.2 Similarity Search and Classification
A database of “high dimensional” data is viewed as a set of database elements where each
element is a vector (of a specific dimension) in a Euclidean space. A query to this database
tries to find elements identical to the specification of the query or similar elements.
A novel approach to efficient similarity search suggests voting to rank the elements based
on their similarity to the query. The rankings are then combined using an aggregation
algorithm [9].
In this approach, each coordinate of the n-dimensional Euclidean space is considered as
a “voter” and the m database points (entries) are “candidates” in an election for candidates
that are nearest to the query specification. Voter j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, ranks the m candidates
based on how close they are to the query in the j-th coordinate. This yields n rankings of
the candidates, and the goal is to aggregate those rankings in a second step to produce a
single ordering on the candidates.
This approach further imports concepts from voting theory to solve the problem of
similarity search in high dimensional databases. Since, as was mentioned in the ranking
systems application above, the Condorcet criterion is found to produce robust results that
are “spam-proof.” An algorithm that is based on Kemeny’s rule (as a Condorcet consistent
rule) is used to aggregate the individual rankings since it “minimizes” distance to a goal
ranking and the problem here is to minimize differences between an element returned as
a query answer and the specification of the query, equivalently achieving high similarity
between queries and results.
The NP-complete complexity of the aggregation process is overcome using heuristics
tailored to this specific problem and by observing that only the ranking of top candidates
in the final outcome is needed and not the full ranking of all candidates.
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5.4.3 Applications of Voting in Networking
A voting-based clustering algorithm for extending the lifetime of sensor networks was pro-
posed as an energy-efficient, balanced and yet simple solution for the energy problem in
sensor networks [23]. In this approach, sensors vote for their neighbors to elect suitable
cluster heads.
Voting has also been devised for achieving mutual exclusion and synchronizing reading
and writing of data replicated across different segments of a network [12, 1].
Moreover, aspects pertinent to traditional elections such as manipulation have also been
studied for applications of elections in networking, for example see [26].
5.5 Applications of Voting in Natural Language Processing
Morphological Disambiguation of Text
Morphological disambiguation refers to assigning part-of-speech tags to words in the input
text. Although the tag is usually the part-of-speech of the word, it could be any other
morphological or grammatical feature depending on the application.
A constraint-based morphological disambiguation system was implemented in which
individual constraints vote on matching morphological tags (parses), and disambiguation of
all the tokens (words) in a sentence is performed at the end by selecting parses that receive
the highest votes. The accuracy of this approach for disambiguating Turkish text reached
95% [21].
5.6 Contributions to Complexity Theory
Complexity-theoretic aspects of voting schemes and related problems have been extensively
studied. One of the most recognized results of studying the computational complexity of
voting is finding “natural” computationally difficult problems. Many problems in the voting
literature were found to be NP-complete. These problems are more widely understood than
some of the well-known basic NP-complete problems. Moreover, there are complexity classes
for which no “natural” complete problem had been found, such as the class of problems
solvable in polynomial time by parallel access to NP, PNP‖ . The first natural problems to be
found complete for parallel access to NP were the winner and ranking problems for Lewis
Carroll’s 1876 voting scheme and Young election system due to Hemaspaandra et al. [14]
and Rothe et al. [24] respectively. The third natural problem in the complexity class PNP‖
was the winner problem for Kemeny’s voting system. The result appeared in 2005 and is
due to Hemaspaandra et al. [15].
5.7 Other Applications
5.7.1 Logic Programming and Voting for Scheduling
In this application, voting is suggested as a remedy to the problem of scheduling a meeting
for individuals with conflicting unavailability and hence conflicting preferences over meet-
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ing dates [18]. Logic programming is used to express individual and subgroup attendee
availability for given dates. Logic (answer set) programming rules are defined to generate
possible meetings based on the input and finally a voting rule is encoded using a third set
of rules and is integrated into the meeting-scheduler system. The voting procedure used is
inspired by voting procedures defined on partial preferences [19] that are discussed in the
chapter on preferences of this thesis. This is driven by the nature of the problem where a
meeting date needs to be finalized based on possibly partial preferences over different days
for meeting or because of the conflicting nature of full preferences when put together. This
work draws clearly from previous work on computational aspects of voting yet it is the first
to marry the concepts of answer set programming and that of voting.
5.7.2 Voting in Entertainment Recommender System
A movie recommender system that caters to users’ interests and resolves conflicting prefer-
ences using voting has been developed and discussed in [11]. In this application of voting
in recommender systems, Black’s voting rule1 was applied on movies as the set of candi-
dates and a set of dimensions (criteria) associated with weights and values. As described
in [11], the vote for a given movie on each dimension is a product of the weight on that
dimension multiplied by the relative rankings of the elements within the dimension. The
top few vote receivers are returned as recommended by the system. The estimated value
or rating of a movie to be recommended is calculated as the ratio of the number of votes
it gets to the maximum number of votes a movie can get for the given user preferences.
Further, the system was argued to be effective and robust to inaccuracies and imprecision
(in stated preference) reflecting the robustness of Black’s rule to small variations in the user
preferences compared to proportional ranking mechanism.
5.8 Electronic Voting
Perhaps the most explicit form of combining voting and computing is realized in electronic
voting. Whether we consider this to be an application of voting in computing or to be a use
of computing in voting, the topic lies nicely in the intersection of the two fields of voting
theory and computer science. We mention electronic voting in passing here, only as an item
that should not be missed in a list of applications combining voting and computing, but we
dedicate the following chapter to address this engaging topic in more detail.
5.9 Comments and Bibliographic Notes
This chapter focused on the applications of voting in computing. In other words, the focus
here was on concepts imported from voting theory to the realm of computing and on ex-
ploiting these ideas to solve problems originating in computer science such as management
of autonomous multi-agent systems and ranking methods for search engines. This chapter
attempted to exhibit the variety of problems where voting is applicable, it did so by provid-
ing a list of some applications in different computing subjects. This list is not exhaustive,
1See Chapter 1 of this thesis for definitions of voting rules.
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but it gives a general overview. There are, for example, many other applications of voting
in problem solving (e.g., [30]), machine learning (e.g., [4, 13, 8, 20]), multimodal interaction
(e.g., [31]), and possibly many other topics.
However, the link to the other direction exists and is marked by rich research endeav-
ors. In this direction, computer science concepts and techniques are used to further study
voting and to provide fine analyses and practical representations of voting procedures. This
scheme as a whole provides new tools, criteria and perspective for describing, evaluating
and analyzing voting systems respectively. We can think of most of the work discussed in
previous chapters as efforts in this direction. The relative proportions of discussions on
these directions is explained by the fact that the thesis is dedicated to the computational
aspects of voting (and not to voting applications in computing).
The confluence of these two disciplines has enriched interdisciplinary research involving
a colorful clique of fields such as decision theory, game theory, mathematical modeling,
computational logic, combinatorial auctions and welfare economics.
In the next chapter, we discuss in some detail a topic that lies nicely in the intersection
of voting theory and computing, and links both fields in both aforementioned directions:
Electronic Voting.
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Chapter 6
Electronic Voting
The people who cast the votes don’t decide an election, the people who count
the votes do.
Joseph Stalin
In Fairfax, Virginia (2003), testing ordered by a judge revealed that several
voting machines subtracted one in every hundred votes for the candidate who
lost her seat on the School Board.
Cited by VerifiedVoter.org1
6.0 Prologue
In previous chapters (up to Chapter 5), we have discussed voting mostly from a theoreti-
cal perspective. In this chapter, we discuss a large scale application of voting: electronic
voting. This discussion will place concepts in a clear practical perspective. For example,
we have defined an election to consist of a set C of candidates and a set V of voters. Here,
an election includes many other factors and entities. In fact, in the context of electronic
voting, most of the work in an election is done before votes are cast, unlike the previous
discussions where the analysis focused on phenomena that take place when reporting and
aggregating the votes.
This chapter is not intended to survey topics in electronic voting. This is a very broad
multifaceted topic that has been extensively studied. The cryptographic aspects alone cor-
respond to a stupendous number of studies (see for example the bibliography in [22]). These
aspects are presented in only informal elucidation.
This chapter, however, is dedicated to a limited discussion of electronic voting since this
is a very important topic in the computing-voting literature, and its relevance to the topic
of this survey is unquestionable. Indeed, the term “voting system” in computing circles
stands most frequently for electronic voting, it is relatively recent that the term is also used
to stand for voting rules analyzed theoretically.
1http://www.verifiedvoting.org/downloads/resources/hr2239_volunteers/
Introduction-5-pages.htm
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In the remaining sections we define What is Electronic Voting in more detail, discuss
Voting technology, catch a glimpse of the History of Electronic Voting, state proposed Crite-
ria for e-Voting Systems, point out main Electronic Voting Debates, present some Electronic
Voting Proposals, and conclude with Comments and Bibliographic Notes.
6.1 What is Electronic Voting?
lectronic voting (e-voting) refers to the use of computers or computerized equipment to cast
votes in an election. The term electronic voting is sometimes used to refer to Internet voting
(where voters communicate their votes through Internet connection). Electronic systems
can be used to register voters, tally ballots (count the votes), and record votes [15].
There are different possible implementations of electronic voting. The literature distin-
guishes the following three:
• Voting at supervised poll-sites using electronic equipment.
• Voting at electronic kiosks available in voter-convenient places (such as public libraries
or shopping centers). The kiosks may be supervised by officials, volunteers or even
surveillance cameras.
• Remote voting (from home, work, etc.) using the voter’s equipment and the Internet.
Many concerns are associated with electronic voting. For example, the Caltech/MIT Voting
Technology Project found that out of the five types of voting machines, hand-counted pa-
pers, mechanical lever machines, punch card ballots, optically scanned paper, and electronic
voting machines, electronic voting machines, despite the accuracy and reliability appeals
for which they were introduced, have the second highest rate of unmarked, uncounted, and
damaged ballots in governor, senate, and presidential elections in the past decade [14, 43].
Another example, when the implications of changing only a single vote per machine were in-
vestigated [20], it turned out that this seemingly insignificant change can swing the election
result. Such a major diversion from accurate results is not likely with occasional errors even
when manually counting ballots. Researchers conclude that electronic voting machines can
possibly make large scale fraud a simple task of changing the source code of one software
system.
However, there are numerous arguments for supporting electronic voting given a clear
set of criteria and guidelines. One of the important factors to consider when supporting (or
opposing) an electronic voting argument is the voting technology used. This is the topic of
the next section.
6.2 Voting Technology
Voting technologies vary greatly and include technologies such as punch cards, optical scan-
ners (that use optical scanners to scan ballots), machine readable ballot systems, direct-
recording e-voting machines that input votes via some input device (such as a keyboard or
touch screen) and immediately add the vote to a running count. Other means for trans-
mitting the vote such as telephone lines, private networks, or Internet are also considered
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electronic voting technologies. For a comparative study on the usability of these technolo-
gies, see [8].
Today, advanced encryption technologies, signature schemes, identification and authen-
tication schemes, and secret sharing schemes are among the leading topics addressed to
improve the security and reliability of electronic voting.
In addition to security and reliability objectives, the use of electronic technologies for
voting aims at obtaining accurate results, reducing costs, speeding up voting and tallying
processes, and facilitating the voting process and increasing voter participation.
6.3 History of Electronic Voting
Although the application of e-voting is relatively recent, early proposals were made to realize
this form of voting. Some of these proposals date back to the 19th century. For example, on
June 1st, 1869, Thomas Edison received U.S. Patent 90,646 for an “Electric Vote-Recorder”
that was designed for use in Congress [25]. Interestingly, this was Edison’s first patented
invention. However, it remained a proposal and was not deployed.
In 1955, Froom described a situation where individuals in a groups would communicate
using some “technical devices” that would also assist in aggregating the opinions of the
group members. In 1970, Henderson suggested “new ways of improving communication
channels to inform the voter, and machinery to channel his or her participation.” Perhaps
the first computer that supported voting system was the Delphi panel that Turoff imple-
mented in 1970. This developed into what is now known as “computer conferencing.”
The idea of electronic voting surfaced again in 1971. Fuller used the term “electrified
voting” in a theoretical context to describe a system that would realize democracy. The
seventies witnessed rich discussions and interest in electronic voting. In 1971 also, Ohlin
described a system where homes would be connected to huge databases via terminals, and
where citizens could participate in social decision making [35].
At the turn of the century, the number of proposals and active projects exploded dra-
matically and different computerized voting equipment was in use. During that period,
several concerns regarding the reliability and security of such equipment were raised.
In February 1975, the General Accounting Office of Federal Elections (later known as
Federal Election Commission) signed an agreement with the National Bureau of Standards
to develop guidelines for ensuring the accuracy and security of the computer-based voting.
These guidelines and reported comments from practical use of voting systems led the collab-
oration of the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and the National Bureau of Standards
(now known as the National Institute of Standards and Technology) to conduct a feasibility
study on developing technical and operational performance standards for electronic voting
systems used in the United States. In 1984, “A Report on the Feasibility of Developing Vol-
untary Standards for Voting Equipment” was produced [19]. The new guidelines adopted
by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) in 2005, will take effect in December
2007 replacing the 2002 Voting System Standards. For more on the history of developing
e-voting standards see, for example, [6]. The use of electronic tools for voting continued
and spread across the United States and other countries.
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In the early nineties, the use of electronic voting started in Belgium, it has been used
widely since then for municipal and general elections. Many countries followed such as
Canada, Brazil, Austria, and India where 380 million voters cast their votes on more than
a million machine in the world’s largest e-voting experience to date [37].
In the Unites States, in 1996, the Reform Party used Internet voting to select a Presi-
dential candidate. This was the first use of Internet voting in national elections. Few years
later, in 2000, Internet voting was used in Alaska (Republican Party Presidential poll), and
at a large scale in Arizona (Democratic primary).
After the electronic voting crisis in Florida in 2002, the Caltech/MIT Voting Technol-
ogy Project [14] emerged in order to develop new voting technologies that preclude e-voting
problems like the one which occurred in Florida in 2002. This technology-focused work
complements the National Commission on Federal Election Reform (Carter/Ford commis-
sion) which focuses on political issues.
In recent years, non-governmental organizations started to conduct elections using elec-
tronic voting. Also, educational organizations such as universities began to conduct student
government elections using computers connected to the university network or to the Inter-
ent (see for a recent example [31]).
Perhaps the most challenging and critical use of e-voting remains to be, however, its use
in Presidential elections. Although many countries have introduced electronic voting, such
as Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States, it
remains a controversial issue for many reasons. We will briefly mention some of these issues
in the following sections.
6.4 Criteria for e-Voting Systems
The following set of criteria captures the main concerns that must be addressed in the
design of an electronic voting system. Most of these, unless cited otherwise, were presented
in [21] and frequently restated in the literature:
• Completeness: all valid votes are counted, and counted correctly.
• Soundness: the dishonest voter cannot disrupt the election.
• Robustness: the voting scheme must work properly and produce correct outcomes
even if a partial failure of the scheme occurs.
• Privacy: secrecy of each and every vote is maintained. Votes should be anonymous.
Voters’ privacy must be protected2 (against coercion for example [3, 27]).
• Usability: in addition to security and accuracy, the voting system must have an
interface that facilitates its proper use by the voters. The usability aspect must be
2This also implies anonymity of the voting system. Anonymity of a voting scheme is defined in Chapter 1.
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taken into consideration when designing a voting system (it must be integrated in the
system’s architecture), and when installing the system (by training election officials
and voters and raising public awareness) [16].
• Unreusability: no voter can vote twice.
• Eligibility: only eligible voters can vote. Moreover, each voter votes once only.
• Fairness: nothing must influence the voting process (other than the preferences of
voters based on clear presentation of candidates, e.g., leak of intermediate results
while voters are casting votes must be prohibited).
• Verifiability: no one can falsify the result of the election.
• Universal Verifiability: a third independent party can check whether votes are counted
correctly or not.
• Receipt-freeness: A voter does not get a receipt that can be used to prove how he
voted. This safe-guards against vote selling or voting under coercion [26, 17].
There are also sociological criteria such as deliberative and representative democracy,
distribution of roles, voter participation, legal concerns, etc. One very important criterion
is consideration of special-needs members of the society, and the availability of voting tech-
nology that assists these individuals in voting while protecting their rights of privacy and
fairness.
In addition to the technical and sociological criteria, there are concerns related to the
interaction of these factors, for example, studies have investigated the effects of voting
technologies on voting behavior [36].
6.5 Electronic Voting Debates
“Three issues: privacy, security, and accuracy are at the heart of the e-Voting debate.”
Phillip J. Windley [43], page 134.
6.5.1 Open Source vs. Closed Source Voting Systems
The arguments favoring open source e-voting systems are numerous and known especially
since the issue of source-available software has been discussed for a long time. In the context
of electronic voting, open source systems are argued to enjoy improved security and quality
since they are open to public scrutiny. In addition to this, open source e-voting systems are
free from dependency on suppliers, and from restrictions on features, since an open source
voting system can be independently modified by the authority to serve specific purposes
when needed. These arguments were presented in more detail in [28]. Examples of worldwide
use of open source and closed source e-voting systems—with conclusions encouraging open
source—are given in [37].
The arguments against open source e-voting systems basically emphasize the practical
limitations of the arguments in favor of open source systems. For example, it is argued that
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the transparency of open source e-voting systems is really limited since it depends highly
on voluntary participation and only a minority of open source e-voting projects attracts
contributions from specialists in the field. Moreover, it is argued that even with careful
inspection of open source systems, there is no guarantee that the studied system is the one
actually used on Election Day. Proving this to voters is a challenging problem especially
with the likelihood of last minute fixes and therefore of malicious software intrusion [28].
Perhaps the strongest argument that weakens the interest in open source e-voting is the
fact that it does not address the underlying fundamental challenges facing e-voting. For
example, open source e-voting does not change the problem of preventing insider attacks,
and one can argue that it may facilitate outsider attacks. Also, it does not solve the issue
of correctly identifying voters while protecting voter privacy and vote secrecy. It does
not address the contextual challenges associated with electronic voting such as usability,
systematic workflow, and distribution of administrative tasks.
6.5.2 Vote Verifiability vs. Receipt Freeness
The concept of Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) or Verified Paper Record (VPR),
proposed by Mercuri in her PhD dissertation [32], refers to the use of paper receipts to verify
that a vote was recorded as intended by the voter. Proponents of the “Mercuri method,”
named after its creator, argue that it is intended as an independent verification system to
assure voters that their votes were cast and recorded correctly.
Opponents of this method, however, raise the concerns of vote buying, coercion, and
compromised voter privacy in case a paper receipt is given to the voter. The voter could
use this receipt to prove to a third party that he voted as requested. In this case, this form
of vote verification is argued to be conducive to vote buying or even to coercion. Hence,
receipt-freeness is usually flagged as one of the requirements that a successful voting system
should meet [26, 17]. There are concerns related to this form of paper vote-receipt, such as
cost and usability but the security, integrity, and privacy concerns remain the most signifi-
cant.
This debate, however, is likely to disappear since there are new proposals for voting
schemes where the voter can verify for himself that his vote was cast and recorded correctly
without compromising vote secrecy. Some of these proposals will be mentioned in the
proposals section.
6.5.3 Voter Convenience vs. Security
There are two topics under this line of debate: one is the issue of remote voting using the
voter’s machine and Internet voting, and the other is the ease of using a voting system
from a voter’s point of view. The latter corresponds to issues such as the friendliness of the
interface, the special need adjustments, and other user convenience and usability matters.
In the first topic, issues such as coercion and security of platform are raised. Voting re-
motely, we cannot make sure that the voter has voted according to his preferences or under
coercion by some interested party. Moreover, voters’ machines are vulnerable to security
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attacks through open ports, and therefrom, viruses, worms, Trojan horses, automatically
downloadable active content, and many other forms of malicious software. The voter’s
privacy may also be compromised since a hacker can get access to information stored on
the machine, or can even monitor active sessions, among which is the voting session. The
other issue with indexplatform security platform security is security concerns related to the
Internet itself. Reliability of connection, flooding, denial of service attacks, are all concerns
related to the use of Internet that remain an issue even if we solve the problem of the voter
machine security. See [41] for a discussion on security considerations for remote electronic
voting.
The argument for remote Internet voting regards voter convenience and reduced cost
of running elections since (a) the voter platform is used, (b) no cost is involved for estab-
lishing a poll site or (c) training election officials/volunteers for administrating the voting
process at the poll sites. Nevertheless, there seems to be stronger argument against the
use of remote Internet voting. Specialists argue that even with current advancements of
e-voting technology, we cannot securely rely on Internet voting. Unless a revolution in such
technologies take place, Internet voting will not be used as a reliable method of voting in
the foreseeable future.
The other topic, regarding ease of use and improved interface, also spurred a divergence
of opinion. The argument for ease of use is clearly strong and simple. To increase voter par-
ticipation and turnout, the voting system must be easily usable with an easy-to-understand
interface. Moreover, there should be special interfaces designed for voters with special needs
such as the disabled (for example the visually impaired).
On the other hand, such friendly interfaces will most likely hide complex implementa-
tion. Certifying complicated multi-thousand lines of code is not a trivial task. This places
a heavy burden on election officials to certify the system. Ironically, this complexity intro-
duced to improve voter convenience may ultimately discourage voters and undermine their
trust in the system.
6.5.4 Diverse vs. Unified Voting Systems
Many appealing arguments can be thought of for using the same system or technology
across a region when conducting an election on the regional level. For example, consistency,
facilitating training of officials and voters (for it is much easier to train users to use one
system than to train different users to use a number of different systems), ease of interfacing
and transmission of data.
However, Rivest presented two other arguments supporting the use of different systems
by different counties in a state. “Just as a woodland’s diverse variety of plants can provide
better resistance to pathogens than the farmer single crop, so too can a variety of voting
technologies provide resistance to an adversary attack,” he commented in [40], page 4.
The other arguments he presented regard gaining experience with new voting systems.
Since it takes time to test, use and learn lessons from implementing new systems, it might
be wise to let individual counties experiment with new technologies as they emerge. By
the time old technologies need to be replaced, there will be reasonable feedback to direct
decisions of using new technologies.
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6.6 Electronic Voting Proposals
One of the earliest proposals on which many recent proposals were based is Fujioka,
Okamoto, and Ohta’s proposal of “A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elec-
tions” [21]. They described a system of voters, an administrator, and a counter where
the voters communicate their votes to the counter through an anonymous channel. They
showed that the system ensures the privacy of the voter even if the administrator and
counter conspire. They further proved that their system is fair and is resistant to fraud by
either the voters or the administrator. The work was based on earlier proposals of signature
schemes [10, 30] and anonymous communication channels [9, 11].
Many other proposals followed [1, 5, 23, 2]. Some of the new proposals were described
by specialists in the field as revolutionary or at least paradigm shifting [39]. These are the
proposals of Chaum, Ryan, and Schneider [12, 42] and Neff [34]. The proposal of Chaum
et al. presented a voting scheme where the voter can verify her vote by getting a receipt
without violating vote privacy requirements.
Other proposals focused specially on Internet voting [13]. In [24], Hoffman discusses
the result of using Internet voting on democracy. A more optimistic discussion on Internet
voting based on Arizona’s 2000 Democratic party’s primary is given in [33].
Research has also emphasized the importance of integrating the administrative aspects
of voting into electronic voting systems [29, 44].
There are three new foci in designing electronic voting systems. One is to use cryptog-
raphy in the architecture of the system and not only in a limited way for ensuring security
of parts of the system, such as communication channels.
The other is to shift the emphasis from certifying voting equipment to certifying voting
results, since the ultimate goal after all is to have accurate election results not to merely
develop advanced technology.
The third focus is on encrypting the voter’s choices and to use that encryption as the
ballot cast by the voter. This encrypted ballot is posted on a “public bulletin” with the
voter’s name. This way, only voters can verify their votes and confirm that their votes were
considered.
6.7 Comments and Bibliographic Notes
• A short survey of the state of the art in electronic voting is presented in [7]. For
an extensive survey on e-voting technology, refer to [18]. Requirements, design, and
implementation details of a special type of electronic voting, remote online voting
using various communication devises, are spelled out in [38].
• In his technical report on “Electronic Voting,” Rivest comments on the dissimilarity
between e-commerce and e-voting [40]. This is reminiscent of Black’s much older
discussion on the dissimilarity between the domains to which the same theory—of
committees and decision making—applies [4]. It seems that despite the apparent
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similarities between the two domains of voting and commerce, and more generally
political science and economics, the two domains are intrinsically different. Here, we
recall the quote with which we started the first chapter of this thesis.
In seeking private interests, we fail to secure greater collective interests. The
narrow rationality of self-interest that can benefit us all in market exchange
can also prevent us from succeeding in collective endeavors.
Russell Hardin (Collective Actions)
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